The Works of Benjamin Franklin, Volume 5. Бенджамин Франклин
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the gentleman makes more injurious comparisons than these:
“That latitude,” he says, “has this advantage over them, that it has produced sharp, acute men, fit for war or learning, whereas the others are remarkably simple, or silly, and blunder eternally. We have six thousand of their militia, which the general would willingly exchange for two thousand regulars. They are forever marring some one or other of our plans, when sent to execute them. They can, indeed, some of them at least, range in the woods; but three hundred Indians with their yell throw three thousand of them in a panic, and then they will leave nothing for the enemy to do, for they will shoot one another; and in the woods our regulars are afraid to be on a command with them on that very account.” I doubt, Mr. Chronicle, that this paragraph, when it comes to be read in America, will have no good effect; and rather increase that inconvenient disgust which is too apt to arise between the troops of different corps, or countries, who are obliged to serve together. Will not a New England officer be apt to retort and say, what foundation have you for this odious distinction in favour of the officers from your certain northern latitude? They may, as you say, be fit for learning; but, surely, that return of your first general, with a well-appointed and sufficient force, from his expedition against Louisbourg, without so much as seeing the place, is not the most shining proof of his talents for war. And no one will say his plan was marred by us, for we were not with him. Was his successor who conducted the blundering attack, and inglorious retreat from Ticonderoga, a New England man, or one of that certain latitude? Then as to the comparison between regulars and provincials, will not the latter remark that it was two thousand New England provincials, with about one hundred and fifty regulars that took the strong fort of Beaudejour in the beginning of the war; though in the accounts transmitted to the English gazette, the honor was claimed by the regulars, and little or no notice taken of the others. That it was the provincials who beat General Dieskau with his regulars, Canadians, and “yelling Indians,” and sent him prisoner to England. That it was a provincial-born officer, with American batteaux-men, that beat the French and Indians on Oswego River. That it was the same officer, with provincials, who made that long and admirable march into the enemy’s country, took and destroyed Fort Frontenac, with the whole French fleet on the lakes, and struck terror into the heart of Canada. That it was a provincial officer, with provincials only, who made another extraordinary march into the enemy’s country, surprised and destroyed the Indian town of Kittanning, bringing off the scalps of their chiefs. That one ranging captain of a few provincials, Rogers, has harassed the enemy more on the frontiers of Canada, and destroyed more of their men, than the whole army of regulars. That it was the regulars who surrendered themselves, with the provincials under their command, prisoners of war, almost as soon as they were besieged, with the forts, fleets, and all the provisions and stores that had been provided and amassed to so immense expense at Oswego. That it was the regulars who surrendered Fort William Henry, and suffered themselves to be butchered and scalped with arms in their hands. That it was the regulars under Braddock, who were thrown into a panic by the “yells of three or four hundred Indians,” in their confusion shot one another, and, with five times the force of the enemy, fled before them, destroying all their own stores, ammunition and provisions. These regular gentlemen, will the provincial rangers add, may possibly be afraid, as they say they are, to be on a command with us in the woods; but when it is considered that, from all past experience, the chance of our shooting them is not as one to a hundred, compared with that of their being shot by the enemy, may it not be suspected, that what they give as the very account of their fear and unwillingness to venture out with us, is only the very excuse; and that a concern for their scalps weighs more with them than a regard for their honor.
Such as these, sir, I imagine may be the reflections extorted by such provocation from the provincials in general. But the New England men in particular will have reason to resent the remarks on their reduction of Louisbourg. Your writer proceeds “Indeed they are all very ready to make their boast of taking Louisbourg, in 1745; but if people were to be acquitted or condemned according to the propriety and wisdom of their plans, and not according to their success, the persons that undertook the siege merited little praise; for I have heard officers who assisted at it say, never was any thing more rash; for had one single part of their plan failed, or had the French made the fortieth part of the resistance then that they have made now, every soul of the New Englanders must have fallen in the trenches. The garrison was weak, sickly, and destitute of provisions, and disgusted, and therefore became a ready prey; and, when they returned to France, were decimated for their gallant defence.” Where then is the glory arising from thence? After denying his facts: “that the garrison was weak, wanted provisions, made not a fortieth part of the resistance, were decimated,” &c., the New England men will ask this regular gentleman, if the place was well fortified, and had (as it really had) a numerous garrison, was it not at least brave to attack it with a handful of raw, undisciplined militia? If the garrison was, as you say, “sickly, disgusted, destitute of provisions, and ready to become a prey,” was it not prudent to seize the opportunity, and put the nation in possession of so important a fortress, at so small an expense? So that if you will not allow the enterprise to be, as we think it was, both brave and prudent, ought you not at least to grant it was either one or the other? But is there no merit on this score in the people, who, though at first so greatly divided, as to the making or forbearing the attempt, that it was carried in the affirmative by the small majority of one vote only; yet when it was once resolved on, unanimously prosecuted the design, and prepared the means with the greatest zeal and diligence; so that the whole equipment was completely ready before the season would permit the execution? Is there no merit or praise in laying and executing their plan so well, that, as you have confessed, not a single part of it failed? If the plan was destitute of “propriety and wisdom,” would it not have required the sharp, acute men of the northern latitude to execute it, that by supplying its deficiencies they might give it some chance of success? But if such “remarkably silly, simple, blundering mar plans,” as you say we are, could execute this plan, so that not a single part of it failed, does it not at least show that the plan itself must be laid with some “wisdom and propriety”? Is there no merit in the ardour with which all degrees and ranks of people quitted their private affairs and ranged themselves under the banners of their king, for the honor, safety, and advantage of their country? Is there no merit in the profound secrecy guarded by a whole people, so that the enemy had not the least intelligence of the design, till they saw the fleet of transports cover the sea before their port? Is there none in the indefatigable labour the troops went through during the siege, performing the duty of both men and horses; the hardship they patiently suffered for want of tents and other necessaries; the readiness with which they learnt to move, direct, and manage cannon, raise batteries, and form approaches; the bravery with which they sustained sallies; and finally, in their consenting to stay and garrison the place after it was taken, absent from their business and families, till troops could be brought from England for that purpose, though they undertook the service on a promise of being discharged as soon as it was over, were unprovided for so long an absence, and actually suffered ten times more loss by mortal sickness through want of necessaries, than they suffered from the arms of the enemy? The nation, however, had a sense of this undertaking different from the unkind one of this gentleman. At the treaty of peace, the possession of Louisbourg was found of great advantage to our affairs in Europe; and if the brave men that made the acquisition for us were not rewarded, at least they were praised. Envy may continue a while to cavil and detract, but public virtue will in the end obtain esteem; and honest impartiality, in this and future ages, will not fail doing justice to merit.
Your gentleman writer thus decently goes on: “The most substantial men of most of the provinces are children or grandchildren of those that came here at the king’s expense—that is, thieves, highwaymen, and robbers.” Being probably a military gentleman, this, and therefore a person of nice honour, if any one should tell him in the plainest language that what he here says is an absolute falsehood, challenges and cutting of throats might immediately ensue. I shall therefore only refer to his own account in this same letter, of the peopling of New England, which he says, with more truth, was by Puritans, who fled thither for shelter from the persecutions of Archbishop Laud. Is there not a wide difference between removing to a distant country to enjoy the exercise of religion according to a man’s conscience, and his being transported thither by a law, as a punishment for his crimes? This contradiction we therefore