Fundamental Philosophy (Vol. 1&2). Jaime Luciano Balmes
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Jaime Luciano Balmes
Fundamental Philosophy (Vol. 1&2)
Complete Edition
e-artnow, 2020
Contact: [email protected]
EAN 4064066399672
Table of Contents
Volume 1
Table of Contents
CHAPTER I. IMPORTANCE AND UTILITY OF THE QUESTION OF CERTAINTY.
CHAPTER II. TRUE STATE OF THE QUESTION.
CHAPTER III. CERTAINTY OF THE HUMAN RACE, AND PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY.
CHAPTER IV. EXISTENCE OF TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE IN THE ABSOLUTE INTELLECTUAL ORDER.
CHAPTER V. TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE IN THE HUMAN INTELLECTUAL ORDER CANNOT EMANATE FROM THE SENSES.
CHAPTER VI. TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE.—INSUFFICIENCY OF REAL TRUTHS.
CHAPTER VII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ME CANNOT PRODUCE TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE.
CHAPTER VIII. UNIVERSAL IDENTITY.
CHAPTER IX. UNIVERSAL IDENTITY—CONTINUED.
CHAPTER X. PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION: MONADS OF LEIBNITZ.
CHAPTER XI. PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION EXAMINED.
CHAPTER XII. IMMEDIATE INTELLIGIBILITY.
CHAPTER XIII. REPRESENTATION OF CAUSALITY AND IDEALITY.
CHAPTER XIV. IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINDING THE FIRST PRINCIPLE IN THE IDEAL ORDER.
CHAPTER XV. THE INDISPENSABLE CONDITION OF ALL HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.—MEANS OF PERCEIVING TRUTH.
CHAPTER XVI. CONFUSION OF IDEAS IN DISPUTES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE.
CHAPTER XVII. THOUGHT AND EXISTENCE.—DESCARTES' PRINCIPLE.
CHAPTER XVIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF DESCARTES, CONTINUED.—HIS METHOD.
CHAPTER XIX. VALUE OF THE PRINCIPLE. I THINK: ITS—ANALYSIS.
CHAPTER XX. TRUE SENSE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION.—KANT'S OPINION.
CHAPTER XXII. THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIDENCE.
CHAPTER XXIII. THE CRITERION OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
CHAPTER XXIV. THE CRITERION OF EVIDENCE.
CHAPTER XXV. THE OBJECTIVE VALUE OF IDEAS.
CHAPTER XXVI. CAN ALL COGNITIONS BE REDUCED TO THE PERCEPTION OF IDENTITY?
CHAPTER XXVII. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.
CHAPTER XXVIII. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.
CHAPTER XXIX. ARE THERE TRUE SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI IN THE SENSE OF KANT?
CHAPTER XXX. VICO'S CRITERION.
CHAPTER XXXI. CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.
CHAPTER XXXII. THE CRITERION OF COMMON SENSE.
CHAPTER XXXIII. ERROR OF LAMENNAIS ON COMMON CONSENT.
CHAPTER XXXIV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
CHAPTER I. SENSATION IN ITSELF.
CHAPTER II. MATTER IS INCAPABLE OF SENSATION.
CHAPTER III. SLEEP AND WAKING.
CHAPTER IV. RELATION OF SENSATIONS TO AN EXTERNAL WORLD.
CHAPTER V. AN IDEALIST HYPOTHESIS.
CHAPTER VI. IS THE EXTERNAL AND IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF SENSATIONS A FREE CAUSE?