Fateful Transitions. Daniel M. Kliman
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unilaterally build and operate an isthmian canal, the agreement stopped short of abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Moreover, the new Hay-Pauncefote Treaty restricted American freedom of action by banning fortifications, neutralizing the canal during wartime, and opening the agreement to third parties. Finding these restrictions unpalatable, the Senate only ratified the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty after adding several amendments. The British government refused to approve the modified treaty, but soon welcomed a new round of negotiations. The resulting agreement—the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty—effectively incorporated all the Senate’s amendments: the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was explicitly abrogated; neutralization of the canal during wartime was not formally guaranteed; and the internationalization clause was removed. Beyond these concessions, Great Britain also dropped the clause prohibiting fortification.42 By the end of the isthmian canal controversy, British capitulation to U.S. demands was complete.
The last major Anglo-American dispute at the turn of the twentieth century occurred over the ill-defined border between Alaska and Canada. The Canadians largely accepted U.S. interpretation of the boundary until the Klondike gold rush of 1896. Aiming to obtain a port giving access to the gold fields, Canada demanded that the United States submit the Alaskan panhandle to arbitration involving a neutral party. From the outset, the United States rejected arbitration. Although skeptical of the Canadian claims, the British government initially sought to extract U.S. concessions by linking the Alaskan boundary dispute to negotiations over the isthmian canal. In the face of mounting U.S. frustration, Great Britain retreated and delinked the two issues.43
Unable to agree on arbitration, the United States and Great Britain reached a temporary arrangement in 1899.44 Hay reopened the dispute in 1901 by proposing the creation of a binational commission to resolve the conflicting claims. By mid-1902, President Theodore Roosevelt was determined that Great Britain should acquiesce to the U.S. formula for delineating the border. As a show of resolve and also to keep order in an unruly frontier, he dispatched a company of cavalry to the Alaskan panhandle.45
The British government, though hoping for international arbitration, ultimately acquiesced to the U.S. formula, and in January 1903, the two sides concluded the Hay-Herbert Treaty. The agreement stipulated that each party would furnish three “impartial jurists of repute” to determine the true boundary. While Great Britain selected legal eminences to represent Canada, the United States appointed blatantly partial commissioners, including a sitting secretary of war. Nonetheless, the British government accepted the American appointments. Moreover, when the commission became deadlocked, the British representative broke with his Canadian counterparts to support the U.S. claim.46 Like the Venezuela crisis and the isthmian canal controversy, the Alaskan boundary dispute featured unilateral British concessions.
British appeasement of the United States, though continuing for almost a decade, was always a transitional strategy. The purpose of appeasement was to stabilize Anglo-American relations to the point where long-term integration became viable. Seen from this perspective, accommodating the United States on Venezuela was a first step toward eliminating sources of conflict. The next steps were agreement on an isthmian canal and resolution of the Alaskan boundary dispute.47 Colonial Secretary Chamberlain’s assessment of Canadian claims to the Alaskan panhandle gives a tangible sense of the rationale underlying British appeasement of the United States. “I care very little for the points in dispute, but I care immensely for the consequential advantages of a thorough understanding between the two countries and the removal of these trumpery causes of irritation.”48
America’s Rise: Democracy Reassures
Great Britain favored a strategy of appeasement because democratic rule in an ascendant United States reduced risk and bolstered trust. Operating in an open society, the British could accurately survey U.S. intentions. Observing American politics in the years preceding the Venezuela crisis, the British diplomat Cecil Spring-Rice, having served a tour in Washington, could contextualize outbursts of Anglophobe sentiment as “not so much hatred as jealousy.”49 There was “no point on which the interests of the U.S. and G.B. are diametrically opposed, and neither wishes to take the other’s territory.”50 In this view, a lingering sense of inferiority might impel the United States to quarrel with Great Britain, but its intentions were at heart benign.
Democratic government in the United States also generated access opportunities the British could exploit. With diverse groups influencing American foreign policy, an “English faction” existed in Washington and New York, respectively the power and money centers of the United States. This provided a basis for shaping American strategic behavior. British officials self-consciously cultivated the English faction. For example, Spring-Rice in 1887 worked to ensure a warm London reception for the daughter of the anglophile secretary of state, Thomas Bayard.51 The open nature of the American political system also afforded diplomats like Spring-Rice a chance to develop close ties with U.S. political elites. During his first tour of Washington, Spring-Rice was hosted by senators and senior officials, and while staying with the secretary of war, attended an impromptu cabinet meeting.52 Friendships translated into access, and “Whatever may be said of the relations, politically speaking, of England and America, one thing is absolutely certain—in no country can we Englishmen make such friendships.”53 Relationships between Anglo-American elites meant Great Britain had allies within the U.S. government sensitive to its interests.
The Venezuela Crisis
America’s democratic institutions functioned as a powerful source of reassurance during the Venezuela crisis, preventing a diplomatic row from escalating into war. As the crisis unfolded, congressional actions and media uproar indicated that the United States would only pursue war as a last resort. Within a week of Cleveland’s bellicose message, the Senate and the House of Representatives unanimously voted to fund a commission to determine the boundary of Venezuela. This signaled American resolve, but also that Republican and Democratic politicians were only prepared to support war if Great Britain ultimately rejected the commission’s findings. Popular support for war, like that of Congress, was conditioned on future British intransigence. American newspapers affirmed that “Whether There Will Be War Now Rests with England,” and that when the true boundary was fixed, “if England shall overstep it, it will mean war!”54 Congress and public opinion conveyed that the United States would only undertake military action against Great Britain after the boundary commission had rendered a decision. The restraint telegraphed by Congress and the press registered in Great Britain. Prime Minister Salisbury and Ambassador Pauncefote understood that Cleveland, in committing to a U.S. commission, had postponed an Anglo-American showdown. Likewise, Colonial Secretary Chamberlain recognized that the “American affair cannot become serious for some time…. Altogether it must be months before there is a real crisis.”55
As the crisis continued, America’s free press made visible changes in the U.S. government’s position. Newspaper reporting suggested that the commission had a less objectionable mission than unilaterally delineating the Venezuelan boundary. On December 25, the New York World published a story titled “Won’t Dictate the Line.” The story quoted Senator George Gray, a political ally of Cleveland. According to Gray, the purpose of the commission was “solely to inform the conscience of the government and the American people…. The United States does not assume to delimit a frontier for Great Britain.”56 Gray’s remarks were subsequently noted in the British press. Because of Gray’s close relationship to Cleveland, many British officials assumed that he was speaking for the president. Consequently, the British government could ascertain a softening of the U.S. position weeks before the American ambassador in London officially communicated the commission’s watered-down objective—obtaining information.57
The U.S. media also illuminated a shift in a key shaper of foreign policy: popular opinion. Although the initial public reaction to Cleveland’s message was bellicose, antiwar sentiment soon surged. By December 20, a leading financial journal, expressing the opinion of the U.S. business community, warned that a “great mistake had been made.”58 The number of newspapers critical of Cleveland’s policy rapidly increased. Joseph Pulitzer, editor of the New York World, spearheaded a growing reconciliation movement and on the first