From Jail to Jail. Tan Malaka
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both as a theoretician and an activist. In particular he was an educator, both in a mass sense, breaking the debilitating and suffocating role of the Dutch colonial education system, and in a narrower sense, in being the first Indonesian to articulate the Marxist analysis and to develop and popularize it in mass appeal during the independence struggle.
He projected the unfolding of the Indonesian revolution, in particular the fundamental place of the nationalist struggle in that revolution, and developed a strategy for the PKI in the 1920s and a fighting program for the Persatuan Perjuangan in the 1940s. He provided a link between the ideas and objectives of the pre-1926 PKI and the physical struggle for independence some twenty years later. Above all Tan Malaka was one of the most determined and uncompromising advocates of resistance and struggle for 100 percent merdeka.
POSTSCRIPT
Tan Malaka concluded From Jail to Jail in March 1948. It seems strange that, although he developed a detailed analysis of the Renville Agreement, signed in January 1948, he virtually ignored the February 1948 change of government in which Hatta replaced Amir Sjarifuddin as prime minister.1
Some observers have characterized this change of government as a Putsch and as the first step in the demolition of the PKI that culminated eight months later in Madiun.2 From Tan Malaka’s perspective, however, the overriding question was still 100 percent merdeka and the means to obtain it. The fact that Amir negotiated Renville, and that Hatta continued to defend it, meant for Tan Malaka that the two governments were of similar character according to his fundamental criterion of perjuangan versus diplomasi. And so it would appear: the PKI, having thrown in its lot with diplomasi, would have little to call on in terms of trust and popular confidence when its partners in diplomasi turned against it.3
In early 1948 several ex-leaders of the Persatuan Perjuangan who were pro-Tan Malaka established the Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat (People’s Revolutionary Movement—GRR) as a front of parties opposing the Renville Agreement.4 One of the precipitating factors in the establishment of this front was the PKI’s shift in line during 1948 from all-out support of Renville and the Amir Sjarifuddin government that had brought it about to opposition to the Hatta government that was implementing it.5 Long-time supporters of perjuangan wanted to foil the PKI’s attempt to present itself as the leader of opposition to an agreement that was ever more clearly being revealed as a blow to the republic.
Some considerable shifting in the relationship between the PKI and the GRR was to take place during the month of August and up to the Madiun uprising in mid-September. Muso, former PKI leader from the 1920s, unexpectedly returned to Indonesia from Moscow in early August and immediately began to accentuate this leftward turn taken by the PKI against Renville and towards a policy of perjuangan.
The GRR’s main newspaper, Moerba, appeared on 14 August 1948 with a banner headline reading “Welcome Comrade Muso!” and maintained that Muso’s new fighting policy for the PKI proved that Tan Malaka and the GRR were following the correct communist line, as opposed to the soft, traitorous, and even “Trotskyist” line of the PKI. Whether they really expected Muso to join forces with themselves or whether it was a propaganda ploy is hard to say, but Muso had no such course of action in mind. He denounced Tan Malaka as a traitor and a Trotskyist since 1926,6 and he evidently tried to pry supporters away from the GRR, for as late as mid-September he was reported as meeting with Ibnu Parna of AKOMA (Angkatan Komunis Muda—Young Communist League), one of the GRR constituents.7
In an apparent attempt to fend off the growing influence of the PKI as dissatisfaction with Renville mounted and Muso’s popularity grew, the government released most of the 3 July detainees on 17 August; Tan Malaka was finally released on 16 September. Evidently the government was interested in developing an alternate left-wing pole to undermine the PKI. But polarization between the government and the PKI had gone too far, and armed clashes broke out in Solo and then Madiun.
On 19 September, Sukarno made a fiery radio address, attacking the PKI for “attempting to seize our beloved Indonesia” and asking the people to choose between him and Muso. Muso replied in kind, saying, “Sukarno-Hatta slaves of the Japanese and America! Traitors must die!”8
The PKI did not receive the support of the people. Quickly the Madiun uprising was isolated and then routed, the leaders escaping to the hills with troops in hot pursuit. Skirmishes continued until the Dutch attack in December, but the rebellion was crushed within days and a generalized anti-left sentiment dominated the government.
Tan Malaka’s autobiography ends before Madiun, but he introduces Volume III with a postscript concentrating on the affair. Characterizing it as a “repeat of the Prambanan Putsch of 1926,” Tan Malaka outlines the multiple errors made by the PKI in taking such an action. But while opposing the PKI, he also states his refusal “to be used as an instrument to crush Muso’s PKI by this government, which for two and a half years had let us rot in all kinds of jails” (Volume III, p. 13). He appears to accept unquestioningly the government’s view of Madiun as a conscious Putsch by the PKI and does not entertain the possibility of provocation or of precipitate action by second-echelon leaders.
The GRR and many of Tan Malaka’s followers were not so reluctant to take up arms against the PKI and were widely reported as participating in the fighting. Major Sabaruddin in particular, with whom Tan Malaka was later to become closely involved, led one of the principal assaults on the city of Madiun and pursued the fleeing PKI leaders into the mountain areas of East Java.9
After the government had recaptured Madiun and wiped out the PKI, Tan Malaka proceeded once again to voice his criticism of the government’s policies.10 His position had a certain attraction at that time, for a second Dutch attack on the republic was indeed becoming more likely as the Renville Agreement proved ever more unworkable. During October and November, the government’s antagonism to the growing strength of the anti-diplomasi forces was manifested in a swing from specific anti-PKI moves to a general opposition to leftists of any stripe. As early as 5 October the leadership council of the GRR issued a statement demanding the least possible curtailment of democratic rights in the anti-Madiun actions, more care in making arrests, and a reaffirmation of the right to existence of all ideologies based on democracy.11
The following statement made by a republican representative in Jakarta reveals the government’s continued suspicion of Tan Malaka and the GRR: “These parties are supporting the government in its battle against the Muso communists. Their programme, however, is against the government. . . . These parties are against any form of negotiations with the Dutch.”12
Possibilities for Tan Malaka making a political comeback in this period were generated not only by the objective situation of increasing Dutch pressures, but also by a subjective factor: the elimination of his principal political opponents, those in the PKI. A large section of the PKI-dominated Front Demokrasi Rakyat (not to mention a number of PKI members themselves) had opposed the Madiun uprising and were probably quite open to joining a strong party oriented to pursuing the politics of perjuangan within a left-wing framework. On the other hand, it is obvious that the post-Madiun atmosphere was scarcely conducive to the construction of a left alternative to the republican leadership, and the vehemence of the PKI opposition and slander regarding Tan Malaka must have made it impossible for many former PKI members to consider joining forces with him under any circumstances.
On 3 October 1948 plans were announced for fusion of the principal parties constituting the GRR. The new party would include the Partai Rakyat (People’s Party), the largest element in the GRR and led by Maruto Nitimihardjo; the Partai Rakyat Jelata (Poor People’s Party), made up mainly of former militia fighters from West Java; and the Partai Buruh Merdeka (Merdeka Workers Party), recently established by Sjamsu Harya Udaya as a counter to the pro-PKI Partai Buruh Indonesia. In addition, AKOMA (Young Communist League), led by Ibnu Parna, and Partai Wanita Rakyat (People’s Women’s Party), led by Nyonya Sri Sulandari Mangunsarkoro, expressed their intention to join the new party provided their special status as sectional representatives could be maintained.13
Discussions on the nature and structure of the new party were held through the