The Female Circumcision Controversy. Ellen Gruenbaum
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valuable both to the understanding of humanity, a fundamental goal of anthropology, and to practical efforts to prevent these practices. For issues less likely to be altered by legislation or war, understanding why it may be in the interests of certain groups to continue practices judged harmful by others is a basic prerequisite for any efforts to convince others to change.
My point is that in order to benefit from the insights of the suspended judgment used in cultural relativism, individuals need not disavow all ethical considerations. And if an individual’s ethics are derived from a particular religious or cultural tradition, that does not automatically disqualify them as ethnocentric. Indeed, when there is dialogue, many of our culturally based human values can be seen to transcend cultures.
Genocide and slavery provide stark examples of cross-cultural ethical judgments; the response to other practices is not as clear to many of us. Consider infanticide. Although one might believe it is wrong to kill or abandon a healthy, unwanted infant after it is born, it is possible to arrive at understanding and sympathy for the moral position of a mother who has committed infanticide without oneself approving of infanticide as a customarily tolerated practice. In a situation of rural isolation, poverty, maternal malnutrition, cultural permission, and no apparent alternatives, a mother may be faced with a situation in which a new baby presents an unacceptable risk to the survival of her fourteen-month-old child who is also dependent on her milk. Early weaning of a toddler in a situation where other sources of milk or nutritious weaning foods are not available could easily lead to that child’s death through malnutrition and consequent infectious diseases. In fact, “kwashiorkor,” the name for a severe nutritional deficiency disease, means “second-child disease,” indicating that the disease is related to early weaning after the arrival of a new infant (Wood 1979:73). Faced with the risk of losing an older child to whom she and her family are already attached and in whom she has invested a great deal of effort, a mother might understandably consider protecting that child from the competition of a new, unwanted infant. If in addition the new infant has some disadvantage—a physical handicap, say, or being female in a social situation where sons are vital—the mother might make the difficult choice of infanticide, for which she would not be considered immoral in that society. (For one such example, see Chagnon 1983. See also Scheper-Hughes’s study of motherhood in the impoverished conditions of urban Brazil, Death Without Weeping, 1992.)
In the case of infanticide, pronouncing a moral judgment is really beside the point. What is to be gained by calling such a mother a murderer? Will an external condemnation serve as a deterrent to future such incidents? Or would changing the economic, educational, nutritional, and other social opportunities be a more effective route to change?
Where change is desirable and urgent, pronouncing moral judgments may have a place. But while it may be psychologically satisfying to pass judgment on the practices of others, it is not particularly useful unless the person is already in agreement with you. With issues like female circumcision, utilizing relativism is often more fruitful because it requires contextualization and inhibits crude ethnocentric prejudices that interfere with effective dialogue. Exploring the context produces clues about what changes would be necessary to allow for changes in the unfortunate practice and what factors might create obstacles to change. Infanticide can disappear when change occurs in the conditions that fostered it, as when economic conditions improve, allowing for more adequate nutrition. One can also expect that changes in cultural conditions, such as the strong preference for sons (which is itself frequently based on old-age security considerations of parents) found in many cultures where female infanticide has been accepted, could also help to reduce infanticide. If rural communities offered better opportunities for children and if a government introduced policies to allow girls the same educational and employment opportunities as boys, this could facilitate a cultural transition away from male-child preference. But under what conditions would a government introduce such policies? And is it acceptable for state power to interfere with cultural preferences? Can a state be assumed to represent the legitimate interests of the peoples it governs, even if some groups oppose the cultural standards imposed?
Strong cultural relativists question whether it is justified to strive to change the culture of others or whether a basic right of cultural self-determination prohibits external interference. In this view, to offer or impose changes rooted in the values and cultural traditions of powerful external forces constitutes cultural imperialism. Wasn’t this exactly the sort of justification used by European powers to conquer and subjugate other regions of the world?
The arguments that it was the “white man’s burden” to carry out a “civilizing mission” in Africa and other lands are now well understood as the ideological cover used to justify economic and social exploitation of subjugated peoples. The idea that “native” peoples should be Christianized and civilized served to garner public opinion in Europe for invasion and establishment of colonial domination around the world. With this justification, willful destruction of indigenous lifeways was carried forth for centuries as powerful countries imposed their economic systems and social values on peoples whose traditional cultures did not deserve the opprobrium they received. And Christianity, capitalism, and related governmental forms have been dogged by numerous economic, moral, and social problems of their own.
Thus it is appropriate to be cautious about the assumption that what seems self-evident and obviously “right” and “wrong” to a Western “us” is universally so. Shifting viewpoints can produce different understandings of the apparent purposes of social actions. Anthropologists, with their deep training in cultural sensitivity, may be more diligent in looking for ulterior motives and unforeseen effects of culture change initiatives undertaken by reformers, public health educators, and others working for change and development. Yet ultimately anthropologists, too, are affected by their own cultural backgrounds and beliefs.
Mahnaz Afkhami, a feminist activist with the Sisterhood Is Global Institute, has noticed that even those Western feminists who attempt to exercise cultural sensitivity at times display what she calls “arrogance”: “I have seen a lot more sensitivity from Western feminists in the last few years, but … sometimes their attempts at cultural awareness and sensitivity can go too far, as we see among those Western women who say that female circumcision … is just another cultural practice. But this cultural relativism is just another example of … arrogance…. It is as if Western feminists are saying ‘okay, a whole set of norms apply to us and our culture, and a whole other set of norms applies to these other cultures’” (Afkhami 1996:17).
Thus the analysis of the causality and roots of female circumcision practices is intricately linked to the need to assess and evaluate change efforts in terms of their intent and effect. Is an effort to change based partly on ethnocentric values? Or is it a response to human needs? Is it responsive to the priorities for change of the population affected by a policy? Can the policy be effective if it is perceived as ethnocentric?
There is no clear rule for how to decide when one is applying a universal moral standard and when one is seeing the world through the moral values of one’s own culture. Although there are philosophers who confidently assert universal moral principles, it is nevertheless quite difficult to persuade people with strongly held beliefs to accept any one set of “universal” values. Assertion, appeals to reason, or complex logical arguments cannot easily dislodge beliefs rooted in culture, faith, emotion, a different philosophical perspective, or lack of knowledge.
This dilemma is at the core of the female circumcision controversy. Although many people have achieved strong, clear views, others do not accept their reasoning or have strong views of their own. A fruitful dialogue requires a clearer understanding on all sides, not strongly stated moral judgments.
As immigrants have brought female circumcision practices with them to the countries of Europe and North America, and as the interconnectedness of the world’s peoples increases, the issue of the harm to the health of women and girls becomes a global concern. The insider/outsider differences in standpoint blur, intensifying the need to achieve some consensus on universal human rights to guide policy. It is incumbent upon North Americans and Europeans to become informed about female circumcision—to overcome misconceptions, to understand possible routes toward change, and to identify a constructive role in change efforts. But it is equally important to keep in mind the differing perspectives