The Handy Law Answer Book. David L Hudson
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experience” flies in the face of stubborn fact.
It goes without saying that, viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased by Ollie’s Barbecue from sources supplied from out of state was insignificant when compared with the total foodstuffs moving in commerce. But, as our late Brother Jackson said for the Court in Wickard v. Filburn (1942): “That appellee’s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial”….
This Court has held time and again that this power extends to activities of retail establishments, including restaurants, which directly or indirectly burden or obstruct interstate commerce. We have detailed the cases in Heart of Atlanta Motel, and will not repeat them here.
The appellees contend that Congress has arbitrarily created a conclusive presumption that all restaurants meeting the criteria set out in the Act “affect commerce.” Stated another way, they object to the omission of a provision for a case-by-case determination—judicial or administrative—that racial discrimination in a particular restaurant affects commerce…. Here, as there, Congress has determined for itself that refusals of service to Negroes have imposed burdens both upon the interstate flow of food and upon the movement of products generally. Of course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by this Court. But where we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end. The only remaining question—one answered in the affirmative by the court below—is whether the particular restaurant either serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or serves food a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce.
Confronted as we are with the facts laid before Congress, we must conclude that it had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce….
The power of Congress in this field is broad and sweeping; where it keeps within its sphere and violates no express constitutional limitation it has been the rule of this Court, going back almost to the founding days of the Republic, not to interfere. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, as here applied, we find to be plainly appropriate in the resolution of what the Congress found to be a national commercial problem of the first magnitude. We find it in no violation of any express limitations of the Constitution and we therefore declare it valid.
What is the full faith and credit clause?
Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that “full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.” This is the provision that provides that judgments in one state are generally respected by other states. It helped to create a single nation out of disparate states. The clause states:
Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.
LegalSpeak: Gonzalez v. Reich (2005)
In assessing the validity of congressional regulation, none of our Commerce Clause cases can be viewed in isolation. As charted … our understanding of the reach of the Commerce Clause, as well as Congress’ assertion of authority thereunder, has evolved over time. The Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to the Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of Confederation. For the first century of our history, the primary use of the Clause was to preclude the kind of discriminatory state legislation that had once been permissible. Then, in response to rapid industrial development and an increasingly interdependent national economy, Congress “ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power,” beginning with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, 24 Stat. 379, and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 et seq.
Cases decided during that “new era,” which now spans more than a century, have identified three general categories of regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under its commerce power. First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress has authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in interstate commerce. Third, Congress has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Only the third category is implicated in the case at hand.
Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As we stated in Wickard, “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” We have never required Congress to legislate with scientific exactitude….
One need not have a degree in economics to understand why a nationwide exemption for the vast quantity of marijuana (or other drugs) locally cultivated for personal use (which presumably would include use by friends, neighbors, and family members) may have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this extraordinarily popular substance. The congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. Indeed, that judgment is not only rational, but “visible to the naked eye,” under any commonsense appraisal of the probable consequences of such an open-ended exemption.
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Were all the Founders convinced that the executive branch should consist of one person?
No, the Founders were divided on the composition of the executive. Much of the debate centered on whether the executive branch should consist of a single person or an executive committee. Some delegates feared that creating a single-person executive would be dangerous and lead to a monarch, such as George III. George III was the King of Great Britain who taxed the colonies and battled them during the Revolutionary War. Above all else, the majority of the Framers wished to avoid creating a king. Most of the delegates assumed that George Washington would become the country’s chief executive.
For this reason, James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson that it was “peculiarly embarrassing” to have the delegates arguing about whether they could trust a single executive. It was “embarrassing,” because Washington sat quietly while this discussion proceeded.
George Mason from Virginia proposed that there be a three-person executive branch. He said that one individual would come from the North, one from the South, and the other from the middle states.
The delegates disagreed about whether to create a strong independent executive or an executive that would be far less powerful than Congress. The delegates also changed their positions on the length of the president’s term. A committee originally proposed that the president would be elected by the legislature for one seven-year term.
President Gerald R. Ford meets with AFL-CIO President George Meany in the Oval Office. The Founding Fathers decided that the executive branch would consist of just one person, the president (iStock).
Finally, on August 31, another committee—the so-called Committee of Eleven—considered an earlier proposal by delegate James Wilson from Pennsylvania that a group of people called electors would choose the president. Under this system, each state would have the number of electors “equal to the whole number of senators and representatives of the House of Representatives.” This proposal was another compromise