Social Torture. Chris Dolan
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Aboke girls in 1996. The Belgian organisation, Pax Christi, made a political decision when it decided to fund the travel expenses of the district chairmen of Gulu and Kitgum districts to go to Nairobi in 1998 ‘to meet a delegation of Lord's Resistance Movement/Army (LRM/A) in a bid to initiate peace talks’.37
From early 1999 there was a noticeable lull in LRA activity. Together with some changes in the political climate, notably President Museveni's agreement to allow people to talk with the LRA (though he himself refused to do so), this created hopes that peace was just around the corner. Several national and international NGOs moved into Gulu district, eager to revive ‘traditional’ leadership and reconciliation mechanisms, and to address the trauma of returned abducted children. The Belgian Government, in addition to the small yet politically significant amounts it invested in ‘traditional leadership’, put significant finance into upgrading the telephone system as part of NURP I, and, from 1999, USAID channelled large volumes of aid through an array of local and international NGOs, notably Red Barnet (Danish Save the Children).
The lull in LRA activity coincided with extensive UPDF activity in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. UPDF forces had been involved in various ways in the fighting in the DRC from 1997 (UN, 2001), and 1999 saw overt fighting there between UPDF and Rwandan Government forces. Despite the Lusaka peace accord of July 1999, fighting continued, some of it involving UPDF forces recruited from northern Uganda.38
District level consultations on NURP II ended with a national consensus workshop in Kampala in October 1999. The District Profile for Gulu and Kitgum, drawn up as part of this process, argued that
The government must acknowledge the scale of trauma-related problems as underlying causes for conflict and underdevelopment. It is critical for all concerned parties involved in the war in the Northern region to develop the will to take the difficult political steps required to prevent further human rights abuses. The continued plight of the lives of thousands of children and individuals who are helplessly affected by the effects of the war, calls for a strategy to resolve the war through peaceful means.
It also argued that, if peace were to be attained, the underlying causes of the conflict had to be addressed. It therefore stressed a need for ‘trauma support systems’ and a need to identify ‘the interest groups causing insecurity’, and thus added weight to calls for a non-military solution (COWI, 1999b; 21).
Perhaps as a political concession to these pressures, the Government signed a Carter Center-brokered ‘peace agreement’ with the Sudanese Government in Nairobi on 8 December 1999. The LRA had not been involved in direct negotiation, and within just two weeks of the peace agreement, the LRA re-entered Uganda from Sudan. Civilians who over the previous six months had begun tentatively leaving the ‘protected villages’ in order to return home, now found themselves being herded back by the army. Vehicles were ambushed and burnt on all roads out of Gulu except the Kampala highway, and rebels mounted attacks on Government targets in the heart of Gulu town. Phase IV had clearly begun.
Phase IV – Amnesty for ‘Terrorists’ (2000 to 2002)
In early January, people were again forced back into the protected villages in scenes reminiscent of the late 1980s and mid-1990s (see Chapter 5). On 17 January, having been pushed for primarily by those interested in seeing a non-violent solution to the LRA conflict, the long-awaited Amnesty Act was put in place. Many question-marks had hung over its development: Could it work without direct negotiations – peace talks – with the rebels? Would it be right to give unconditional amnesty, without ensuring that the culprits admitted and atoned for their crimes and some guarantee that they would not re-offend? What would be the implications for civil liability vis-à-vis Acholi who refused to recognise traditional inter-clan reconciliation mechanisms such as mato oput and compensation payments for damage done or lives taken (culo kwor)? How would it accommodate non-Acholi who might insist on enforcing their rights through civil courts? The timing and actual implementation of the Amnesty law were also concerns: should it begin before preparations to receive, demobilise and resettle returnees were completed?
As finally formulated, the Act offered amnesty for ‘any Ugandan who has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion against the government of the Republic of Uganda’. Persons who voluntarily renounced such acts were to be pardoned and excused from criminal prosecution. To avoid the Commission having to deal with the large numbers abducted and returned within a matter of days or weeks it was only available for former LRA members who were above twelve years of age and who had stayed with the LRA for more than four months. In all other respects it was a ‘blanket’ amnesty, open to all members of rebel groups, including the leadership. It was initially to run for six months, with the possibility of extension by the Minister for Internal Affairs. Due both to lack of funding (the Government provided the Commission with just under U.S. $1 million annually for administrative costs) and, some would argue, lack of political will, the amnesty process took some time to be put in place, with the Commission officially appointed in July 2000, and the Gulu and Kitgum offices opened in February and July 2001 respectively.
In parallel with these processes, a reasonable degree of security had been re-established relatively quickly in early 2000 following the LRA's angry outburst in late December 2001. By some accounts the LRA was under considerable pressure within Sudan in the wake of the Nairobi peace accord, and was seeking to make links with the Equatoria Defence Forces, a Sudanese rebel force operating in South Sudan. They finally met with the Carter Center in February 2000, and in July a ministerial meeting was hosted in Atlanta at which the Atlanta Joint Action Plan for the Implementation of the Nairobi Agreement was drawn up. A further meeting was convened in Khartoum in October 2000, and another in November, this time in Nairobi.
The UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that ‘improved security and access in northern Uganda encouraged many relief agencies to establish semi-permanent offices in Acholiland. The number of agencies involved with relief assistance increased from five in mid-1996 to over 60 by end-2000’ (UNOCHA 2001: 14). A severe outbreak of Ebola haemorrhagic fever in Gulu district in late 2000 (thought by some to have been brought back from the DRC by a returning soldier) fuelled local and international calls for the dismantling of the protected villages.
On 3 June 2001 the Carter Center hosted a further implementation meeting in Nairobi. Gulu District's LCV Chairman met with the LRA on 4 June 2001, and the Government declared a demilitarized zone. In a further implementation meeting in Nairobi in November 2001, a letter was written to Kony asking him to participate in the dialogue, but to no avail. By late 2001, UNOCHA was reporting increased movement between camps and home areas in both Gulu and Kitgum, and that ‘Although District authorities have not directed ‘decongestion’ per se, there are numerous reports of people responding to new deployments by UPDF and creating settlements close to these. New smaller camps have been set up (from large camps) throughout the sub-county, especially around larger camps like Pabbo’ (OCHA, December 2001, reported in Global IDP database).39
At a political level, 2000 saw a contentious referendum on the continued viability of the ‘Movement’ political system, and 2001 saw President Museveni's re-election for a second term, though with virtually no support in the northern districts. Pader district was created out of the southern half of Kitgum district. During this period, the Amnesty Act although intended primarily for the LRA, in practice proved more popular with non-LRA insurgent groups. When the Gulu diocese Justice and Peace Commission investigated the fact that less than 400 LRA members had taken up amnesty by April 2002, they concluded that ‘Groups in Acholi civil society have always held that a blanket amnesty is a crucial instrument in bringing a lasting peace to the troubled region. However, two and a half years after being passed by the Parliament of Uganda, the effects of the Amnesty Law in Acholi are not very much in evidence’.40 Worse still, they found that over half of returnees were being pressurised to incorporate into the UPDF.
Throughout this phase, religious leaders made attempts to meet with LRA members, but these were generally disrupted by the UPDF. Meanwhile, pressure on the LRA from both inside and outside Uganda appeared to be increasing. The EU drew up a resolution in