D-Day: History in an Hour. Rupert Colley
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described the scene as men tried to disembark from their landing craft: the soldiers ‘plunged into about two feet of water and machine-gun bullets laced into them. Bodies piled up on the ramp.’ Neutralized by German fighters, overhead support from squadrons of RAF planes proved ineffectual. Only twenty-nine tanks managed to make it ashore where they struggled on the shingle beach, and of those only fifteen were able to advance as far as the sea wall, only to be prevented from encroaching into the town by concrete barriers.
The Dieppe Raid, which had lasted just six hours, was a costly affair – 60 per cent of ground troops were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. The operation left 1,027 dead, of whom 907 were Canadian. A further 2,340 troops were captured, and 106 aircraft shot down. An American, Lieutenant Edward V. Loustalot, earned the unenviable distinction of becoming the first US soldier killed in wartime Europe.
Despite the failure of Dieppe and the high rate of losses, important lessons were learned – that a direct assault on a well-defended harbour was not an option for any future attack; and that superiority of the air was a prerequisite. Churchill concluded that the raid had provided a ‘mine of experience’. In charge of the operation, Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, cousin to King George VI, would later say, ‘If I had the same decision to make again, I would do as I did before… For every soldier who died at Dieppe, ten were saved on D-Day.’ Hitler too felt as if a lesson had been learned. Knowing that at some point the Allies would try again, he said, ‘We must reckon with a totally different mode of attack and in quite a different place.’
PLANNING
Casablanca Conference
Meeting in January 1943, Churchill and US president Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed that a cross-Channel invasion was a necessity, and that plans for such a venture should be initiated. But at this stage both the prime minister and the president had alternative priorities: for Churchill, the focus of the war in Europe would be centred on Italy, starting with an invasion of Sicily; while Roosevelt’s main concern was the ongoing war in the Pacific.
Stalin, although invited, was not present at Casablanca – preoccupied by the ongoing battle raging round Stalingrad. Another Allied leader conspicuous by his absence was the head of the Free French forces, General Charles de Gaulle.
De Gaulle had been living in exile in London since the fall of France in June 1940. Philippe Pétain’s Vichy government, collaborating with the German invaders, had, in absentia, found de Gaulle guilty of treason and sentenced him to death. De Gaulle’s relationship with his allies was far from cordial. Roosevelt, in particular, disliked the Frenchman, refusing to acknowledge the self-proclaimed leader in any way that might enhance de Gaulle’s political standing. The Allies were not about to liberate France merely to install de Gaulle into power. Instead, Roosevelt insisted, following liberation there would be a provisional military government in place until elections could be held. Roosevelt and Churchill pointedly kept de Gaulle in the dark regarding the invasion plans and, indeed, only informed him two days before the event.
COSSAC
As a consequence of Casablanca, in March 1943, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan was charged with the initial planning of a cross-Channel invasion of occupied Western Europe, codenamed Overlord, to include a naval assault, codenamed Neptune. Morgan, leading a team of fifty, was given the title Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), though the Allies had yet to decide who their Supreme Commander should be. Undeterred, the COSSAC team, based in London’s St James’s Square, began work.
The Germans had fifty-nine divisions posted in France. The puzzle for COSSAC was how to land enough men as practicably possible to withhold the Germans until sufficient reinforcements were brought over. Attacking a port, as illustrated by the Dieppe Raid, was out of the question, so instead Morgan and his teams proposed an invasion via a beach. But where? Air superiority was vital (another lesson from Dieppe) so it had to be within operational reach of England. Two years previously, the BBC had urged people to send the War Office their photographs and postcards of coastal Europe. The British public responded with enthusiasm, sending in almost 10 million snaps which COSSAC now pored over, looking for clues and snippets of information. Meanwhile, air reconnaissance crews flew over the coasts of occupied Europe, collecting information regarding the lay of the land; their missions rarely disturbed by the overstretched German Luftwaffe who were otherwise engaged on the Eastern Front. The sorties covered the whole coast – from the Netherlands down to Spain – far more than was necessary but vital not to give German intelligence any idea of where the invasion might take place.
Small-scale raids on the French coasts were charged with taking photographs, collecting sand and soil samples to be analysed to ensure the beaches could sustain the weight of heavy tanks, and capturing Germans who then endured interrogation.
It soon became apparent that there were only two options – the area around Calais, the Pas-de-Calais, or, 140 miles to the west, the beaches of Normandy on the Cotentin Peninsula. Although Normandy was still well within range of fighter planes, Calais had the advantage of being the nearest, just twenty-one miles, from the southern coast of England hence the greater chance of an invading fleet remaining undetected as it crossed the Channel. Calais was also much nearer to the German border than Normandy. But Calais had the distinct disadvantage of being heavily protected by divisions of German tanks, and it was the most obvious point to expect an invading force to land.
Thus, Morgan proposed Normandy.
COSSAC planned accordingly. Morgan envisaged troops landing on a thirty-mile expanse of beach, while airborne troops would capture the Norman capital of Caen, eight miles inland. Having secured a foothold, the land troops would then capture the port of Cherbourg to the west of the Cotentin Peninsula, thus enabling the means for supplies to be shipped over.
Meanwhile, planning began on a simultaneous invasion from the south of France, codenamed Operation Dragoon.
The Mulberry Harbours
A problem that vexed Morgan and his team was that without access to a port, the transport ships lacked a harbour that had sufficiently deep enough water. Vital to the success of the invasion would be the Allies’ capacity to bring in reinforcements and supplies (necessarily via transport ships) quicker than the enemy. The ingenious solution was to build two inflatable harbours in England (one for the Americans, the other for the British and Canadians), tow them across the English Channel, and plant them near the beaches. Churchill approved of the proposals, with orders to ‘Let me have the best solution worked out. Don’t argue the matter. The difficulties will argue for themselves.’ The harbours, each designed to be the size of the port of Dover, consisted of a series of large watertight concrete chambers to be anchored down as pier heads, linking a long stretch of steel roadway.
A concrete caisson being towed by a tug to form part of a Mulberry Harbour.
To ensure the provision of calm water off the Normandy coast, some sixty old merchant ships, codenamed Corncobs, were to be sailed across the Channel and then sunk in rows, thereby recreating the conditions of a sheltered harbour.
Meanwhile, work began on the world’s first undersea oil pipeline, 70 miles long from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg. PLUTO (Pipe Line Under The Ocean) would pump a million litres of oil a day into northern France, reducing the reliance on tankers.
Engineers also designed airfields that could be constructed on site in Normandy to allow easier disembarkation for later waves of troops and, in the opposite direction, quick evacuation of the wounded.
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