The Last Days of the Spanish Republic. Paul Preston
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from Spain had in any way weakened the government or encouraged any of the Great Powers to hasten their recognition of Franco. Before Negrín could reply, Azaña had left the Embassy. He attended a concert at the Opéra Comique with Cipriano Rivas; returning to the Embassy merely to collect their luggage, the two men left together for the Gare de Lyon. Their departure eagerly recorded by an army of journalists and photographers, they took the night train to Collonges-sous-Salève near the Swiss border. As Azaña had done on previous occasions in his political career, he fled from the pressures besetting him, and his flight would be severely damaging to the Republic.47 The Minister of Justice, Ramón González Peña, declared that Azaña’s behaviour was high treason. Negrín even toyed with the unrealistic idea of having Azaña put on trial.48
5
Meanwhile, the hostility between the Communists and Casado was becoming ever more public. In fact, Casado had long been attempting to foment dissent between the Communists and the other component groups of the Popular Front. A fruitful opportunity had arisen when the PCE harshly criticized Largo Caballero, who after crossing into France on 29 January 1939 had decided to remain in Paris. As he had abandoned Madrid once before, on 6 November 1936, claims that he had sent his papers and household linen and silver in an ambulance two days before crossing the frontier with his family fuelled accusations of cowardice.1 On 2 February, the PCE issued a manifesto severely censuring his absence at a time when his presence in Madrid might have contributed to raising morale:
The Politburo denounced before the working class and the Spanish people the shameful flight from our national territory of Sr Largo Caballero who, aided by a small group of enemies of the unity of the Spanish people and its organizations, has done everything in his power to sabotage the work of the Government and break the unity and resistance of our people and now crowns his previous criminal activity with this desertion.
In addition to banning the distribution of the manifesto, Casado held a meeting of the Madrid Popular Front at which he deliberately fuelled Socialist hostility towards the Communists by making a theatrical show of stressing his indignation at the way in which Largo Caballero had been depicted. He claimed, falsely, that the manifesto had called the veteran leader ‘a thief and a murderer’.2
With the more realistic and prudent Palmiro Togliatti still in France – after the loss of Catalonia – PCE leaders in Madrid made unrestrained and belligerent declarations about last-ditch resistance. The Comintern adviser present, the Bulgarian Stoyan Minev, alias ‘Boris Stepanov’, was also talking in terms of sidelining Negrín and establishing a revolutionary war council to put an end to capitulationism. Stepanov was doing no more than articulating the party leadership’s visceral resentment of the way they were being blamed for the course of the war. This was made clear in the course of a meeting of the PCE provincial committee held in Madrid between 9 and 11 February. In an unrestrained speech, Dolores Ibárruri attacked Largo Caballero, Casado and Miaja. She referred to the two officers as ‘distinguished mummies’. Vicente Uribe went further, denouncing the cowardice of those who were doing the job of the enemy by spreading the notion that peace without reprisals was possible. His proposal that the Communist Party take power to purge such defeatists and strengthen the war effort was a symptom of impotence, an empty threat designed to inhibit the conspirators. The inevitable effect of its threatening tone was further to isolate the PCE and make Casado readier to act. His initial response was to attempt to censor Mundo Obrero’s report on the the speeches, but his orders were ignored.3
The proceedings of this meeting further intensified Casado’s hostility towards the Communists. He had tried to prevent it taking place, which was a dictatorial abuse of the powers associated with the state of martial law decreed in late January. Deeply irritated by the Communist leadership’s references to the failure of the Brunete offensive and the strong possibility of disloyalty within the military, Casado was all the more furious because Dolores Ibárruri had called him a ‘mummy’. He shouted: ‘I should have no hesitation!… They had better look out! I have foreseen all the consequences. In case anything happens to me, I have a list of all my enemies and at least thirty of them will die!’ Edmundo Domínguez was convinced that Casado’s bluster reflected fear of his machinations being discovered.4
On his return from France on 10 February, Negrín was furious. He viewed the PCE’s calls for an exclusively Communist-led resistance as disloyalty. On the 15th, Líster reported to Negrín in Madrid. The Prime Minister received him in his bathroom where he was shaving. There was nothing unusual in that. On a regular basis, while shaving and or even while soaking in the bath, Negrín would conduct business. He was not bothered by the niceties of protocol and, with so many responsibilities and so little time, he would listen to reports or take advice where he thought it was useful, and one such place was in his bathroom. The American journalist Louis Fischer, who advised him on the foreign press, described how Negrín would invite him to his quarters to talk and he would often find him in the bathroom shaving, clad only in his pyjama bottoms. He would then take a bath while Fischer sat on a stool or leaned against the wall chatting with him: ‘Occasionally a secretary would come in with a telegram, bend over the bath-tub and hold it while Negrín read it. Negrín was very natural and simple about all this.’5
Now, on 15 February, after expressing his appreciation that Líster had returned to the central zone, they talked about the prospects of further resistance. Saying that the pair of them were likely to end up being shot, Negrín gave Líster a gloomy outline of situation. ‘He told me that a whole series of senior military commanders and political and trade union leaders – anarchists, Socialists and Republicans – were ready to capitulate. Wherever they looked, all they saw were difficulties and, instead of working to strengthen the discipline and morale of the troops and of the civilian population, they spent their time spreading defeatism and conspiring.’ Negrín confided in Líster that Rojo had written him a letter presenting his resignation and threatening to make a public statement if he (Negrín) did not put an end to the war and provide more money for the troops exiled in France. Significantly, Negrín added that Rojo had sent a copy of his letter to Matallana. Regarding the situation within the government, Negrín ‘bitterly criticized some of his ministers, saying that they were cowards and did little but squabble among themselves about petty issues. He added that those who continued to behave with dignity were Uribe, José Moix Regàs, the Minister of Labour, and Vayo.’6
The following day, 16 February, according to a report by Togliatti, Negrín spoke on the telephone to Uribe saying, ‘I am told that the Communists in the Popular Front have declared that whether they respect or not the orders of the government depends what the Party decides.’ He said angrily: ‘I will shoot all the Communists.’ According to a similar account of this confrontation given by Stepanov, Negrín rang Uribe and asked him if it was true that the PCE politburo had decided that government measures would be accepted only with its approval. Before Uribe could reply, Negrín said that, if it was true, he would have the entire politburo arrested and put on trial. Shortly after this conversation with Uribe had taken place, Togliatti returned from France and he was able to smooth things over with Negrín.7
During the three and a half weeks that Negrín spent in Spain after his return to the centre-south zone, he seemed to be afflicted with a degree of uncertainty. The man appointed on 24 February to be head of the corps of political commissars, Bibiano Fernández Osorio Tafall, although a member of Azaña’s Left Republican party Izquierda Republicana, was a supporter of the policy of resistance.8 He confided in Cordón his concern that Negrín was wasting time reorganizing government departments instead of creating a general staff of loyal officers. Cordón saw