Point of View 2-Book Bundle. Douglas L. Bland
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not so subtly, reminded of the expectations of me as a member of the team. Shortly thereafter, I was transferred off of the Justice Committee, albeit largely for reasons unrelated to my above attempt to hold the government to account and in compliance with the law.
3. The Caucus
I suppose that if there was a criticism of my performance as a member of the Conservative government caucus it was that I was not a team player. If my critics equate being a team player with being a government cheerleader, I concede the point.
Now, within caucus, there are obviously differing understandings of this role both in concept and in application. There are those who believe members, owing their election to the party and the party leader, are essentially an extension of the Prime Minister’s Office Communications Branch. Proponents of this model believe it is the purpose of MPs to read prepared lines in the House and then return to the ridings on break weeks to continue the selling of the government’s messaging. Any straying from approved communication lines is viewed as going rogue.
When I served as a Conservative MP, I took a more nuanced view of my role as a backbench caucus member. As a member of the government caucus, I was loyal to the party and to the leader, under whose banner I was elected. Accordingly, I felt obliged to support the government’s legislative agenda and I believe my voting record reflected consistency in that regard. However, supporting the government does not, in my view, necessitate blindly and mindlessly supporting everything the government says or does.
In my view, the constructive criticism of government initiatives is not the equivalent of mutiny, or even disloyalty. Quite the opposite actually; sycophants and yes-men are certainly less valuable to a government’s performance than constructive critics who demonstrate their loyalty by challenging the government to continually perform even better. Whereas a yes-man will continue to cheer blindly even as it becomes obvious that a policy is going off the rails, the constructive critic, not shy of speaking truth to power, will advise his caucus colleagues of the proposed policy’s shortcomings in order that improvements can be made — changes that will ensure that the final policy is sound. In so doing, he demonstrates his loyalty to his party and his government.
Traditional caucus loyalists believe that all differences between caucus members ought to be resolved in caucus behind closed doors; once a position is determined, the party leaves the caucus room united and singing from a single song sheet. It all seems perfectly reasonable; however, as appealing as in camera discussions might be for those concerned only with the party’s interests, they do absolutely nothing to promote the public interest. When a decision is under consideration behind closed doors, it is inevitable that political ramifications will also be under consideration. How will this initiative be viewed by the base? How will the voters react in the strategic swing ridings? How will the party’s fundraising be affected?
These partisan considerations might be extremely important to party operatives, but they are of absolutely no relevance to the taxpaying constituents that a Member of Parliament is supposed to be representing. In order to ensure that it is the public’s interests rather than the party’s interests that are being considered, transparency demands that important matters be decided in public.
A public discussion of the issues would ensure that the points of view of the various stakeholders are heard and considered. Such is certainly not the case in a typical CPC caucus meeting, which in fact barely qualifies as a meeting. The process is completely controlled by the party leadership and more closely resembles a briefing than a meeting. There are no motions; there are no votes. There is no Roberts Rules of Order.
Caucus members do receive updates, and they hear from the prime minister how great they all are and how Canadians trust only them to manage the country, especially the economy. To remove any doubt, caucus members are provided talking points, canned stump speeches, and sample letters to the editors of local newspapers, all designed to reinforce the government’s messaging and the caucus member’s role in distributing those communications to his or her constituents.
Members are briefed about the government’s plans and proposed legislative initiatives. However, these plans and initiatives are often news to the caucus members as, frequently, no notes will have been distributed in advance to provide background. That deficiency significantly compromises the caucus members’ ability to ask researched or meaningful questions.
More problematic, no votes are ever taken inside the government caucus room. A minister will brief the caucus concerning a legislative initiative she intends to introduce. She will take questions and will attempt to provide clarification and satisfy concerns caucus members may have. But the government bill will not formally (or informally) be approved by the caucus. Caucus members will subsequently be whipped, or instructed, to support a bill or motion that they have had the opportunity to discuss but have never had the opportunity to approve.
An Opposition motion or bill will similarly be presented to the caucus. The government will state its position; there will be a discussion of it and the opportunity to ask questions. But no vote will ever take place. Caucus members will be expected to follow the government’s position regarding the proposal but will never have the opportunity to ratify that government position.
This is very different from situation that existed in the provincial Progressive Conservative caucus of Ralph Klein, which I had the pleasure of serving in from 2001–2004. Premier Klein ran what at least approximated a democratic caucus. No legislative proposal could make it to the floor of the Alberta Legislature without first having been vetted, then supported by an actual vote at a standing policy committee of the caucus and finally by a show-of-hands vote at a full caucus meeting.
The party whip would ask for a show of hands on all matters before the caucus. If the result was not obvious, hands would remain up until a formal count could be taken. If a minister’s recommendation was defeated, the minister could tweak the proposal or remedy the defect and bring it back for approval, but nothing made it onto the floor of the legislature without caucus approval.
I was able to use that democratic vetting process in 2003 to delay radical changes to Alberta’s automobile insurance regime for over a year. In a well-publicized display of democracy in action, Finance Minister Pat Nelson had to modify her legislative proposals, which capped injury claims, several times. It was not until she changed the legislation to include public consultation and a mandatory legislative review in the future that the bill received the requisite caucus support and could proceed to First Reading in the Alberta Legislature.
There is no comparable vetting or approval process in the caucus of the Conservative Party of Canada. In a partial, but woefully inadequate, attempt to remedy this defect, the government established Caucus Advisory Committees (CACs) several years ago. The CACs are comprised of the caucus members who are assigned to various committees; other caucus members may attend, but the schedules are not published.
The aptly named advisory committees are briefed on imminent legislation initiatives and can ask questions and provide input. Informal votes are sometimes taken, but these are completely non-binding on the minister — a fact that perfectly illustrates the focus-group relevance of the CPC caucus including the CACs. For example, the Justice CAC unanimously approved salary disclosure, in PMB C-461 (also known as the CBC and Public Disclosure Act), at $188,000. However, the committee’s approval of this bill did not prevent the executive from instructing the evisceration of the CBC and Public Disclosure Act at the Access and Ethics Committee. As with all other aspects of their role as members of that caucus, MPs are expected to willingly and unequivocally follow the will of the party leadership.
As a result, the government caucus plays no meaningful or substantive role in holding the government to account.
4. The Senate
On Tuesday, March 05, 2013, the House of Commons was debating an NDP Opposition day motion seeking to abolish the “chamber of sober second thought” (the Senate). They cited recent well-publicized allegations against specific senators as a rationale for mothballing the $92 million upper house. I listened intently to their argument, but was not remotely persuaded, save to the extent that recent developments reinforce the need to reform the Senate.
Firstly, every institution has members who have