The Arctic and World Order. Группа авторов
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Hole, “Reuters, October 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-greenland-security-ins-idUSKBN2750J6.
67 67. Katrina Manson and Richard Mine, “US Financial Aid for Greenland Sparks Outrage in Denmark,” April 23, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/6d5e20cd-8af5-484d-9fb2-249cd83eeea8.
68 68. United Nations, “The Climate Crisis—A Race We Can Win, “ https://www.un.org/en/un75/climate-crisis-race-we-can-win; UN SG António Guterres “ Remarks at 2019 Climate Action Summit,” September 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-23/remarks-2019-climate-action-summit. Alec Luhn, “Freezing Cold War: Militaries Move in as Arctic Ice Retreats—Photo Essay,” The Guardian, October 16, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/oct/16/arctic-ice-retreats-climate-us-russian-canadian-chinese-military.
69 69. See Sen. Roger Wicker and Sen. Dan Sullivan, “Polar Icebreakers Are Key to America’s National Interest,” Defense News, October 20, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/10/19/polar-icebreakers-are-key-to-americas-national-interest/.
70 70. Larry Luxner, “As Arctic Warms Up, US Air Force Launches Department’s First Strategy for Confronting Threats,” New Atlanticist, July 22, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/as-arctic-warms-up-us-air-force-launches-departments-first-strategy-for-confronting/; C. Todd Lopez, Air Force Reveals Cold Facts on New Arctic Strategy,” DoD News, July 21, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2281961/air-force-reveals-cold-facts-on-new-arctic-strategy/; Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Department of the Air Force introduces Arctic Strategy,” July 21, 2020, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2281305/department-of-the-air-force-introduces-arctic-strategy/. See also Richard Weitz, “US Policy Towards the Arctic: Adapting to a Changing Environment,” October 24, 2019, https://icds.ee/en/us-policy-towards-the-arctic-adapting-to-a-changing-environment/.
71 71. In 2009, in the government’s National Security Strategy 2020 it was proclaimed that to transform Russia into a “world power” was a national interest and strategic priority. See http://interkomitet.com/foreign-policy/basic-documents/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020/. Cf. Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (London: Routledge, 2013), chapters 1 and 6.
72 72. AFP, “Russian Rocket Fuel Leak Likely Cause of Marine Animal Deaths,” The Guardian, October 5, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/05/marine-poisoning-in-kamchatka-russia-may-be-rocket-fuel-leak; “95% of Marine Life on Sea Floor Killed in Kamchatka Eco-Disaster, Scientists Say,” The Moscow Times, October 8, 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/06/95-of-marine-life-on-sea-floor-killed-in-kamchatka-eco-disaster-scientists-say-a71672.
73 73. Andrew Osborn, “Putin’s Russia in Biggest Arctic Military Push since Soviet Fall,” Reuters, January 30, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-russia-arctic-insight-idUSKBN15E0W0.
74 74. “Shipbuilders to Deliver Two Mmissile Corvettes to Russian Navy,” TASS, August 25, 2002, https://tass.com/defense/1193533; “Russian Navy Project 21631 Buyan-M Class Corvette Zelyony Dol Arrives at Northern Fleet Base,” Navy Recognition, August 22, 2020, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/august/8880-russian-navy-project-21631-buyan-m-class-corvette-zelyony-dol-arrives-at-northern-fleet-base.html.
75 75. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Launches New Nuclear-Powered Ice-breaker,” The Diplomat, May 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russia-launches-new-nuclear-powered-icebreaker/; USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy, “Major Icebreakers of the World,” 2017, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/20170501%20major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=2017-06-08-091723-907. Cf. Paul C. Avey, “The Icebreaker Gap Doesn’t Mean America is Losing in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, November 28, 2919, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/the-icebreaker-gap-doesnt-mean-america-is-losing-in-the-arctic/.
76 76. Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Top General Indirectly Confirms Arctic Deployment of the Unstoppable Kinzhal Missile,” The Barents Observer, December 19, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/12/russias-top-general-indirectly-confirms-arctic-deployment-unstoppable-missile; Zachary Cohen, “Satellite Images Indicate Russia is Preparing to Resume Testing its Nuclear-powered Cruise Missile,” CNN, October 20, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/20/politics/russia-nuclear-powered-cruise-missile-test-satellite-images/index.html; J. M. Doyle, “Cruise Missiles in the Arctic Seen as Another Outcome of Great Power Competition,” Seapower, September 10, 2020, https://seapowermagazine.org/cruise-missiles-in-the-arctic-seen-as-another-outcome-of-great-power-competition/.
77 77. Spohr, op. cit.; Holly Ellyatt, “Russia Drops Out of Top 5 Global Military Spenders While US and China Up the Ante,” CNBC, April 29, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/29/russia-drops-out-of-top-5-global-military-spenders.html.
78 78. It is noteworthy, that, with the clear intention of setting geopolitical signals, joint Sino-Russian sea maneuvers began in 2012. Michael Paul, “Partnership on the High Seas: China and Russia’s Joint Naval Manoeuvres,” SWP Comment, no. 26, June 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C26_pau.pdf. Sergey Sukhankin, “The Northeastern Dimension of Russia’s ‘Ocean Shield 2020’ Naval Exercises,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, 125, September 11, 2020 (Part 1), https://jamestown.org/program/the-northeastern-dimension-of-russias-ocean-shield-2020-naval-exercises-part-one/; Ibid., Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, 127, September 15, 2020 (Part 2), https://jamestown.org/program/the-northeastern-dimension-of-russias-ocean-shield-2020-naval-exercises-part-two/. Spohr, op. cit.
79 79. Sukhankin, op. cit.
80 80. Spohr, op. cit.
81 81. “Other Developing Nations Can Adopt China’s Growth Model: President Xi Jinping,” The Economic Times (India), October 18, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/other-developing-nations-can-adopt-chinas-growth-model-president-xi-jinping/articleshow/61134034.cms; Mengjie, “President Xi Delivers New Year Speech Vowing Resolute Reform in 2018,” Xinhuanet, December 31, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/31/c_136863397.htm.
82 82. Spohr, op. cit. See also Marc Lanteigne, “The Twists and Turns of the Polar Silk Road,” Over the Circle, March 15, 2020, https://overthecircle.com/2020/03/15/the-twists-and-turns-of-the-polar-silk-road/.
83 83. Ryan Hass and John L. Thornton, “The Trajectory of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Reactive Assertiveness to Opportunistic Activism,” Brookings Institution 3/2018, p. 7, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fp_20171104_hass_the_trajectory_of_chinese_foreign_policy.pdf.
84 84. Thomas Nilsen, “Major Step Towards a Europe-Asia Arctic Cable Link,” The Barents Observer, June 6, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2019/06/mou-signed-set-arctic-telecom-cable-company; Frank Jüris, “Handing Over Infrastructure for China’s Strategic Objectives: ‘Arctic Connect’ and the Digital Silk Road in the Arctic,” SINOPSIS, March 7, 2020, https://sinopsis.cz/en/arctic-digital-silk-road/#fn4.
85 85. Jüriis, op. cit.
86 86. Ibid.; and Clayton Cheyney, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Competition and Exporting Political Illiberalism,” ISSUES & INSIGHTS 19—Working Paper #8, Pacific Forum, July 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200226180229/https://www.pacforum.org/sites/default/files/issuesinsights_Vol19%20WP8FINAL.pdf.
87 87. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy. January 2018 (First Edition), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Cf. Mariia Kobzeva, “China’s Arctic Policy: Present and Future,” The Polar Journal 9, 1 (2019), pp. 94–112, https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2019.1618558; Martin Kossa, “China’s Arctic Engagement: Domestic Actors and Foreign Policy,” Global Change, Peace & Security 32, 1 (2020), pp. 19–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2019.1648406; Idem, Marina Lomaeva and Juha Saunavaara, “East Asian Subnational Government Involvement in the Arctic: A Case for Paradiplomacy?,” The Pacific Review (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020. 1729843.
88 88. Adam Vaughan, “How the Coronavirus Has Impacted