Kant's Critique of Judgement. Immanuel Kant
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J. H. BERNARD.
Trinity College, Dublin,
May 24, 1892.
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More than twenty-one years have passed since the first edition of this Translation was published, and during that time much has been written, both in Germany and in England, on the subject of Kant’s Critique of Judgement. In particular, the German text has been critically determined by the labours of Professor Windelband, whose fine edition forms the fifth volume of Kant’s Collected Works as issued by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences (Berlin, 1908). It will be indispensable to future students. An excellent account of the significance, in the Kantian system, of the Urtheilskraft, by Mr. R. A. C. Macmillan, appeared in 1912; and Mr. J. C. Meredith has published recently an English edition of the Critique of Aesthetical Judgement, with notes and essays, dealing with the philosophy of art, which goes over the ground very fully.
Some critics of my first edition took exception to the clumsiness of the word “representation” as the equivalent of Vorstellung, but I have made no change in this respect, as it seems to me (and so far as I have observed to others who have worked on the Critique of Judgement), that it is necessary to preserve in English the relation between the noun Vorstellung and the verb vorstellen, if Kant’s reasoning is to be exhibited clearly. I have, however, abandoned the attempt to preserve the word Kritik in English, and have replaced it by Critique or criticism, throughout. The other changes that have been made are mere corrections or emendations of faulty or obscure renderings, with a few additional notes. I have left my original Introduction as it was written in 1892, without attempting any fresh examination of the problems that Kant set himself.
JOHN OSSORY.
The Palace, Kilkenny,
January 6, 1914.
GLOSSARY OF KANT’S PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS
Absicht; design.
Achtung; respect.
Affekt; affection.
Angenehm; pleasant.
Anschauung; intuition.
Attribut; attribute.
Aufklärung; enlightenment.
Begehr; desire.
Begriff; concept.
Beschaffenheit; constitution or characteristic.
Bestimmen; to determine.
Darstellen; to present.
Dasein; presence or being.
Eigenschaft; property.
Empfindung; sensation.
Endzweck; final purpose.
Erkenntniss; cognition or knowledge.
Erklärung; explanation.
Erscheinung; phenomenon.
Existenz; existence.
Fürwahrhalten; belief.
Gebiet; realm.
Gefühl; feeling.
Gegenstand; object.
Geist; spirit.
Geniessen; enjoyment.
Geschicklichkeit; skill.
Geschmack; Taste.
Gesetzmässigkeit; conformity to law.
Gewalt; dominion or authority.
Glaube; faith.
Grenze; bound.
Grundsatz; fundamental proposition or principle.
Hang; propension.
Idee; Idea.
Leidenschaft; passion.
Letzter Zweck; ultimate purpose.
Lust; pleasure.
Meinen; opinion.
Neigung; inclination.
Objekt; Object.
Prinzip; principle.
Real; real.
Reich; kingdom.
Reiz; charm.
Rührung; emotion.
Schein; illusion.
Schmerz; grief.
Schön; beautiful.
Schranke; limit.
Schwärmerei; fanaticism.
Seele; soul.
Ueberreden; to persuade.
Ueberschwänglich; transcendent.
Ueberzeugen; to convince.
Unlust; pain.
Urtheil; judgement.
Urtheilskraft; Judgement.
Verbindung; combination.
Vergnügen; gratification.
Verknüpfung; connexion.
Vermögen; faculty.
Vernunft; Reason.
Vernünftelei; sophistry or subtlety.
Verstand; Understanding.
Vorstellung; representation.
Wahrnehmung; perception.
Wesen; being.
Willkühr; elective will.
Wirklich; actual.
Wohlgefallen; satisfaction.
Zufriedenheit; contentment.
Zweck; purpose.
Zweckmässig; purposive.
Zweckverbindung; purposive combination, etc.
PREFACE
We may call the faculty of cognition from principles a priori, pure Reason, and the inquiry into its possibility and bounds generally the Critique of pure Reason, although by this faculty we only understand Reason in its theoretical employment, as it appears under that name in the former work; without wishing to inquire into its faculty, as practical Reason, according to its special principles. That [Critique] goes merely into our faculty of knowing things a priori, and busies itself therefore only with the cognitive faculty to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure and pain and the faculty of desire; and of the cognitive faculties it only concerns itself with Understanding, according to its principles a priori, to the exclusion of Judgement and Reason (as faculties alike belonging to theoretical cognition), because it is found in the sequel that no other cognitive faculty but the Understanding can furnish constitutive principles of cognition a priori. The Critique, then, which sifts them all, as regards the share which each of the other faculties might pretend to have in the clear possession of knowledge from its own peculiar root, leaves nothing but what the Understanding prescribes a priori as law for nature as the complex of phenomena (whose form also is given a priori). It relegates