Human Rights. Michael Freeman

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Human Rights - Michael  Freeman


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Slotte 2015).

      Moyn’s ‘discontinuity’ objection to ‘textbook’ histories of human rights is distinct from the ‘triumphalist’ objection. ‘Deep’ history can, however, be defended against both objections. As a history of Christianity would be absurd without a reference to the life of Jesus, so a history of human rights can be illuminated by tracing its ancient origins. Such an approach does not have to deny the obvious fact that the meaning of rights-language has changed over time, that rights-proposals have often been contested, that the history is one of advances and setbacks, paths taken and opportunities missed, of main roads, side roads and dead ends. The history should assume as little as possible about the merits and limitations of the contemporary concept: evaluation belongs to philosophy not history (see chapter four).

      However, before we can study the history of human rights, we must know what it is the history of. We might begin with a definition, but the variety of meanings of human rights across time and space makes an uncontroversial definition difficult. It is better, therefore, to begin the history of human rights with the point of the concept. The contemporary concept of human rights was developed as a response to the abuse of power. This conception of human rights is suitable for deep history because power and its abuse can be found throughout history. The history of human rights can trace the emergence of the idea of universal rights as a solution to this problem. The modern concept differs from earlier rights-concepts, but it is composed of various elements that have their own histories and that have come together in the modern concept.

      Others maintain that the concept of human rights originated in the West and was universalized only recently. Some argue that, if the history is Western, its validity cannot be universal. Others say that the history of a concept is irrelevant to its validity: there may be good reasons for universalizing a concept that has a particular history.

      Some have argued that there could be no concept of individual rights in ancient times, because individuals were considered to be subordinate parts of the social whole. This idea was weakened by increasing social complexity that undermined roles and identities, creating the rights-bearing individual. This historical sociology of individual rights is supposed to discredit the concept of universal human rights. But is it true?

      Aristotle believed that constitutions could assign rights, such as the rights to property and participation in public affairs, to citizens. When these rights were violated, the laws determined compensation or punishment. Aristotle had no conception of human rights, however, as he believed that rights derived from constitutions, and that some men were slaves by nature (Miller, F. 1995).

      Roman law provides the main link between classical Greek thought about rights and modern conceptions through its influence on medieval ideas. The French historian, Michel Villey, initiated a debate on the distinction between objective right (that which is right) and subjective rights (personal entitlements). Villey argued that Roman law had no conception of subjective rights: the Latin word ius referred to objective right (Tuck 1979: 7–9; Tierney 1988: 4–6, 15). Villey’s view has been questioned on the ground that Roman law conceived of justice as rendering to each his right (suum ius). Other scholars have found rights to property, freedom from arbitrary rule, and fair trial in Roman law. These were not human rights but the legal rights of citizens; non-citizens and slaves were excluded. Slaves were recognized as persons and given some limited protection by the law, but they could not make complaints in court and there was no ideological objection to slavery. Roman law also recognized the law of nations as law common to all peoples – an important precursor of modern international law (Giltaij and Tuori 2015).

      The Stoic philosophy influenced early Christianity, which provided a new basis for the unity underlying the diversity of peoples. Christians saw the salvation of the individual soul as the highest good. The duty to seek salvation presupposed the autonomy of the individual will, which derived its dignity from the will of God. However, although Christianity separated the demands it made of the individual from those made by society, St Paul preached obedience to secular political authority. Christianity also preached the ‘love of the poor’. Although salvation might be available only to an elite, all humans were morally equal in that each was a candidate for salvation: women as well as men. The Christian author, Tertullian, wrote around 217 ad that it was ‘a basic human right that everyone should be free to worship according to his own convictions’ (Wiles and Santer 1977: 227). A decree of the emperor Charlemagne, dated 802 ad, speaks of the rights (justitias) of the people, especially of the poor, the widows and the orphans (Nelson 2019: 396–7). Eventually, the idea emerged that secular laws were not legitimate if they contravened the laws of God. The Church, however, largely conformed to the norms of society, accepting existing social hierarchies, the patriarchal family and slavery.

      A clear shift from objective right to subjective rights took place in the late Middle Ages. Medieval people


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