An Essay Concerning Human Understanding / Ein Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand. Auswahlausgabe. John Locke
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something that is solid, and extended, whose parts are separable and movable different ways; and by Extension, only the Space that lies between the Extremities of those solid coherent Parts, and which is possessed by them, they confound very different Ideas one with another. […] ’Tis true, Solidity cannot exist [184]without Extension, neither can Scarlet-Colour exist without Extension; but this hinders not, but that they are distinct Ideas. Many Ideas require others as necessary to their Existence or Conception, which yet are very distinct Ideas. Motion can neither be, nor be conceived without Space; and yet Motion is not Space, nor Space Motion: Space can exist without it, and they are very distinct Ideas; and so, I think, are those of Space and Solidity. […] Body then and Extension, ’tis evident, are two distinct Ideas. For,
§ 12. First, Extension includes no Solidity, nor resistance to the Motion of Body, as Body does.
§ 13. Secondly, The Parts of pure Space are inseparable one from the other; so that the Continuity cannot be separated, neither really, nor mentally. For I demand of any one, to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in Thought. To divide and separate actually, is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity: And to divide mentally, is to make in the Mind two Superficies, where before there was a Continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the Mind, as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct Superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of: But neither of these ways of Separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure Space.
[186]’Tis true, a Man may consider so much of such a Space, as is answerable or commensurate to a Foot, without considering the rest; which is indeed a partial Consideration […]. But a partial consideration is not separating. A Man may consider Light in the Sun, without its Heat; or Mobility in Body without its Extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial Consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a Consideration of both, as existing separately.
§ 14. Thirdly, The parts of pure Space, are immovable, which follows from their inseparability; Motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things: But this cannot be between Parts that are inseparable; which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.
Thus the determined Idea of simple Space distinguishes it plainly, and sufficiently from Body; since its Parts are inseparable, immovable, and without resistance to the Motion of Body.
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§ 16. Those who contend that Space and Body are the same, bring this Dilemma: Either this Space is something or nothing; if nothing be between two Bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask, whether it be Body or Spirit? To which I answer by another Question, Who told them, that there was, or could be nothing, but solid Beings, which could not think; and thinking Beings that were not extended? Which is all they mean by the terms Body and Spirit.
[188]§ 17. If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this Space void of Body, be Substance or Accident, I shall readily answer, I know not: nor shall be ashamed to own my Ignorance, till they that ask, shew me a clear distinct Idea of Substance.
§ 18. […] And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two Syllables, Substance, to consider, whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite incomprehensible GOD, to finite Spirit, and to Body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same Idea, when each of those three so different Beings are called Substances? If so, whether it will thence follow, That God, Spirits, and Body, agreeing in the same common nature of Substance, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different modification of that Substance; as a Tree and a Pebble, being in the same sense Body, and agreeing in the common nature of Body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter; which will be a very harsh Doctrine. If they say, That they apply it to God, finite Spirits, and Matter, in three different significations, and that it stands for one Idea, when GOD is said to be a Substance; for another, when the Soul is called Substance; and for a third, when Body is called so. If the name Substance, stands for three several distinct Ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct Ideas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a Notion, the Confusion and Errors, that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term […].
[190]§ 19. They who first ran into the Notion of Accidents, as a sort of real Beings, that needed some thing to inhere in, were forced to find out the word Substance, to support them. […] So that of Substance, we have no Idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.
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§ 21. But to return to our Idea of Space. […] where nothing hinders […] a Body put into motion may move on, as where there is nothing between, there two Bodies must necessarily touch. For pure Space between, is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual Contact; but bare Space in the way, is not sufficient to stop Motion. The truth is, these Men must either own, that they think Body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm, that Space is not Body. For I would fain meet with that thinking Man, that can, in his Thoughts, set any bounds to Space, more than he can to Duration; or by thinking, hope to arrive at the end of either: And therefore if his Idea of Eternity be infinite, so is his Idea of Immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.
§ 21.[bis]. Farther, those who assert the impossibility of Space existing without Matter, must not only make Body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. No one, I suppose, will deny, that God can put an end to all motion that is in Matter, and fix all the Bodies of the Universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so long [192]as he pleases. Whoever then will allow, that God can, during such a general rest, annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a Vacuum. For it is evident, that the Space, that was filled by the parts of the annihilated Body, will still remain, and be a Space without Body. […] there is no necessary connexion between Space and Solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a Vacuum, do thereby confess, they have distinct Ideas of Vacuum and Plenum, i. e. that they have an Idea of Extension void of Solidity, though they deny its existence; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the signification of Words, as to call Extension Body, and consequently make the whole Essence of Body, to be nothing but pure Extension without Solidity, must talk absurdly, whenever they speak of Vacuum, since it is impossible for Extension to be without Extension. For Vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies Space without Body, whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make Matter infinite, and take from God a power to annihilate any Particle of it.
§ 22. But not to […] appeal to God’s Omnipotency to find a Vacuum, the motion of Bodies, that are in our view and neighbourhood, seem to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid Body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid Parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that Superficies, if there be not [194]left in it a void space, as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid Body. And if where the least Particle of the Body divided, is as big as a Mustard-seed, a void Space equal to the bulk of a Mustard-seed, be requisite to make room for the free motion of the Parts of the divided Body within the bounds of its Superficies […]. And let this void Space be as little as it will, it destroys the Hypothesis of Plenitude. For if there can be a Space void of Body, equal to the smallest separate Particle of Matter now existing in Nature, ’tis still Space without Body; and makes as great a difference between Space and Body, as if it were Μέγα χάσμα, a distance as wide as any in Nature. […]
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§ 26. To conclude, whatever Men shall think