Social Torture. Chris Dolan
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be as important as the conflict they all purported to be seeking a solution to. Indeed, at times even the civil society actors seemed to be fighting over who would be the one to bring peace. More importantly, perhaps, young men in their thousands were driven to join armed forces, whether the UPDF, the various militias set up in 2003, or indeed the LRA itself. What lay behind this phenomenon?
And what, given the evident involvement of international actors in various dimensions of the situation, are we to make of their relative importance in resolving or perpetuating the conflict? External involvement went beyond funding humanitarian or developmental schemes to include military training and other types of ‘non-lethal assistance’. External support was also critical to what initially appears to be a very ‘local’ initiative, namely the revival of traditional leadership structures. This initiative was almost entirely driven by externally generated ideas and funding. Yet calls for an explicitly political intervention by the United Nations were ignored.77 This prompts many to ask ‘How bad does a situation have to get before action is taken?’, beneath which lies a possibly more important question, namely what exactly is it that enables decision-makers to excuse their own ‘inaction’? How was it that in an era of global communications, there was so little international outrage over this situation which, rather than being hidden away in torture chambers, could potentially be made visible to the public eye through various media, with the threat of at the least possible comparisons with the situation in southern Sudan, and at worst politically and economically damaging charges of complicity in abuses and atrocities? Where, in a world of ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’, were those with the power to influence and intervene, and why were they not more active?
Notes
1. For an exploration of these tensions with regard to conflict in East Timor, see Dolan, 2004.
2. Samuel Baker built Patiko Fort in 1872 on the former site of an outpost for slavers.
3. This is not to mythologize the past; it is clear that subsistence in northern Uganda was always more difficult than in what is now southern Uganda. R. M. Bere, one of the first British administrators of the Acholi District, argued that ‘A struggle for existence has governed much of the tribal history’ (Bere, 1947: 5).
4. By January 2002, the District Veterinary Officer reported that Gulu had 6,800 head of cattle, 2010 of which came through the unpopular government programme of restocking, while others were bought from neighbouring districts (KM e-newsletter no 5, 15 February 2002).
5. For discussion on the extent to which considering the Acholi as purely a colonial construct may itself be a continuation of an ‘imperial dialogue’ which ignores pre and post-colonial identity formation processes, see Finnström, 2003; Chapter 2.
6. Gulu, 4 August 1998. He also reported that in World War II there were some 1,600 members of the King's African Rifles from Gulu and Kitgum (at that time all Gulu district), of whom about 800 were still alive and members of the King's African Rifles Association.
7. One explanation offered to me for why the Catholic Church in Gulu was slow to set up its Justice and Peace Commission (on 1 June 1998) was that ‘the Gulu church is more DP sympathetic, while Kampala Peace and Justice is more NRM aligned’ (discussion with Pax Christi representative, 5 June 1998).
8. For discussion of the ways in which anthropology was used to legitimise regional differences, see Finnström, 2003; Chapter 3.
9. Exactly who was actually involved in each of these examples is highly contested, in particular responsibility for atrocities in the Luwero triangle.
10. Gulu, 7 June 1998. When a local NGO, Peoples Voice for Peace, attempted to document the matter, they found it almost impossible to interview the victims themselves, and were obliged to interview women who were familiar with the cases instead (personal communication).
11. According to O'Kadameri these were actually started in 1992 by Betty Bigombe (2002: 36).
12. A wide open space near the middle of Gulu town, used for various public purposes.
13. Awere and Awac in 1993, Atiak in 1994 – all were displaced again (see Chapter 5).
14. The first major meeting was held on 25 November 1993 in Pagik parish, Aswa county, and a second followed on 10th January 1994. A third meeting was held at Atoo Hills on 22nd January, and a fourth on 2 February 1994.
15. Interview with elder, Gulu 8 August 1998.
16. Examples included 11 August 1996, 29 August 1996, 4 September 1997, 4 July 1998, 16 January 2000 (see also Finnström, 2003: 240).
17. The Monitor, 11 December 1997, ‘Museveni Admits U.S. Help Against Sudan’.
18. New Vision, 8 June 1998, ‘Kony: DP Attacks Albright’.
19. Gulu, 27 September 1999.
20. A tongue-in-cheek reference to the Museveni Government.
21. An allusion to the U.S.A.
22. The issue of the SPLA included their mobilisation within Uganda, with support from the Ugandan government (Professor Barbara Harrell-Bond, 30 September 1999).
23. New Vision, 26 June 1998 ‘UNICEF Condemns Kony’.
24. New Vision, 11 July 1998, ‘Ethiopian Pilot Killed In Crash’.
25. The Monitor, 14 July 1998, ‘LRA Claims It Shot Down Chopper’.
26. New Vision, 2 April 1998, ‘Kony for London Acholi meeting’.
27. Odek Pilot Report, 21 July 1998.
28. New Vision, 11 June 1998, ‘Acholi Exiles Criticise Museveni’.
29. New Vision, 18 July 1998, ‘Kony Gives Conditions For Peace Negotiations’.
30. New Vision, 17 July 1998, ‘War Damages Uganda's Image’.
31. The Monitor, 3 February 1998, ‘Saleh Admits UPDF's Mistakes’.
32. Hon. Norbert Mao and Hon. Daniel Omara Atubo.
33. Parliamentary Buildings, Kampala, Uganda, January 1997.
34. The centre opened on 23 March 1997 with only 10 children. Designed to handle 75 children at a time, by January 1998, when I first visited, it had 263, of whom 32 were girls. The most recent arrivals said that once a girl has conceived she is taken to Sudan, from where it is more difficult to escape, hence the lower number of girl returnees. Since March they had reunited 306 boys and 60 girls with their families. Some children were directed to GUSCO by the RDC, most came from the military. GUSCO informed the army if they had any weapons on them. UNICEF had provided a lot of mattresses and nominated the centre for an award, WFP had given high protein biscuits, and the British High Commission had given 33 million Uganda shillings.
35. New Vision, 3 March 1998, ‘Kony Victims to Get Sh 44m’.
36. The Monitor, 26 March 1998, ‘Mrs Clinton Blasts Kony’.
37. New Vision, 4 July 1998, ‘Acholi Leaders to Meet Kony Men’.
38. Correspondence on the diaspora listserve Acholinet estimated the figure at a questionable 25,000.
39. www.idpproject.org: Profile of Internal Displacement: Uganda, 11 October 2002, p 78.
40. Justice and Peace News (Gulu Diocese), Vol. 2 No 3, June 2002.
41. New Vision, 20 January 2002, ‘Uganda Rebels Face U.K. Courts’.
42. Under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, these include placing explosive or other lethal device in public places with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, direct involvement or complicity in the murder, kidnapping or maiming or attack on a person or group of persons, and seizure or detention of hostages in order to compel a State, an international or inter-governmental organ, a person or group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act. Persons found guilty