Animal Intelligence. George John Romanes
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from reflex action; we have now to consider the features by which it is distinguished from reason. These are accurately, though not completely, conveyed by Sir Benjamin Brodie, who defines instinct as 'a principle by which animals are induced, independently of experience and reasoning, to the performances of certain voluntary acts, which are necessary to their preservation as individuals, or to the continuance of the species, or in some other way convenient to them.'[4] This definition, as I have said, is accurate as far as it goes, but it does not state with sufficient generality and terseness that all instinctive action is adaptive; nor does it clearly bring out the distinction between instinct and reason which is thus well conveyed by the definition of Hartmann, who says in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious,' that 'instinct is action taken in pursuance of an end, but without conscious perception of what the end is.' This definition, however, is likewise defective in that it omits another of the important differentiæ of instinct—namely, the uniformity of instinctive action as performed by different individuals of the same species. Including this feature, therefore, we may more accurately and completely define instinct as mental action (whether in animals or human beings), directed towards the accomplishing of adaptive movement, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between the means employed and the ends attained, but similarly performed under the same appropriate circumstances by all the individuals of the same species. Now in every one of these respects, with the exception of containing a mental constituent and in being concerned in adaptive action, instinct differs from reason. For reason, besides involving a mental constituent, and besides being concerned in adaptive action, is always subsequent to individual experience, never acts but upon a definite and often laboriously acquired knowledge of the relation between means and ends, and is very far from being always similarly performed under the same appropriate circumstances by all the individuals of the same species.
Thus the distinction between instinct and reason is both more definite and more manifold than is that between instinct and reflex action. Nevertheless, in particular cases there is as much difficulty in classifying certain actions as instinctive or rational, as there is in cases where the question lies between instinct and reflex action. And the explanation of this is, as already observed, that instinct passes into reason by imperceptible degrees; so that actions in the main instinctive are very commonly tempered with what Pierre Huber calls 'a little dose of judgment or reason,' and vice versâ. But here, again, the difficulty which attaches to the classification of particular actions has no reference to the validity of the distinctions between the two classes of actions; these are definite and precise, whatever difficulty there may be in applying them to particular cases.
Another point of difference between instinct and reason may be noticed which, although not of invariable, is of very general applicability. It will have been observed, from what has already been said, that the essential respect in which instinct differs from reason consists in the amount of conscious deliberation which the two processes respectively involve. Instinctive actions are actions which, owing to their frequent repetition, become so habitual in the course of generations that all the individuals of the same species automatically perform the same actions under the stimulus supplied by the same appropriate circumstances. Rational actions, on the other hand, are actions which are required to meet circumstances of comparatively rare occurrence in the life-history of the species, and which therefore can only be performed by an intentional effort of adaptation. Consequently there arises the subordinate distinction to which I allude, viz., that instinctive actions are only performed under particular circumstances which have been frequently experienced during the life-history of the species; whereas rational actions are performed under varied circumstances, and serve to meet novel exigencies which may never before have occurred even in the life-history of the individual.
Thus, then, upon the whole, we may lay down our several definitions in their most complete form.
Reflex action is non-mental neuro-muscular adjustment, due to the inherited mechanism of the nervous system, which is formed to respond to particular and often recurring stimuli, by giving rise to particular movements of an adaptive though not of an intentional kind.
Instinct is reflex action into which there is imported the element of consciousness. The term is therefore a generic one, comprising all those faculties of mind which are concerned in conscious and adaptive action, antecedent to individual experience, without necessary knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, but similarly performed under similar and frequently recurring circumstances by all the individuals of the same species.
Reason or intelligence is the faculty which is concerned in the intentional adaptation of means to ends. It therefore implies the conscious knowledge of the relation between means employed and ends attained, and may be exercised in adaptation to circumstances novel alike to the experience of the individual and to that of the species.
CHAPTER I.
APPLICATION OF THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES TO THE LOWEST ANIMALS.
Protozoa.
No one can have watched the movements of certain Infusoria without feeling it difficult to believe that these little animals are not actuated by some amount of intelligence. Even if the manner in which they avoid collisions be attributed entirely to repulsions set up in the currents which by their movements they create, any such mechanical explanation certainly cannot apply to the small creatures seeking one another for the purposes of prey, reproduction, or, as it sometimes seems, of mere sport. There is a common and well-known rotifer whose body is of a cup shape, provided with a very active tail, which is armed at its extremity with strong forceps. I have seen a small specimen of this rotifer seize a much larger one with its forceps, and attach itself by this means to the side of the cup. The large rotifer at once became very active, and swinging about with its burden until it came to a piece of weed, it took firm hold of the weed with its own forceps, and began the most extraordinary series of movements, which were obviously directed towards ridding itself of the encumbrance. It dashed from side to side in all directions with a vigour and suddenness which were highly astonishing, so that it seemed as if the animalcule would either break its forceps or wrench its tail from its body. No movements could possibly be better suited to jerk off the offending object, for the energy with which the jerks were given, now in one direction and now in another, were, as I have said, most surprising. But not less surprising was the tenacity with which the smaller rotifer retained its hold; for although one might think that it was being almost jerked to pieces, after each bout of jerking it was seen to be still attached. This trial of strength, which must have involved an immense expenditure of energy in proportion to the size of the animals, lasted for several minutes, till eventually the small rotifer was thrown violently away. It then returned to the conflict, but did not succeed a second time in establishing its hold. The entire scene was as like intelligent action on the part of both animals as could well be imagined, so that if we were to depend upon appearances alone, this one observation would be sufficient to induce me to attribute conscious determination to these microscopical organisms.
But, without denying that conscious determination may here be present, or involving ourselves in the impossible task of proving such a negative, we may properly affirm that until an animalcule shows itself to be teachable by individual experience, we have no sufficient evidence derived or derivable from any number of such apparently intelligent movements, that conscious determination is present. Therefore, I need not wait to quote the observations of the sundry microscopists who detail facts more or less similar to the above, with expressions of their belief that microscopical organisms display a certain degree of instinct or intelligence as distinguished from mechanical, or wholly non-mental adjustment. But there are some observations relating to the lowest of all animals, and made by a competent person, which are so remarkable that I shall have to quote them in full. These observations are recorded by Mr. H. J. Carter, F.R.S., in the 'Annals of Natural History,' and in his opinion prove that the beginnings of instinct are to be found