Cycles. Edward R. Dewey
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Fig. 8. U. S. Automobile Production, 1900-1944
Factory sales of motor vehicles, with a trend projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
The automobile industry in early 1946 had a huge volume of new orders, but there was no evidence that these would create a new trend line. The industry’s rate of growth was declining sharply well before 1940, and was closely approaching maturity, as shown in Fig. 8. Whatever temporary postwar splurge the industry may enjoy, the trends revealed in the chart suggested it had already attained, prewar, the bulk of the mature maximum of output. A Fortune estimate of mid-1944, for instance, concluded that a production of 4½ million cars annually from mid-1945 on would completely saturate the market by 1950; a production of 6½ million cars would saturate it by the end of 1947. Actually, of course, all early forecasts of automobile production for the months immediately following the war were vitiated by the occurrence of a strike wave; even 1946 production fell much below the manufacturers’ earlier hopes. While failure to produce more cars in 1946 came from inability to manufacture, and not from the lack of a market, subsequent years should be watched for an answer to an apposite question: Will even “deferred demand,” so called, enable the automobile industry hereafter to get very far above its prewar average production levels?
Fig. 9. Value of U. S. Horse-Drawn Vehicle Production, 1839-1939
Data decennial 1839-1899, quinquennial 1899-1919, biennial thereafter. Data are adjusted for the purchasing power of the dollar, 1926= 100. A trend is shown, projected in dashes tentatively to 1960. Ration scale.
We have here an example of an industry which, even before reaching maturity, was superseded by another. Without the advent of the dynamic automobile industry, which destroyed it, the horse-drawn vehicle industry would doubtless have reached maturity at the levels indicated by the dotted line at the top.
What happened to the earlier carriage industry is shown in Fig. 9.
Grouped together on pages 36-41 the reader will find charts showing the trend in a number of basic activities as various as cattle on farms, corn production, cotton production, wool production, wheat production, malt liquor consumption, lumber production, cotton spindles in operation, coal production, copper production, and lead production. These are shown not because any one of the series charted is particularly significant in itself, but because as a group the charts tell a consistent story, and — most important — because long series of figures are available.
They indicate that maturity has been or is being reached throughout our economic fabric as a whole. In the light of such charts, any talk of the unlimited frontiers that lie before us is a pure expression of faith and hope. The statistical evidence does not support it. Like goldfish nibbling at the glass of their bowl, we have demonstrably been reaching the circumference of our economic world-as-it-is.
This is not a tragic fact; it is merely a fact. We may adjust ourselves to it well or badly. Still more, we may decide as a society that we refuse to live in a world of such an established circumference, and try to break whatever bonds have been holding us there (if we can discover what they are, of what they are made, and how to break them), and then create a world with far wider horizons for ourselves. Some may suspect that this course will be the one that Americans will ultimately try to follow.
There are some newer industries in the nation which still have much of their growth ahead of them. We shall survey a few of these briefly in the following chapter. They should be of interest to investors who are concerned with the long-term outlook, and to young people who are intelligently choosing industrial careers.
There is no reason, however, to assume that the activity of any one of them, or of all of them put together, will change the near-term national outlook suggested by the charts discussed in this chapter.
Fig. 10. Cattle on U. S. Farms, January 1840-1944
Data decennial 1840-1910, annual thereafter. A trend is shown, projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig.. 11. U. S. Corn Production, 1839-1945
Data decennial 1839-1870, quinquennial 1870-1895, annual 1898-1945. A trend is shown, projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 12. U. S. Cotton Production, 1830-1945
Data decennial 1830-1850, annual thereafter. Two distinct trends are shown, one prior to and the other following the Civil War. The latter has been projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 13. U. S. Wool Production, 1840-1943
Data decennial 1840-1860, annual thereafter. Two distinct trends are shown, one prior to and one following the Tariff Act of 1924. The latter has been projected tentatively to1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 14. U. S. Wheat Production, 1839-1945
Data decennial 1839-1870, quinquennial 1870-1895, annual 1898—1945. A trend is shown, projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 15. Malt Liquor in the United States
Consumption 1839-1920. Production 1921-1944. Data decennial 1839-1859, annual 1863-1944. The effect of prohibition is clearly indicated. A trend is shown, projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 16. U. S. Lumber Production, 1839-1945
Data decennial 1839-1899 (1849 missing), annual 1904-1945. First two points are estimated from value data. A trend is shown, projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 17. U. S. Cotton Spindles in Operation, 1839-1945
Data decennial 1839-1880, annual 1880-1945. A trend is shown, projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 18. U. S. Coal Production, 1840-1943
Data decennial 1840-1850, quinquennial 1850-1870, annual thereafter. A trend is shown, projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 19. U. S. Smelter Copper Production, 1850-1943
Data quinquennial 1850-1870, annual thereafter. A new cycle of growth, coinciding with the birth of the electrical industry, began in 1880. Two trends are shown, the present trend projected tentatively to 1960. Ratio scale.
Fig. 20. U. S. Refined Primary Lead Production, 1830-1943
Data decennial 1830-1850, quinquennial 1850-1870, annual thereafter. Here again two cycles of growth are in evidence. The beginning of the second