The Arctic and World Order. Группа авторов
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waters within Russia’s Arctic EEZ east from Novaya Zemlya to the Bering Straits—that is the Kara, Vilkitskiy, and Sannikov Straits, as internal waters. But while Russia argues its position on the basis of historical agreements between Russia and England, Canada underlines the aspect of shared sovereignty, namely that the “Canadian” Northwest Passage is considered also to be part of Inuit Nunangat, indeed, their “Arctic homeland.”45
As all the Arctic players—large and small—and their Indigenous peoples maneuver for position and their exact stake in the region—land, seabed, and waters—equally exogenous powers are pressing onto the scene. Ever since the ascent of Xi Jinping to the Chinese Communist Party leadership in 2013, China wants to have a say in the region. So do Japan, South Korea and Singapore in the Far East46 as well as Britain and Germany in Europe.47 All are crowding in as they look north. No one wants to miss out, whatever the issue—be it science, resources, shipping or security.
National and Indigenous Interests in the Arctic
The Arctic was long described as an area of low security tensions, with favorable conditions for international cooperation, but the dramatic climate transformation and rapidly shifting geostrategic realities of the past decade have meant new challenges and changed preconditions for all powers of the circumpolar North. As a result, all actors are now updating their Arctic policies for the 2020s and beyond.48
But why do some Arctic countries prioritize the Arctic more than others? How do the global big powers and the mid-sized or small countries each assert themselves in Arctic policies? How does the Nordic regime (focused on peace and cooperation, prosperity and sustainability) interact with the impact of exogenous powers on intra-Arctic affairs and the regional power equilibrium? And what is the relationship between state actors and Indigenous representation? Here, some middling states have acted big—particularly Canada, Norway and Denmark (Greenland)49—setting instructive examples against which to compare the conduct of the great powers: America, Russia and China.
For Canada, a neighbor and NATO ally of the United States, and during the Cold War effectively America’s junior partner in the North (spanning from the Beaufort Sea to Baffin Bay), things have changed since 1991, as this relatively small political “actor” has emancipated itself at the circumpolar top table through the Arctic Council in particular. Two cornerstones of its Arctic Strategy stand out. The first is a readiness to exercise national sovereignty, especially over resource development, rooted in a deeply engrained and romanticized narrative of how Canada’s national identify is so deeply intertwined with its historical relationship to the North. Second, the Harper administration (2011–2015) made a high priority of retaining a maritime presence in the Arctic, after Canadian defense officials in the early 2000s had begun to reexamine Canadian capabilities in the Arctic due to the changing security and environmental situation in the region. Ottawa’s fresh focus and military commitment to the Canadian Arctic was shown through opening of an Arctic Training Center in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, in 2013—a year-round training base for Arctic operations which above all else increases the military’s ability to respond to emergency operations in the Arctic.50
Since Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister in 2015, Ottawa frames its role in the north as a global leader of climate research and a “responsible steward” of the Arctic. Canada has also positioned itself alongside Russia as one of two indispensable Arctic nations. In 2015, Foreign Minister Dion dubbed Moscow an “unavoidable partner” with which closer bilateral cooperation in the Arctic ought to be sought as a matter of national interest, despite major political tensions. Dion spelled it out in 2016: “Almost 50% of the North is Russian, and 25% is Canadian. Between us, we control 75% of the North. To sever the links with Russia, our neighbour, serves the interest of no one.”51
The Trudeau administration has furthermore sought to balance the concerns of all Northern stake holders, incorporating the Indigenous community into decision-making processes. After all, “as the ice melts, the debate of the sovereign rights of the Arctic nations heats up.”52
Generally, Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework in its 2019 incarnation stressed the significance of the so-called “rules-based international order” in the Arctic which responds effectively to new opportunities, but also challenges—such as posed by a brazen China with its persistent interest in the NSR and Canadian natural resources.53 Thus, Ottawa stated that Canada’s Arctic policy will be conducted through international engagement. Meanwhile, the focus at home is on achieving “strong, sustainable, diversified and inclusive local and regional economies,” fostering a healthy and resilient ecosystem and continuing to work towards “reconciliation” with the first nations.54
The Canadian Inuit believe the Canadian government must do more. They want recognition of “Indigenous Knowledge as an extensive system of scientific data” that, they stress, must be integrated as a central component of policy and decision-making around Arctic environmental efforts, as well as the health and community prosperity of Inuit Nunaat. Moreover, there is a sense that Inuit participation generally must not merely be secured, but increased in national environmental, economic and defense strategies and international diplomacy. As the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) points out, the government “must understand that Inuit use and occupy Inuit Nunaat—their homeland, that Inuit are the stewards of the land, and, given appropriate infrastructure, are the principal players in Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and security.”55
Questions of Arctic identity, security, and economics are equally if not more acute for Norway and Greenland.56 For Oslo, the Arctic has long been a foreign (and defense) policy priority. “We play a leading role in international diplomacy in the Arctic and we cooperate closely with other countries and organisations on how best to develop the region.” Norway’s “High North Strategy” is one “between geopolitics and social [and economic] development.”57
Half of Norway’s territory (land and waters) is north of the Arctic Circle, from the city of Bodø to Svalbard, and it is here that the country is on the frontline with Russia—with tensions for the past century flowing and ebbing. Since 1949, NATO has formed an indispensable pillar of Norwegian security, and the Alliance in turn benefits from Norway’s active contributions to it. No one anticipates direct threats to Norway in the short term. The most serious concern is so- called “horizontal escalation” of a crisis triggered elsewhere on the fringes of Europe, rapidly growing into a wider conflict that threatens Norwegian waters, airspace and territory. In this regard all eyes are on the Kremlin, for there is a sense that Russia has been demonstrating hostile intent with its continued build-up of Arctic military capabilities that threaten the ability of Norway and its allies to operate armed forces, secure critical infrastructure and waterways, protect civilian populations, and come to each other’s assistance.
Specifically, improvements to Russia’s Northern Fleet, including surface vessels and submarines armed with modern cruise missiles, pose an increased threat to NATO operations in the Norwegian Sea, to undersea internet cables and to sea lines of communication essential to reinforcing Norway from North America or Europe. And since the High North holds strategic importance to Russia’s Bastion Defense in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean, NATO feels it must plan for possible future operations in an increasingly contested environment. What’s more, the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 has brought an increased threat from new medium-range ballistic missiles, requiring Norwegian and allied defense planners to adjust to novel threats to the homeland and region.
Norway, though small in size, is undoubtedly “punching above its weight” when it comes to security; it does so thanks to high-tech capabilities and its ability to engage all of society in a “total defense” effort. Despite these perceived strengths of its military capabilities, the country still faces pressing challenges. Not only does Oslo need to enhance the readiness and resilience of Norwegian forces to deter aggression, it has to manage the consequences of an increasingly complex international (Arctic) environment and the climate challenge, too.58
Given Norway’s geographic location—it is intimately connected to the sea, with long coastlines