Sris Chatterjee and An Yan, “Why Do Some Firms Pay with Contingent Value Rights,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43, no. 4 (December 2008): 1001–1036.
6
Audra L. Boone and J. Harold Mulherin, “How Are Firms Sold?” Journal of Finance 62, no. 20 (April 2007): 847–875.
7
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., C.A. 7102-CS (Del. Ch. May 4, 2012) (Strine, C.), May 4, 2012.
8
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The U.S. Supreme Court revisited this case in 2014 and addressed the case's reliance on the efficiency of markets in processing information. The Court declined to reverse Basic on this issue.
9
Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc., C.A, No, 6844-VCG (Del Ch. Nov. 1, 2013).
10
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 3 EXC 112 (Del. 1985).
11
Delaware General Corporation Law Section 141(e).
12
In re Southern Peru Copper Corp. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, C.A. No. 961-CS (Del. Ch. Oct 14, 2011).
13
Daniel Feldman, Reverse Mergers (New York: Bloomberg Press, 2009), 27–33.
14
Tim Jenkinson and Miguel Sousa, “Why SPAC Investors Should Listen to the Market,” Journal of Applied Finance 21, no. 2 (September 2011): 38–57.
15
Mark Mitchell and J. H. Mulherin, “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics 41, no. 2 (June 1996): 193–229.
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, David T. Robinson, and S. Viswanathan, “Valuation Waves and Merger Activity: The Empirical Evidence,” Journal of Financial Economics 77, no. 3 (September 2005): 561–603.
18
Panambur Raghavendra Rau and Aris Stouraitis, “Patterns in the Timing of Corporate Event Waves,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, no. 1 (February 2011): 209–246.
19
Ralph Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry: 1895–1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).
20
Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan (New York: Grove Press, 1990).
21
Joseph R. Conlin, The American Past (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Press, 1997), 500.
22
George Stigler, “Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger,” American Economic Review 40 (May 1950): 23–34.
23
Nell Irvin Painter, Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877–1919 (New York: Norton, 1987), 178–179.
24
Ibid.
25
Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1977), 249.
26
Alfred D. Chandler, “The Coming of Oligopoly and Its Meaning for Antitrust,” in National Competition Policy: Historians' Perspective on Antitrust and Government Business Relationships in the United States (Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, 1981), 72.
27
Robert C. Puth, American Economic History (New York: Dryden Press, 1982), 254.
28
T. J. Stiles, The First Tycoon: The Epic Life of Cornelius Vanderbilt (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009) 456.
29
Peter O. Steiner, Mergers: Motives, Effects and Policies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).
30
Federal Trade Commission, Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions (Washington, DC, 1977).
31
Harold Geneen, Managing (New York: Avon, 1989), 228–229.
32
Henri Servaes, “The Value of Diversification during the Conglomerate Wave,” Journal of Finance 51, no. 4 (September 1996): 1201–1225.
33
John G. Matsusaka, “Takeover Motives during the Conglomerate Merger Wave,” RAND Journal of Economics 24, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 357–379.
34
John Brooks, The Go-Go Years: The Drama and Crashing Finale of Wall Street's Bullish 60s (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998).
35
A. J. Briloff, “Accounting Practices and the Merger Movement,” Notre Dame Lawyer 45, no. 4 (Summer 1970): 604–628.
36
Steiner, Mergers, 116.
37
Stanley H. Brown, Ling: The Rise, Fall and Return of a Texas Titan (New York: Atheneum, 1972), 166.
38
John Brooks, The Takeover Game (New York: Dutton, 1987), 4.
39
Ken Auletta, Greed and Glory on Wall Street: The Fall of the House of Lehman (New York: Random House, 1986). Auletta provides a good discussion of how the traders, led by Lewis Glucksman, usurped the power of the investment bankers, led by Pete Peterson, and forced Peterson out of the firm. Peterson, however, went on to thrive as one of the founders of the very successful Blackstone private equity firm. For a good discussion of how Glucksman's protégé and successor, Richard Fuld, ended up leading Lehman Brothers right into the largest bankruptcy in history, see Lawrence G. McDonald and Patrick Robinson, A Colossal Failure of Common Sense: The Insider Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers (New York: Crown Business, 2009).
40
For an excellent discussion of this merger, see Jeff Madrick, Taking America (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 1–59.
41
“Hostility Breeds Contempt in Takeovers, 1974,” Wall Street Journal, October 25, 1989.
42
Niall Ferguson, High Financier: The Lives and Times of Siegmund Warburg (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 183–199.
43
For an excellent discussion of the history of this company during the conglomerate era, see Stanley H. Brown, Ling: The Rise and Fall of a Texas Titan (New York: Atheneum, 1972).
44
Mark L. Mitchell and J. Harold Mulherin, “The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity,” Journal of Financial Economics 41, no. 2 (June 1996): 193–229.
45
Sara B. Moeller, Frederick P. Schlingemann, and René M. Stulz, “Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave,” Journal of Finance 60, no. 2 (April 2005): 757–783.
