Weapons Of The Rich. Strategic Action Of Private Entrepreneurs In Contemporary China. Thomas Heberer

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Weapons Of The Rich. Strategic Action Of Private Entrepreneurs In Contemporary China - Thomas Heberer


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jieceng),36 particularly among young entrepreneurs in the private sector, people returning to China after studying abroad, and professionals working in the new media. He demanded that these new classes should be represented in organizations such as the CCP and other political parties, in People’s Congresses (PCs), People’s Political Consultative Conferences (PPCCs), etc.37 In September 2016, Yu Zhengsheng, while on an inspection tour in Tianjin as a member of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee and Chairman of the National PPCC, declared that people of the ‘new social strata’, particularly entrepreneurs in the nonpublic economic sectors, should be fully respected, and party state authorities should help them to ‘unite around the CCP and the government’ (Yu Zhengsheng, 2016). The United Front Departments (tongzhanbu) of the CCP were called upon to take care of this new social segment and offer training courses to bring private entrepreneurs closer to the party and strengthen their entrepreneurial and ‘patriotic’ spirit,38 a task which had already been written into the Charter of the CCP United Front Department in 2015.39 A national conference of leading ‘United Front’ cadres held in early 2018 again supported the decision to reinforce party work within these ‘new social classes’.40

      In the context of the anti-corruption campaign initiated in 2014 China’s political leadership also targeted private entrepreneurs. Many of them were involved in major corruption cases. Interestingly, in autumn 2016 Renmin Ribao published an article on the private sector calling for a ‘new relationship’ between private entrepreneurs and leading cadres in order to combat corruption. Such a statement had originally been made by Xi Jinping during a meeting of entrepreneurial delegates to the National PPCC in March of that year. Xi emphasized that the government–business relations (zhengshang guanxi) should be ‘intimate’ (qin) and ‘clean’ (qing), meaning just and honest. He called on both government officials and entrepreneurs to create a new atmosphere of cooperative relations in which corrupt practices, exchange of power and money, as well as predatory behavior on the part of cadres and entrepreneurs had no place. Although governments at all levels and entrepreneurs should keep a distance from each other, the former should treat private enterprises like relatives, frequently communicate with them, take care of them, and support them in solving problems. Entrepreneurs in turn should contribute to local development and refrain from corrupt and illegitimate practices (Zou, 2016). In his report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP, Xi Jinping reiterated that constructing new qin and qing relations between politics and business would be the right way to create a ‘healthy’ private economy and sound entrepreneurship (Xi Jinping, 2017). Interestingly, a provincial party publication emphasized that the core responsibility to accomplish this objective was on the side of the government, not on the side of private entrepreneurs (Xia, 2018).

      For his part, Premier Li Keqiang underscored in his work report presented at the annual session of the National PC in 2016 the Chinese government’s intention to resolutely promote private sector development.41 Li had emphasized several times before that ‘mass entrepreneurship’ and ‘entrepreneurial innovation’ (dazhong chuangye, wanzhong chuangxin) would be fostered in order to achieve China’s ambitious development goals.42 In fact, judging by numerous official statements made by the Premier in recent years, China’s private entrepreneurs are conceived of as a crucial force for initiating and maintaining a process of continuous technological innovation, an important precondition of China becoming a globally competitive economy (Li Keqiang, 2017).43

      In September 2017, shortly before the 19th Party Congress of the CCP, a joint statement issued by the CCP’s Central Committee and the State Council reemphasized the state’s willingness to put new policies on track to assist private entrepreneurs and protect their legal rights. The new policies sought to ensure that their innovative capacity, patriotism, and ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ (qiyejia jingshen)44 be further developed, and that they consistently act in the interest of the nation, their businesses, and their employees.45 Private entrepreneurs were expected to advance patriotism and professionalism, as well as innovation and social responsibility (Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan, 2017). Official documents like this one have repeatedly reiterated the party state’s invocation of private entrepreneurs as both loyal regime supporters and an innovating force bearing a major responsibility for China’s modernizing program until 2050.

      Interestingly, Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Party Congress of the CCP in October 2017, however, addressed the private sector only marginally. He emphasized that its development should be supported (zhichi fazhan) and guided (yindao) and that the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ should be further promoted and protected (Xi, 2017). The same holds true for the Working Report of the Government at the 2018 session of the National People’s Congress, delivered by Prime Minister Li Keqiang, which only mentioned the government’s intention to ‘solve the crucial problems of private enterprises’ (Li Keqiang, 2018). Nevertheless, even these limited references to the private sector induced the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC/Gongshanglian) and its local branches to proclaim the implementation of new private sector policies.46 To what extent these initiatives will translate into the implementation of concrete policies over the coming years remains to be seen, but party and government leaders have made it very clear that China’s future depends on the success of its private entrepreneurs in an increasingly competitive global economy.

      For instance, the vice-president of the Federation of Industry and Commerce of Anhui Province and a member of the People’s Political Consultative Conference called for assisting the private sector to overcome the ‘three difficulties’ facing this sector: lack of capital, shortage of manpower, and insufficient support of local governments to initiate and finance innovations.47 In his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2014, Prime Minister Li Keqiang announced the above-mentioned promotion of ‘mass entrepreneurship and mass innovation’ to boost the Chinese economy and entrepreneurial innovation,48 which was followed in 2015 by the promulgation of the ‘Opinion of the State Council on Some Issues and Measures for Boosting Mass Entrepreneurship’ (Guowuyuan, 2015). In mid-2017, the Chinese State Council adopted detailed guidelines for promoting ‘mass entrepreneurship’ in order to open up new avenues of employment, optimize China’s economic structure, and foster sustained growth. According to these guidelines the state shall facilitate business registration procedures, set up new credit channels and financial services for start-ups and promising enterprises, nurture collaboration between enterprises and research institutes in order to assist private enterprises in identifying and employing skilled workers and professionals, open new industries for private investment, and enact measures to strengthen the protection of property rights, intellectual property, and the legal status of private businesses (Guowuyuan, 2017). Prime Minister Li Keqiang reiterated the same points in September 2018, emphasizing the need to ‘intensify mass entrepreneurship’ and further facilitate businesses start-ups.49 This would suggest that private investment and the role of private enterprises in generating economic growth and new job opportunities had become increasingly urgent. The fact that Li had to repeat the official line announced in 2017 revealed how difficult it was to implement new private sector policies.

      To support private enterprise development, in early 2018, the ‘Central Political and Legal Work Conference’, organized by the powerful ‘Central Political and Legal Work Commission’ (Zhongyang zhengfawei) under the Central Committee of the CCP, called for taking further measures to protect individual property rights to make private entrepreneurs feel safer in their business operations and to trigger entrepreneurial innovation. Concurrently, Guo Shengkun, head of the commission and member of the Political Bureau of the CCP, emphasized the need to handle the legal cases of entrepreneurs properly in accordance with the law. In fact, several court verdicts based on false accusations and flawed trials in recent years had been abrogated and the respective victims rehabilitated.50 This has made observers speculate on the beginning of a new era in state–business relations.51

      Indeed, there is evidence that the Chinese leadership is facilitating private sector investment and development, for instance, in the defense industry, which is so far closely monopolized by public sector investment. This should foster more competition, trigger innovation, and reduce costs since the private sector


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