Franco. Paul Preston
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bulwarks of culture, civilization and Christianity in Europe’.47 On the same day, Hitler instructed the new German Chargé d’Affaires in Spain about his duties. The man selected was the retired General Wilhelm Faupel, one-time organizer of the Freikorps, adviser to the Argentinian and Peruvian Armies, and Director of the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut. A staunch Nazi, he was told not to interfere in military affairs.48 Faupel presented his credentials to Franco on 30 November.49
Franco’s delight with the signs of co-ordinated fascist help would no doubt have been tarnished had he known of the contempt with which the Italians viewed his military achievements. On 25 November, Mussolini told the German Ambassador to Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, that the Nationalists were lacking in offensive spirit and personal bravery. After negotiating with Franco the Italo-Spanish agreement on military and economic co-operation, Filippo Anfuso, Ciano’s representative, reported on 3 December that the Nationalists acted as if they were taking part in a colonial war, concerned with tiny tactical actions rather than with striking great strategic blows. He concluded that Franco needed Italian generals, an Italian column under the orders of Roatta and a sense of urgency.50 It was only because Mussolini wanted a fascist Spain to put pressure on France and was hopeful that Franco could be coached in the ways of fascism that the Duce contemplated sending further aid to the Caudillo. But, like the Germans, he insisted on certain conditions. The most important was an undertaking ‘to conduct future Spanish policy in the Mediterranean in harmony with that of Italy’.51
That Franco, conventionally considered to be fiercely proud, should have been happy to accept German and Italian aid on humiliating conditions was not at all puzzling. In the first place, he was desperate. Moreover, he still felt a certain deference towards both Hitler and Mussolini. It was to be his good fortune that, as the American Ambassador in Berlin, William E. Dodd, observed, ‘having recognized Franco as conqueror when this has yet to be proved, Mussolini and Hitler must see to it that he is successful or be associated with a failure’.52 Italy was already racing down the slippery slope to total commitment. In a matter of four months, Mussolini had gone almost imperceptibly from his initial reluctant decision to supply twelve transport aircraft, via the shipping of substantial quantities of aircraft and armoured vehicles in August, September and October, to formal recognition. That gesture would soon involve Mussolini in an irrevocable commitment to Franco’s cause which was now facing possible defeat and needed massive assistance.
Faupel telegrammed the Wilhelmstrasse on 5 December with the stark message ‘We are now faced with the decision either to leave Spain to herself or to throw in additional forces.’ In the German Foreign Office, State-Secretary Weizsäcker feared that to comply would require sending a sea convoy which would attract the hostile attention of England. He believed that Italy should bear the brunt of helping Franco.53 Immediately after signing his secret agreement with Franco on 28 November, Mussolini called a staff conference to examine the possibility of stepping up Italian military aid to Franco and asked Hitler to send a representative. On 6 December, the Duce, Ciano and Roatta met a pessimistic Admiral Canaris at the Palazzo Venezia. Mussolini suggested that Germany and Italy each prepare a division for Spain, that German and Italian instructors be sent to train Franco’s troops and that a joint Italo-German general staff direct and co-ordinate operations alongside Franco’s staff. Canaris agreed to co-ordination of the continued delivery of military aircraft and naval and submarine support for Franco in the Mediterranean but repeated the views of Hitler, of von Blomberg, of other senior Wehrmacht officers and of State-Secretary Weizsäcker that Germany could not be seen to send large numbers of troops to Franco without risking international repercussions which might undermine her rearmament plans. Nevertheless, Mussolini decided to go ahead with Italy’s commitment of substantial ground forces. It was also agreed that a joint Italo-German general staff be set up to galvanize Franco’s operations despite the fears of Canaris that Franco would narrow-mindedly resist.54
It is clear from the minutes of this meeting on 6 December that Mussolini, in a spirit of disdain towards Franco, had decided to take the outcome of the Spanish Civil War into his own hands. Although, for obvious reasons, Franco was not informed about what had been said at the meeting, he could in general terms be confident that the Italians could now withdraw their support for him only with the greatest difficulty. On the following day, Mussolini wrote to General Roatta giving him command of all Italian land and air forces already in Spain and soon to be sent. The Duce instructed Roatta to liaise with Franco and the newly arrived German Chargé d’Affaires, General Faupel, over the creation of a joint headquarters staff. Two days after the 6 December conference, Mussolini set up a special office, the Ufficio Spagna, to co-ordinate the various ministerial contributions to Italian aid for Franco.*55
The clinching of external assistance was paralleled inside Spain by the consolidation of the Generalísimo’s undisputed authority. Franco had already sabotaged what limited chances there had been of rescuing José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Now, in December 1936, the Generalísimo provided another stark illustration of the speed and skill with which he could act when he felt himself threatened. As the numbers of casualties suffered by the Moroccan Army grew, Franco had to reconcile himself to relying more and more on the recruitment of militia whose first loyalty was to a political group. Inevitably, that increased the political weight of the two parties which made the most substantial contribution, the Falange and the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista. There was no immediate difficulty or doubt about their commitment to the Nationalist cause but, in the long run, their political ambitions differed considerably. Having gone to some trouble to start building his own absolute power, Franco was sensitive to potential threats both to the efficacy of the Nationalist war effort and to his own hegemony. The absence of José Antonio left the Falange disorientated. The veil of secrecy about his death maintained that situation. The Carlists were then, in the short term, more of a threat to Franco’s hegemony within the Nationalist zone. The President of their National War Junta, Manuel Fal Conde, had been asserting the autonomy of Carlism since late October.56 The Carlists saw a chance to make a more overt bid to consolidate their independence within the Nationalist camp when a decision was announced giving regular army rank to militia officers, and creating short-term training courses to turn them into alféreces provisionales (provisional second lieutenants).
On 8 December, with the permission of Mola, they set up a separate Real Academia Militar de Requetés for the technical and ideological training of Carlist officers. They claimed that their purpose was no more than to ensure the replacement of casualties and those Requeté officers who had gone into the regular forces. The Falangists had two such academies, but had taken the precaution of securing Franco’s approval. The Generalísimo was quietly furious and took the opportunity to flex his muscles. After carefully consulting, cultivating and neutralizing Fal Conde’s more malleable rival, the languid Conde de Rodezno, Franco moved. Fal Conde was informed through General Dávila, the administrative head of the Junta Técnica del Estado, that Franco considered the establishment of a Carlist Academy to be tantamount to a coup d’état. Fal Conde was given forty-eight hours either to leave the Nationalist zone or else to face a court martial. Franco gave serious thought to executing the Carlist leader. As it was, since he was loath to risk undermining the morale of the Requetés fighting at the front, the Caudillo contented himself with his exile to Portugal.57 To clinch his control over the autonomous militias, Franco issued a decree militarizing all three militia groups, those of the Falange, of the Carlists and of the CEDA, and placing them under the command of Colonel Monasterio.
By a curious coincidence, just as Franco was dealing