The Moral State We’re In. Julia Neuberger

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The Moral State We’re In - Julia  Neuberger


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and their social and economic opportunities equal to those of non-disabled people, the ‘right to die’ legislation might jeopardize people’s right to live:

      The bill would open the floodgates for people who are not just terminally ill but for those with long term physical illnesses to be helped to die. The safeguards included in the bill are simply not good enough to guard against many disabled people being included.

      There is simply no system of safeguards that can detect the hidden pressures and strains from relatives and carers that may drive a disabled person to seek an assisted suicide.

      Whilst all the debate around Lord Joffe’s Bill was taking place, the Christian Medical Fellowship recommended a letter-writing campaign for people to express opposition to the Bill, but it is not clear what the response to this was. An Independent on Sunday poll in 2001 asked, ‘Should people have the right to die when they choose?’ and found-unsurprisingly, given the vagueness of the question-that 85 per cent of respondents answered yes and 15 per cent answered no. Meanwhile, a survey by the Disability Rights Commission reported that 63 per cent of people felt there should be new laws to make euthanasia or assisted suicide legal. However, more than eight out of ten respondents said measures were needed to protect disabled people from the use of ‘do not resuscitate’ notices and the withholding or withdrawal of treatment.

      Much of the debate in the media has related to people dying of ‘terminal illness’ such as cancer or motor neurone disease. It is not clear whether some of the common diseases of old age, such as heart failure, dementia, or strokes, or even the natural processes of ageing itself, are typically viewed as terminal illnesses. Consequently, with the exception of some age-related organizations such as Help the Aged, the possible implications for older people of proposed changes in the law are not addressed as frequently as those for younger people. Yet it is the fear of living after a massively disabling stroke, of being completely dependent and unable to exercise one’s autonomy, that has driven the Bill’s supporters to try to get legislation through. Despite the public discussion being focused to a considerable extent on younger people, support for this legislation is at least in part about the fear of being very old and dependent, in both existential and economic terms.

      First, it is one thing to kill oneself because one cannot bear to continue living. Suppose one were suffering unbearable pain, or extreme depression. Although it is terrible for those who are left behind, whose guilt is never assuaged because they feel they could have done more, there is a strong case for saying such suicides are not sinful. I say this despite the teachings of almost all the religious groupings. Historically, religions have argued that suicide is a sin. Those who committed suicide were often not buried in the same cemetery as those who died naturally; they might even be buried with a stake driven though their hearts, as consummate sinners. The argument was that God had given life and it was not for human beings to decide when life should be ended. Yet judicial killing was somehow permitted alongside this view, and the ‘just war’ was also permissible. So the logic barely stands up.

      Japanese culture, and some others, have taken a different view in particular circumstances. Certainly there is also a strong argument for discouraging suicide. It is, after all, too easy to do, and the waste of opportunity, talent, and expectation is palpable. Nevertheless, with all the reservations about acute depression being a mental illness and the desire for suicide it sometimes engenders therefore being the result of an abnormal psychological state, it does have to be said that for some people life is intolerable. If that is the case, there may not be a strong argument to prevent them from committing suicide, or even for criticizing them posthumously if they succeed. In other words, there is a moral dimension to the argument that suicide, in these circumstances, is not necessarily wrong and that attitudes towards it should change.

      It is therefore not necessarily wrong for someone to whom life has become intolerable, for instance through continual pain, to commit suicide. What is wrong is to expect them to do it in order to relieve the obligation of their care from their family or from society at large, or to ask someone else to help them to do it. And therein lies the rub, for it is not easy to commit suicide if one is already very frail. This might encourage people who had not yet reached this condition to contemplate suicide before they became too incapacitated to carry it out.

      That is a problem answered to a considerable extent by the idea of having legalized euthanasia. Obviously real safeguards would have to be put in place. Doctors could not act without another doctor, or health professional, or some other person, witnessing the request and formalizing it in some way. People of sound mind would then be able to take control of their own lives and deaths. What argument can there really be against such a system, properly designed with protection in place for individuals and protection, legal and ethical, for health professionals?

      The answer has to be that it is simply wrong to ask someone else to kill you. If an individual wants to commit suicide, sad though it is, that is understandable. One could even argue that it is their right to do so, especially if they are terminally ill already and however traumatic for everyone left behind. But to ask other people to do it for you, because you lack the determination or because you want to wait to the last possible moment when


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