Sky’s the Limit: Wiggins and Cavendish: The Quest to Conquer the Tour de France. Richard Moore
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fortunes of the British Cycling team. For the first time, the sport had money, thanks to lottery funding. Keen was given an annual budget of £2.5m and charged with drawing up a plan that could transform Britain’s cyclists from mediocrity to … well, just about anything would be an improvement on performances that, with the odd exception (Boardman, Graeme Obree, Yvonne McGregor), ensured Britain occupied the lower tiers of world cycling.
Keen’s proposals, to focus the country’s efforts, and funding, exclusively on track cycling, were radical and controversial. But he had thought about it long and hard, and he felt that he had little choice; that to try and produce a road team that could compete with the best in the world would be pointless. ‘My view at the time,’ Keen told me in 2007, ‘was that men’s professional road cycling was almost completely dominated by an underlying drugs culture. And … in the context of the programme I was charged with creating, having a drugs system, or even a tolerance of a drugs system, was just not an option.
‘The idea that you could plan for men’s road racing success at world level … to me it couldn’t be done,’ continued Keen, for whom planning is like breathing. ‘It seemed to me that the furthest we could go with road racing for men was to create a development programme where we could take promising young riders to that line in the sand – of what I’d call performance credibility – and then say, “If that is the world you want, as far as we understand it, then off you go and good luck.”’
As he spoke, Keen measured his words carefully, but the implications and subtext to what he was saying were as devastating as they were damning. That phrase, ‘performance credibility’, had particular resonance, not least because of Keen’s intimate knowledge of the sport. He was speaking not as an outsider, but as someone whose protégé, Boardman, was now part of the world he was describing. Although Boardman had showed flashes of brilliance in road races, the highlight perhaps being his second place – to five-time Tour de France winner Miguel Indurain – at the 1995 Dauphiné Libéré, his potential on the road appeared to be limited. By what? His limitations over the longer distances, or the three-week duration of the Tour de France? Or his refusal to take drugs? Keen wouldn’t say explicitly. But he might have said that Boardman’s performances fell within the realms of ‘performance credibility’, and left it at that.
Nevertheless, for many, Keen’s track-focused plan was tantamount to treason. Ignore road cycling? Pretend the Tour de France doesn’t exist? He was trampling on the dreams of all those – the overwhelming majority of cycling fans – who are drawn to the sport by the glamour and excitement of the greatest race in the world.
Keen argued that he had no choice; he was under pressure to produce a return on the new funding under the terms dictated by the distributors of lottery cash. UK Sport was the agency charged with sharing out the money among all the governing bodies, but the cash came with conditions attached and targets to be reached. For UK Sport, the challenge was this: how to set comparable targets across all sports. The answer was to focus on world championships and Olympics. Sports would be assessed and evaluated purely on their performances in these events. Olympic and world medals would effectively write lottery cheques. Conversely, no medals would see funding reduced.
In cycling, the maths was simple. At the Olympics there were 12 gold medals available on the track, just four on the road (and two in mountain biking); and it was the same at the world championships. Keen concluded that a British rider could win the Tour de France or the Paris-Roubaix Classic and become a household name in mainland Europe, but it would count for nothing as far as UK Sport was concerned. So he had no choice: the bulk of the money had to be directed towards the track.
But Keen went further than that. As he settled into his office in the Manchester Velodrome in 1997 – having first visited a used furniture shop to buy a desk and chair – he pored over files describing road races all across Europe to which British teams were invited every year. And every year they went, invariably to be soundly thrashed by their continental rivals, blowing holes in the budget with no tangible return. As far as Keen was concerned it was madness. Even worse, it was pointless. So he took a more radical step than merely cutting funding for a men’s senior road squad: he took his axe to it. In the British cycling revolution, at least in its first phase, it was not – to paraphrase Lance Armstrong – all about the bike. It was all about the track.
Ten years later, even as Brailsford, who took over from Peter Keen in 2004, spoke in Bourg-en-Bresse with such breezy optimism of running a clean team and entering the Tour de France, the omens seemed less than encouraging.
In fact, Keen’s prescience had proved remarkable, and his decision not to fund a road programme eminently sensible. A year after he drew up his World Class Performance Plan, with its track focus, a major doping scandal erupted at the 1998 Tour de France. It blew the lid on the scale of organised, endemic doping at the highest level of professional road cycling. The so-called ‘Festina affair’ – involving the world’s number one team – proved to be merely the start, however. It was followed, over the following years, by a drip-drip-drip of doping allegations, revelations and scandals.
Drip-drip-drip they went, like an irritating leak that isn’t quite bothersome enough to actually fix. Finally, in 2006, came the next deluge: an international blood doping ring uncovered by a Spanish investigation, which removed the favourites, Ivan Basso and Jan Ullrich, on the eve of the Tour de France. This, coupled with a positive test for the eventual winner of that year’s Tour, Floyd Landis, seemed, finally, like it could be the tipping point, and the catalyst for change. If the first step to changing is to admit you have a problem, then such a step appeared to be taken towards the end of 2006, cycling’s annus horribilis, when the sport’s world governing body, the UCI, commissioned an independent audit to discover the extent of the doping problem: a small step, but a significant one for an organisation that stood accused of burying its head in the sand, or, worse, being complicit in the problem. Meanwhile, and under pressure from the World Anti-Doping Agency (founded in response to the Festina affair), the number of anti-doping tests were stepped up; and the first steps were taken by the UCI to establish ‘biological passports’ for riders. When these were finally introduced, for the 2008 season, they were hailed as being at the vanguard of anti-doping.
But in Bourg-en-Bresse, as Brailsford spoke about lifting the ‘doom and gloom and negativity around the doping stories’, his optimism was to prove premature. The 2007 Tour was hit by a series of catastrophic scandals, from the yellow jersey Michael Rasmussen’s series of missed drugs tests before the race had started, to double stage-winner Alexandre Vinokourov’s positive test for an illegal blood transfusion.
‘La mort du Tour,’ read the front page headline of the French newspaper Libération, in thick black letters, above the ghostly silhouette of a racing cyclist, as the Tour stumbled towards the finish in an ever-thickening fog of drugs-related scandals. France Soir even devoted its entire front page to an official-looking ‘death notice’, announcing the passing of the Tour de France on 25 July 2007, in Orthez, ‘at the age of 104 years, as a result of a long illness’. The paper stated that ‘the funeral will be held in a strictly private circle’.
Wiggins, who had consistently spoken out against doping – and, indeed, offered this as one reason why he had continued to focus his efforts on the track rather than the road – even found himself indirectly implicated when a Cofidis teammate, Cristian Moreni, tested positive for testosterone in the final week. Moreni was arrested at the summit of the Col d’Aubisque, the gendarmes having waited for him as he finished the 228km stage before carting him off in his cycling kit, while the rest of the Cofidis team, including Wiggins, were given a police escort off the mountain.
Speaking an hour later from a police station, Wiggins admitted he had found the situation ‘scary’: ‘I don’t want to be caught up in this in any way. It makes you think about your future as a professional. What is the point? I could be doing better things than pissing about like this. But then you think, why shouldn’t I continue doing something I get a lot of pleasure out of?’
Not that Wiggins had a choice about continuing in the 2007 Tour, with the organisers requesting their withdrawal and Cofidis obliging. Wiggins was disgusted with Moreni, with his team and with the Tour. He couldn’t bear to wear his Cofidis leisurewear