Zonal Marking. Michael Cox
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a coach who had significantly improved the fortunes of Lazio and Roma, regularly finished in the top five, and helped launch the careers of Alessandro Nesta and Francesco Totti. For all Zeman’s popularity with neutrals, his influence on managerial colleagues was negligible. He remained a cult figure.
Instead, the manager most instrumental in promoting the third attacker was Alberto Zaccheroni. He’d toiled his way up through Italy’s lower divisions, winning promotion from the fourth and third tiers, before working in Serie B and then landing his first Serie A job with newly promoted Udinese, finishing 11th in 1995/96. He was originally a disciple of Sacchi, a 4–4–2 man, so when he found himself with three quality centre-forwards throughout 1996/97, he played only two. He could pick from Oliver Bierhoff, the prolific old-school German target man whose two goals as a substitute had won the Euro 96 final; Paolo Poggi, a hard-working forward who made good runs into the channels; and Márcio Amoroso – a shaven-headed, explosive Brazilian who was inevitably compared to Ronaldo and who topped the goalscoring charts in Brazil, Italy and Germany. Bierhoff and Poggi started the season up front, with Amoroso playing when Bierhoff was injured. With a couple of months remaining in 1996/97, Udinese found themselves three places clear of the relegation zone in Serie A, with tricky trips to Juventus and Parma, first and second in the table, in their next two games.
These contests proved significant. Udinese’s trip to Juventus, defending champions and on their way to another title, produced an unthinkable 3–0 away victory, despite Zaccheroni’s side going down to ten men inside three minutes. Zaccheroni switched to a 3–4–2, and somehow his forwards ran riot: Amoroso scored a penalty, Bierhoff scored a header, then Bierhoff’s flick-on found Amoroso running in behind to make it three. It was perhaps the most surprising Serie A victory of the decade. After Udinese recorded such an extraordinary win with three defenders and four midfielders, Zaccheroni retained that defensive structure for the trip to Parma, introducing Poggi as the third forward. Udinese again recorded a shock victory, 2–0, and the 3–4–3 was here to stay. The new formation helped Udinese surge up the table – having been battling relegation, they finished fifth and secured European qualification for the first time in the club’s history.
Zaccheroni continued with 3–4–3 for 1997/98, taking Udinese to a historic third-placed finish. Bierhoff led the line, flanked by Poggi and Amoroso running into space. Udinese scored in every game that season, and Zaccheroni constantly pointed to his side’s goalscoring figures to underline his belief in open, expansive football. Udinese beat Lecce 6–0, Brescia 4–0, Bologna 4–3 and Zeman’s Roma 4–2. ‘My system was not the 3–5–2, which you could observe elsewhere, but a system that included four midfielders,’ Zaccheroni later recalled. ‘And there’s a big difference. I looked around, I studied and I observed things that I didn’t like. Often there were five across the midfield, which I don’t like at all because eventually it becomes a 5–3–2 and you lack an attacking threat. I observed Cruyff’s Barcelona and Zeman’s Foggia, but these weren’t the solutions I was looking for; I didn’t want three in midfield [in a 4–3–3], which inevitably forced you to defend in a 4–5–1. A midfield four, however, can effectively support the attack and defence simultaneously. My target was to keep three up front, so they didn’t have to retreat all the time, so I started working on it, first with pen and paper, and then on the pitch.’
Zaccheroni became defined by 3–4–3, and beyond the simple numbers game, Udinese were demonstrating that underdogs could attack. ‘Once, when coaches took their teams to, say, San Siro to play Milan or Inter, they had to pray for a result,’ said Zaccheroni. ‘Now the mentality is different. We can go there with our own ideas and our own style of play.’
Zaccheroni took his style to San Siro somewhat literally, by becoming the Milan coach in 1998. This was, theoretically at least, a dramatic step down. Zaccheroni’s Udinese had finished fifth and third in the previous two campaigns, while Milan had endured two disastrous campaigns, finishing 11th and 10th. Zaccheroni was a highly promising coach, but the prospect of implementing a 3–4–3 at the club which had dominated Italian football with Sacchi’s 4–4–2, and largely stuck to that system since, seemed daunting. ‘Don’t expect an Udinese photocopy,’ he declared, despite the fact he’d brought both striker Bierhoff and right-wing-back Thomas Helveg with him from Udine. ‘Milan will play with three defenders, four midfield players and three forwards, but that doesn’t mean that it will be the same as Udinese’s play. Anyway, 3–4–3 is not a magical formula. Perhaps it will be a new interpretation of 3–4–3.’
That proved prescient. Zaccheroni commenced the campaign with his usual system, although there was only one guaranteed starter up front. His old favourite Bierhoff began all 34 games and managed 19 goals: two penalties, three from open play with his feet, and 14 headers. Out wide, Zaccheroni struggled to find the right balance. George Weah wasn’t suited to the left-sided role, and despite his unquestionable talent, the 1995 Ballon d’Or winner wasn’t prolific, never finishing within ten goals of Serie A’s top goalscorer. Meanwhile, Maurizio Ganz scored some crucial late goals, but was workmanlike rather than explosive. Zaccheroni tried deploying playmakers rather than forwards in his front three. The magical Brazilian Leonardo showed flashes of brilliance, but was more effective coming off the bench.
Milan, Lazio and Fiorentina emerged as the three title contenders that season. Fiorentina were briefly favourites, but slumped after Gabriel Batistuta injured his knee in a goalless draw with Milan, and then his strike partner Edmundo allowed himself a mid-season break because he fancied heading to the carnival in Rio. Milan’s goalless draw at Lazio in early April, with eight games remaining, meant Lazio were nailed-on title favourites. But then came a major tactical shift.
Throughout the season Zaccheroni had only ever deployed Zvonimir Boban, the wonderfully gifted, tempestuous Croatian number 10, as one of his two central midfielders. Boban’s two dismissals in the first half of the campaign, meanwhile, meant two suspensions, two dressing-downs from Zaccheroni and widespread speculation that he would leave in January. However, a week after that goalless draw with Lazio, Milan welcomed Parma to San Siro and, for the first time, Zaccheroni deployed Boban as a number 10, floating behind Bierhoff and Weah in a 3–4–1–2, in a tactical change supposedly suggested by Demetrio Albertini and Alessandro Costacurta, two dressing-room leaders. Milan started nervously, and went behind. But Boban took control, and after Paolo Maldini smashed a brilliant right-footed equaliser past Gianluigi Buffon from outside the box, Milan piled on the pressure.
Boban, a tall, swaggering figure and the only Milan player to wear his shirt untucked, provided the game’s pivotal moment. Collecting the ball in the left-back position under pressure, he nonchalantly poked it past Parma’s Diego Fuser with the outside of his boot, charging onto it before teammate Guly could get in his way. Then, from just inside his own half, Boban launched a long pass over the top of the Parma defence with such perfect weight that it tempted Buffon to advance, but also enabled Milan striker Ganz to prod it past the Parma goalkeeper on the volley, before he outpaced the recovering Fabio Cannavaro to slide it into an empty net. 2–1. Boban was magnificent, and received a standing ovation from the Milan supporters as he was substituted. Later that day Lazio lost the Rome derby 3–1 to a Francesco Totti-inspired Roma. Suddenly, the title race was on. More importantly, number 10s were now sexy again.
The following weekend Zaccheroni and Bierhoff returned to Udinese. Both received a rapturous reception upon emerging from the tunnel; Zaccheroni put on his sunglasses as if trying to hide the tears, while Bierhoff, strangely, was presented with Udinese’s Player of the Year award ten months after he’d departed the Stadio Friuli. But neither were in the mood for niceties. Milan won 5–1, their most dominant performance of the campaign and a perfect demonstration of their new attacking trident’s powers. Boban scored the first two, Bierhoff added the next two – both headers, of course – and then came the most telling goal of Milan’s run-in. Boban received the ball in the number 10 position, casually sidestepped a dreadful two-footed lunge from Udinese defender Valerio Bertotto, and found himself with Weah running into the left-hand channel and Bierhoff running into the right-hand channel. Boban glanced towards Weah but slipped in Bierhoff, who chipped a cross over goalkeeper Luigi Turci, allowing Weah to nod into an empty net. Milan were rampant, and now top for the first time, having suddenly