The Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle
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The Nicomachean Ethics
ARISTOTLE
The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
Jazzybee Verlag Jürgen Beck
86450 Altenmünster, Loschberg 9
Deutschland
Translator: F. H. Peters
ISBN: 9783849648381
www.jazzybee-verlag.de
CONTENTS
Preface To The Fifth Edition. 1
Chapter 6.—: The Several Moral Virtues And Vices. 44
Book IV.: The Several Moral Virtues And Vices—Continued. 55
Book V.: The Several Moral Virtues And Vices—Concluded. Justice. 74
Book VI.: The Intellectual Virtues. 96
Chapters 1–10.: Characters Other Than Virtue And Vice. 111
Chapters 11—14.: Of Pleasure. 127
Book VIII.: Friendship Or Love. 133
Book IX.: Friendship Or Love—Continued. 152
Chapters 6–9.: Conclusion. 179
PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.
Many more or less important alterations have been made in this translation, which was first published in 1881, as new editions have from time to time been called for. The present edition in particular has been revised throughout, and brought into accordance with Bywater’s text (Oxford, 1890), Endnote 002 which is coming to be recognized, not in Oxford only, as the received text of the Nicomachean Ethics. I wish gratefully to acknowledge the debt which, in common with all lovers of Aristotle, I owe to Mr. Bywater, both for his edition and for his “Contributions to the Textual Criticism of the Nicomachean Ethics” (Oxford, 1892).
To Mr. Stewart also I wish to express my gratitude, not only for much assistance derived from his admirable “Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics” (Oxford, 1892), but also for much kindly and helpful criticism in that work and in a review of my first edition (Mind, July, 1881). My old friends Mr. A. C. Bradley and Mr. J. Cook Wilson (Professors now at Glasgow and Oxford respectively) will allow me to repeat my thanks for the valuable help they gave me when the first edition was passing through the press. To Mr. F. H. Hall of Oriel, and Mr. L. A. Selby Bigge of my own College, I am indebted for some corrections in a subsequent edition. To other translators and commentators I am also under many obligations, which I can only acknowledge in general terms.
When I have inserted in the text explanatory words of my own, I have enclosed them in square brackets thus [ ]. A short Index of leading terms and proper names has been added to this edition (in preparing which I have found Mr. Bywater’s Index of the greatest service). This Index makes no pretension to completeness or anything approaching to completeness (except in regard to proper names). Its aim is merely, in conjunction with the Table of Contents, to help the reader to find the more important passages bearing on the questions in which he may be specially interested.
F. H. PETERS.
Oxford, May, 1893.
BOOK I.: THE END.
1.: In all he does man seeks same good as end or means.
Every art and every kind of inquiry, and likewise every act and purpose, seems to aim at some good: and so it has been well said that the good is that at which everything aims.
But a difference is observable among these aims or ends. What is aimed at is sometimes the exercise of a faculty, sometimes a certain result beyond that exercise. And where there is an end beyond the act, there the result is better than the exercise of the faculty.
Now since there are many kinds of actions and many arts and sciences, it follows that there are many ends also; e.g. health is the end of medicine, ships of shipbuilding, victory of the art of war, and wealth of economy.
But when several of these are subordinated to some one art or science,—as the making of bridles and other trappings to the art of horsemanship, and this in turn, along with all else that the soldier does, to the art of war, and so on, Endnote 003—then the end of the master-art is always more desired than the ends of the subordinate arts, since these are pursued for its sake. And this is equally true whether the end in view be the mere exercise of a faculty or something beyond that, as in the above instances.
2.: THE end is THE good; our subject is this and its science Politics.
If then in what we do there be some end which we wish for on its own account, choosing all the others as means to this, but not every end without exception as a means to something else (for so we should go on ad infinitum, and desire would be left void and objectless),—this evidently will be the good or the best