The German Campaign in Russia: 1940-1942. U.S. Department of Defense
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Staff and Command Post Exercises
(November-December 1940)
The preliminary plan was tested in a General Staff exercise conducted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, General Paulus. General Staff officers responsible for the drafting of the plan acted as group leaders. Paulus divided the exercise into three phases: the first began 29 November with the invasion and the initial battles near the border; the second, beginning 3 December, continued the offensive operations to the line Kiev — Minsk — Lake Peipus; and the last, staged 7 December, dealt with reaching the potential objectives beyond this line.
After each phase Paulus indicated the premises for the start of the next part of the exercise by explaining the phase line that had been reached, the condition of the troops, the supply situation, intelligence estimate, etc. All participants thus based their ideas on the same data. During the third phase of the game it became evident that the German ground forces would hardly be sufficiently strong to fan out across the funnel-shaped Russian theater if — contrary to the generally prevailing opinion — the Red Army was capable of offering continued resistance. Paulus reported the results and the lessons learned to Halder.
Generalmajor (Brig. Gen.) Eduard Wagner, Chief, Supply and Administration Division, prepared logistical exercises, which were to take place in December and January. Wagner also worked on a logistical plan that was to serve as a counterpart to the strategic survey prepared by the Operations Division. Special emphasis was placed on establishing an efficient supply system in the assembly areas and drawing up a sound base-development plan to guarantee the flow of supplies during the execution of far-reaching operations in the Russian theater.
Concurrent with, but independent of, these exercises the chiefs of staff of the three army groups were asked to work on problems involved in a campaign against Russia. They were briefed by Halder who limited the scope of their investigations to defeating the Russian forces in White Russia and the western Ukraine. Paulus provided them with all the necessary data, and each officer was instructed to arrive at a solution without consulting his fellow workers. The studies submitted at the beginning of December 1940 were carefully scrutinized by both Halder and Paulus. Ideas that were at great variance with those submitted in the preliminary plan were selected as topics of discussion for a conference of all chiefs of staff of army groups and armies which took place at Army High Command Headquarters on 13 and 14 December 1940. The discussions served to clarify a number of problems for which no solution had been found during the various exercises. It was also concluded that the Soviet Union would be defeated in a campaign not exceeding 8-10 weeks' duration.
Economic Survey
In November 1940 Reichs Marshal Hermann Goering ordered General der Infanterie (Lt. Gen.) Georg Thomas, Chief, Armed Forces Economic Office, to study the economic implications of a campaign against the Soviet Union. In the summary of his report Thomas arrived at the following conclusions:
a. During the initial months of an operation which would lead to the occupation of European Russia excluding the Urals, Germany would improve its food and raw material position, if the destruction of Soviet supplies could be prevented, if the Caucasus oil region was seized intact, and if the transportation problem was solved.
b. In the event that hostilities should continue for some time, Germany would benefit only if the transportation problem was solved and the civilian population induced to remain and cooperate. More specifically:
(1) The destruction of mechanized equipment would have to be prevented and the production of new farm machinery would have to be resumed without delay. Supplies of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) would have to be allocated to agriculture.
(2) The industrial production would depend on the immediate availability of electric power plants and the delivery of raw materials generally unavailable in European Russia.
c. Until the establishment of a link with the Far East, Germany would be short of such strategic materials as rubber, tungsten, copper, platinum, zinc, asbestos, and jute.
d. The area south of the Volga and Don estuaries including the Caucasus would have to be included among the objectives of the operation. The oil produced in the Caucasus region would be essential for the exploitation of any territories occupied in Russia.
e. By occupying European Russia, Germany would seize 75 percent of the total Soviet armament potential and almost 100 percent of the precision-tool and optical industries.
The study was submitted to Hitler who, though recognizing its intrinsic value, failed to make any basic changes in his overall military-political plans.
Directive BARBAROSSA
(18 December 1940)
On 6 December General Jodl requested General Warlimont to draw up a directive for the campaign against Russia on the basis of the preliminary plan that had been approved by Hitler. Six days later the draft of Directive No. 21 was submitted to Jodl who made a few insignificant changes and ordered a revised draft prepared. The same day the Navy submitted a report stressing the danger of starting a war on a second front while Germany's naval forces were fully engaged in the struggle against Britain. On 16 December Warlimont submitted the revised draft of the directive to Jodl who was to present it to Hitler the next day. During their conference Jodl and Warlimont discussed the dangers of a two-front war and the serious POL problems it would involve.
On 17 December Jodl presented the draft of Directive No. 21 to Hitler who made some basic changes with regard to the mission of the two army groups that were to be committed north of the Pripyat Marshes. First priority was to be given to the capture of Leningrad and Kronshtadt and to the destruction of the enemy forces in the Baltic States. The advance on Moscow would not be resumed until these objectives had been attained. Only if Russia's military machine collapsed earlier than anticipated would Army Group Center be permitted to drive simultaneously on Leningrad and Moscow.
After the necessary changes had been incorporated in the directive it was signed by Hitler on 18 December and distributed to the services under the new cover name Operation BARBAROSSA. The directive read as follows:
Directive No. 21
Operation BARBAROSSA
18 December 1940
The German Armed Forces must make preparations to crush Soviet Russia in a lightning campaign, even before the termination of hostilities with Great Britain (Operation BARBAROSSA).
For this purpose the Army will commit all available forces except those needed to safeguard the occupied territories against surprise attacks.
The Air Force will earmark sufficient forces in support of the ground operations to guarantee the rapid conclusion of this campaign and to minimize any potential damage eastern Germany might suffer through enemy air attacks. The concentration of air power in the East is, however, subject to certain limitations. First, all German-held military bases and war production centers must be adequately protected against enemy air raids. Second, the air offensive against Great Britain and against its life lines in particular must not be slowed down.
The Navy will continue to focus its attention on Great Britain while the campaign against Russia takes place.
In due time, i. e., at least eight weeks before the intended start of the operation, I shall issue a directive for the strategic concentration against Soviet Russia.
Any preparations which require more time and are not already under way will be initiated immediately and brought to a conclusion before 15 May 1941.