The Secret War: Spies, Codes and Guerrillas 1939–1945. Max Hastings
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personal report extolled his skills at the military-political interface: ‘With the finest feel for foreign psychology and mentality, together with uncommon linguistic ability, he knows in exemplary fashion how to deal with foreigners (from the lowest to the prominent).’ Interestingly, however, other naval officers, including Erich Raeder and Karl Dönitz, disliked Canaris, thinking him sly.
During the early years of Hitler’s rule he ingratiated himself enthusiastically and successfully with the foremost Nazis. In 1935, aged forty-eight, he was appointed chief of Germany’s intelligence service, controlling both espionage abroad and counter-espionage at home, though Himmler ran his own domestic security service, the RSHA, under Ernst Kaltenbrunner, with the Gestapo as its enforcement arm. As Trevor-Roper noted, ‘All German politicians of consequence sought to set up their own information bureaus (just as they also sought to establish private armies) as additional supports for their personal authority; and it was essential to the purpose of these bureaus that their results should be the private property of their chiefs.’
The RSHA was no more efficient than the Abwehr, but it wielded more influence through its direct subordination to Himmler. MI6 noted that it achieved good penetration of neutral embassies in Berlin, which yielded useful information. Meanwhile, Canaris’s service had stations around the world and intelligence cells within every formation of the Wehrmacht. The admiral’s early years of office saw a dramatic expansion of his empire; he achieved a reputation for administrative efficiency and diplomatic skills, both in his handling of the Nazi hierarchy and in dealing with prominent foreigners. Until at least 1942, the service’s prestige stood high both inside Germany and abroad.
Canaris was instinctively secretive, even before he became a spymaster, and more so thereafter. Within the rambling warren of offices in a row of converted mansions on Berlin’s Tirpitzufer, where the Abwehr had its headquarters until it was bombed out in 1943, he seemed to glide almost invisibly from one room to another. So he did too on his frequent travels to other countries, especially Spain: a signed portrait of Franco, its dictator, adorned his office wall. He seldom wore uniform – an oddity in Nazi society, which was obsessed with fancy dress. He was elaborately courteous, not least to subordinates, and something of a hypochondriac who took too many pills. He relaxed by riding regularly and playing a smart game of tennis. His passion for animals was much remarked: he was followed around Abwehr headquarters by two dachshunds, to which he talked constantly. One of them once fell ill while Canaris was visiting Italy, and he telephoned at length to Berlin to discuss its condition. His Italian companions assumed that he was speaking in code about great issues of state, but his obsession with the dog was authentic. He often said that he trusted animals more than people; it was probably more accurate to say that he liked them better. In conversation, whether professional or social, he was a master of equivocation. Few people were ever sure what Canaris really thought, which was supposed by contemporaries to reflect his depth of character. More likely, it masked chronic indecision.
Although technically a branch of OKW, the Abwehr quickly became Canaris’s personal fiefdom. Throughout the war his men achieved considerable success in suppressing dissent and capturing Western Allied agents operating in Hitler’s empire, which did much to sustain the admiral’s standing in Nazi high places: Col. Franz von Bentevegni, who ran counter-espionage, was one of Canaris’s few impressive subordinate appointments. Yet the Russians were able to sustain their astonishing espionage activities inside Germany until 1942, and military leakages persisted until 1945, even if the huge matter of Germany’s broken codes lay beyond Canaris’s remit.
The agents his officers dispatched to gather information abroad were almost all unfit for the role. It is odd that Berlin never attempted to recruit spies to dispatch to Britain who might have passed for gentlemen. Even in 1940, the accent and manners of the upper class remained a passport to social acceptance in Churchill’s embattled island. The writer Cyril Connolly wrote an angry letter to the New Statesman complaining that when he himself was detained as a possible spy, he was immediately released when it was discovered that he had been educated at Eton. The experience of the Cambridge Spies, deemed beyond suspicion as members of the upper-middle class, suggests that if the Abwehr had dispatched to Britain a few Nazis with passable table manners and some skill as fly-casters or grouse-shooters, they would have been asked to all the best houses.
As it was, however, when two of Canaris’s key men, Col. Hans Pieckenbrock, the head of intelligence, and Col. Erwin Lahousen, head of sabotage, were sacked in 1943, this was no gesture of Nazi spite, made for political reasons; it was the consequence of their obvious incompetence and of their departments’ failure. German secret operations abroad deployed immense labour for negligible results. One of the Abwehr’s most notable recruits was naval lieutenant Heinrich Garbers. He was a vegetable farmer’s son, a passionate Nazi, who in 1938 had sailed across the Atlantic in a thirty-foot yacht, the Windspiel, which he constructed himself. Amid the Allied naval blockade, the Germans devised the notion of dispatching agents to far-flung places in sailing boats too humble to attract the attention of the enemy. In 1941 and 1942 Garbers made epic forays to South Africa and Namibia respectively. Thereafter he captained the little schooner Passim, which made two immense voyages at an average speed of six knots. The boat sailed under the name of the Santa Maria, and flew successively French, Spanish and Portuguese colours as Garbers deemed appropriate. In 1943 he carried three Abwehr men, codenamed ‘Walter’, ‘Fred’ and ‘Jim’, to Argentina, in what he afterwards described laconically as ‘an uneventful voyage of 65 days’.
In a nautical sense it may be true that nothing much happened, but relations on board were poisoned by the mutual loathing of Walter and Fred, while Jim was perpetually prostrate with sea-sickness, which cost him a drastic weight loss. The passengers were successfully delivered to a reception committee of Argentine sympathisers at Rio del Plata, who presented the Passim’s crew with coffee and oranges before the little vessel turned about and sailed home. Garbers, plainly a man of iron, seemed wholly untroubled by his experiences. He returned safely to Europe and received the Ritterkreuz. There is no evidence, however, that his passengers contributed anything to the Nazi war effort. Likewise, the Hungarian air force officer Count László Almásy crossed 2,000 miles of North African desert to deliver two agents to Egypt in May 1942, a remarkable achievement, and Almásy later inspired the novel and film The English Patient, though its version of this enthusiastic Nazi was fanciful. His passengers, however, did nothing on arrival to justify their epic journey. Nearer home, it became increasingly clear to the British monitoring the Abwehr’s wirelessed reports that its network of overseas stations and informants produced almost nothing that was both new and true.
As Trevor-Roper pursued his researches through the ever-growing harvest of Bletchley decrypts, ‘We soon became aware that “the little Admiral” was a far more complex and controversial character than we had supposed. As the incompetence of his organisation was progressively revealed to us, we discovered, or deduced, something of the politics in which he was involved, and we noted his feverish travels, in every direction, but especially to Spain, which distinguished him sharply from our own more sedentary chief’ – Stewart Menzies. For several decades after the war, Canaris was treated as a major figure of the era, the subject of several weighty biographies. The foremost element in the Canaris mythology was a claim that he had been a secret crusader against Hitler, who had given active assistance to the Allied cause. Several German writers energetically promoted this view, because their post-war society was desperate to identify virtuous men who had dared to raise their hands against the vast evil of Nazism, and suffered martyrdom in consequence.
It is now plain that such claims were unfounded. Until 1938 Canaris was an ardent supporter of the Nazis, and for years thereafter Hitler frequently used him as a personal emissary abroad. The admiral worked amicably with Reinhard Heydrich of the RSHA. The two families socialised: Frau Canaris and the executive planner of the Holocaust sometimes played the violin together. From 1939 onwards, the admiral became increasingly gloomy and nervous – colleagues noted him drinking heavily. Trevor-Roper regarded it as an absurd delusion that Canaris was the directing brain of ‘the other Germany’. The Abwehr’s chief, in his view, was a man of limited gifts, who confined his anti-Nazi activities to making his organisation a haven for officers who shared his rising distaste for Hitler and his supporters, and who resisted active complicity in