Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina. Antonius C. G. M. Robben
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A public display of support was the most effective means to aid the aging leader.
This show of support was made on 21 July 1973. A column of eighty thousand Peronist Youth members marched on Perón’s residence at Gaspar Campos Street. Perón was not at home but invited four representatives to meet him in Olivos.30 The JP leaders felt that they had finally gotten through to Perón, but soon after their departure, the government press agency announced that Perón had appointed the right-wing López Rega as his go-between with the Peronist Youth.
A new public display became now the only recourse to break the cordon, and tip the balance in favor of the left wing. The opportunity arrived on 31 August 1973 when Perón reviewed a parade in support of his presidential candidacy from the balcony of the CGT union headquarters. The Peronist left regarded this parade both as a showdown with the labor unions and as an opportunity to convince Perón that their political line mustered the greatest popular support.
The extraordinary importance given to the crowd competition can be inferred from the meticulous reporting by the Peronist Youth magazine El Descamisado about the amount of time each column spent passing before the CGT headquarters. The labor unions took two hours and forty-five minutes, while the Peronist Youth groups marched for two hours and forty-two minutes in much tighter columns and at a faster pace.31 The Peronist left believed they had won the contest and broken the cordon around Perón. The revolutionary process could start afresh.32
This belief was strengthened by the visit of the FAR and Montoneros leaders Roberto Quieto and Mario Firmenich to Perón on Wednesday 5 September, and again three days later in the company of the principal leaders of the Peronist Youth. Unbeknownst to them, Perón was playing a Machiavellian game with stakes he soon failed to control. He raised their expectations because he needed their support for the upcoming elections, but had already cast his lot with the unions, the traditional vertical backbone of the Peronist movement. As Perón remarked at the beginning of September 1973, the time had not yet come for a generational rejuvenation because the country’s reconstruction would take several years: “the boys will be in charge three years from now.”33 But the revolutionary Peronists were unwilling to wait three years while the Peronist right continued its advance into power.
Perón into Power
The presidential elections of 23 September 1973 were won overwhelmingly by Juan Domingo Perón.34 Perón had not toured the country during the election campaign, and there were no massive rallies. The victory was as expected, but the ballot needed to be ratified by a massive Peronist crowd at Perón’s inaugural speech at the Plaza de Mayo. El Descamisado expressed this sentiment of 12 October 1973, as follows: “The square almost came down when he said ‘Comrades.’ How much did that moment cost, that word and spoken from up there, from that balcony…. Many felt a shiver running down their spine. There were tears. Embraces. Others shouted like crazy. And some even lowered their head. This ‘Comrades’ was, crystal clear, the end of ‘the battle of eighteen years.’ And those present in the square were the witnesses of the signing of the triumph of this first battle.”35 The deaths of Ezeiza and Cámpora’s resignation seemed forgotten when Perón dedicated a special word to the second-generation Peronists: “I want to send our deepest affection to these young people who are our hope, together with the most sincere appeal that they should work and become qualified. Because young people will be the artisans of the future we are dreaming of.”36
These words gave new hope to the revolutionary Peronists. The cordon had been broken, Perón was now in charge, and the generational rejuvenation remained firm in place. The leader-crowd dynamic was once again the compass of Peronist rule. Perón told the crowd that “following an old Peronist custom, I will present myself each year on the first day of May at this same place to ask the people gathered here whether they agree with the government we are leading.”37 Little did Perón know that the belief of the second-generation Peronists in the mythical leader-crowd dialogues would precipitate their falling out with him on 1 May 1974. Nevertheless, in October 1973 the crowd romance was still in full bloom, and the revolutionary Peronists were convinced that their tireless crowd mobilizations had paid off.
Once Perón was in power, the Peronist Youth and Montoneros realized that he did not accept their radical proposals. He continued to advocate a pact among labor, capital, and government, while rejecting the class struggle.38 Perón stated that the labor unions constituted the vertical backbone of the Peronist movement, and he passed legislation which increased the power of the Peronist union centrals at the expense of the more radical Independent and clasista unions.39 The revolutionary Peronist left was dumbfounded and concluded that Perón was surrounded again by traitors and bureaucrats incapable of defending the true essence of Peronism. In their eyes, the political situation of 1973 resembled that of 1955, and they were not going to stand by passively and watch the revolution being crushed. They also concluded that street mobilizations had outlived their political usefulness.
Crowd mobilizations were abandoned and replaced by two tactics: grass roots organization and guerrilla actions. The grass roots work consisted of recruiting new members, developing local organizations in neighborhoods and slums, and founding new chapters (unidades básicas).40 The guerrilla actions entailed an increased harassment of labor union chapters, and the elimination of union leaders. A deadly feud developed between the Peronist right and the Peronist left which will be discussed in chapter seven.
Crowd Rupture with Perón
The tense relationship between Perón and the revolutionary Peronists deteriorated further between late 1973 and early January 1974. Five elements contributed to this situation. One, the government proposed in December 1973 tougher laws on political violence.41 The Montoneros declared that Perón had always maintained that the violence from above generates the violence from below. If a truly popular Peronist government had been in power, then there would not have been any cause for political violence.42 Two, Perón stated on 10 January 1974 that he would “impose the Social Pact” if need be.43 The revolutionary Peronists felt betrayed. In their eyes, Perón was making common cause with the Peronist right, the oligarchy, and the multinational corporations. Three, on 19 January 1974 the Marxist People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) attacked the Azul army base. Perón was furious, and insinuated a complicity of the governor of Buenos Aires, Oscar Bidegain. Bidegain sympathized with the Revolutionary Tendency, and was replaced by his vice-governor Victorio Calabró, an important right-wing union leader. Four, the guerrilla attack gave Perón further reason to pass his tough laws on political violence. He cowed eight left-wing Peronist congressmen into stepping down in case of dissent.44 The congressmen resigned on 24 January, and the new legislation was approved on 25 January. The next day a dozen Peronist Youth chapters were bombed. The political position of the Peronist left was caving in rapidly with the loss of governor Bidegain, the eight congressmen, and the assaults on local branches. Finally, the Peronist Youth leaders had a personal falling out with Perón on 1 February. When Perón invited thirty-six representatives of an array of youth organizations, including many small right-wing groups, to reopen a dialogue, the Peronist Youth leaders refused to attend. This affront worsened the relations even more, and the pressure increased on the Peronist left in the party, the movement, and on the street. Prominent leaders were arrested, the left-leaning Peronist governor of Córdoba was deposed, the popular magazine El Descamisado was forbidden, and street demonstrations were repressed.
To make matters worse, the Peronist left was also weakened from the inside. Political differences made several groups turn away from the principal Peronist Youth and Montonero leaders in January 1974. One dissident group expressed its unswerving loyalty to Perón, a second group favored grass roots mobilization, and a third wanted a more confrontational opposition to the Peronist right.45 The Peronist left was falling apart and losing political ground. They embarked deliberately on a collision course with Perón. Aside from guerrilla operations, their principal weapon became once again the crowd. They were going to demonstrate their power of mobilization at Perón’s appearance at Plaza de Mayo on 1 May 1974.
The 11 March demonstration in the Atlanta soccer stadium was the general rehearsal for