The Political Works of Thomas Hobbes (4 Books in One Edition). Thomas Hobbes
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the particular persons, or members thereof, to the common good of them all; so also may there be amongst a multitude of those members, instituted a subordinate union of certain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for some common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for subordinate government, for counsel, for trade, and the like. And these subordinate bodies politic are usually called CORPORATIONS; and their power such over the particulars of their own society, as the whole city whereof they are members have allowed them.
10. In all cities or bodies politic not subordinate, but independent, that one man or one council, to whom the particular members have given that common power, is called their SOVEREIGN, and his power the sovereign power. which consisteth in the power and the strength that every of the members have transferred to him from themselves, by covenant. And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood: that to transfer a man's power and strength, is no more but to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And every member of the body politic, is called a SUBJECT, (viz.) to the sovereign.
11. The cause in general which moveth a man to become subject to another, is (as I have said already) the fear of not otherwise preserving himself, and a man may subject himself, to him that invadeth, or may invade him for fear of him; or men may join amongst themselves to subject themselves to such as they shall agree upon for fear of others. And when many men subject themselves the former way, there ariseth thence a body politic, as it were naturally; from whence proceedeth dominion, paternal, and despotic and when they subject themselves the other way, by mutual agreement amongst many, the body politic they make, is for the most part called a commonwealth in distinction from the former, though the name be the general name for them both and I shall speak in the first place of commonwealths, and afterward of bodies politic, patrimonial and despotical.
PART II
Chapter 20: Of the Requisites to the Constitution of a Commonwealth
1. That part of this treatise which is already past, hath been wholly spent, in the consideration of the natural power, and the natural estate of man; namely of his cognition and passions in the first eleven chapters; and how from thence proceed his actions in the twelfth; how men know one another's minds in the thirteenth; in what estate men's passions set them in the fourteenth; what estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason, that is to say, what be the principal articles of the law of nature, in the fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and lastly how a multitude of persons natural are united by covenants into one person civil or body politic. In this part therefore shall be considered, the nature of a body politic, and the laws thereof, otherwise called civil laws. And whereas it hath been said in the last chapter, and last section of the former part, that there be two ways of erecting a body politic; one by arbitrary institution of many men assembled together, which is like a creation out of nothing by human wit; the other by compulsion, which is as it were a generation thereof out of natural force; I shall first speak of such erection of a body politic, as proceedeth from the assembly and consent of a multitude.
2. Having in this place to consider a multitude of men about to unite themselves into a body politic, for their security, both against one another, and against common enemies; and that by covenants, the knowledge of what covenants, they must needs make, dependeth on the knowledge of the persons, and the knowledge of their end. First, for their persons they are many, and (as yet) not one; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together, be attributed to the multitude, or truly called the action of the multitude, unless every man's hand, and every man's will, (not so much as one excepted) have concurred thereto. For multitude, though in their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in their designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though they agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to another; yet, in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the state of hostility, and not of peace; like the seditious Jews besieged in Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies, and yet fight amongst themselves; whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men hath done any act: it is to be understood, that every particular man in that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part only. Secondly, though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man hath right to everything, and consequently, as hath been said, chap. XIV, sect. 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing: and therefore meum and tuum hath no place amongst them.
3. The first thing therefore they are to do, is expressly every man to consent to something by which they may come nearer to their ends; which can be nothing else imaginable but this: that they allow the wills of the major part of their whole number, or the wills of the major part of some certain number of men by them determined and named; or lastly the will of some one man, to involve and be taken for the wills of every man. And this done they are united, and a body politic. And if the major part of their whole number be supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars, then are they said to be a DEMOCRACY, that is to say a government wherein the whole number, or so many of them as please, being assembled together, are the sovereign, and every particular man a subject. If the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished from the rest, be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars, then are they said to be an OLIGARCHY, or ARISTOCRACY; which two words signify the same thing, together with the divers passions of those that use them; for when the men that be in that office please, they are called an aristocracy, otherwise an oligarchy; wherein those, the major part of which declare the wills of the whole multitude, being assembled, are the sovereign, and every man severally a subject. Lastly if their consent be such, that the will of one man, whom they name, shall stand for the wills of them all, then is their government or union called a MONARCHY; and that one man the sovereign, and every of the rest a subject.
4. And those several sorts of unions, governments, and subjections of man's will, may be understood to be made, either absolutely, that is to say, for all future time, or for a time limited only. But forasmuch as we speak here of a body politic, instituted for the perpetual benefit and defence of them that make it; which therefore men desire should last for ever, I will omit to speak of those that be temporary, and consider those that be for ever.
5. The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to another, or others, the right of protecting and defending himself by his own power, is the security which he expecteth thereby, of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it. And a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer may not be deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they have every one subjected themselves; and without that security there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages, and make himself a prey to others. And therefore when there is not such a sovereign power erected, as may afford this security; it is to be understood that every man's right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth still with him. And contrariwise, where any subject hath right by his own judgment and discretion, to make use of his force; it is to be understood that every man hath the like, and consequently that there is no commonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of a commonwealth, a man subjecteth his will to the power of others, must appear from the end, namely security. For whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure himself.
6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a commonwealth, and put in writing without erecting of a power of coercion, are no reasonable security for any of them that so covenant, nor are to be called laws; and leave men still in the estate of nature and hostility. For seeing the wills of most men are governed only by fear, and where there is no power of coercion, there is no fear; the wills of most men will follow their passions of covetousness, lust, anger, and the like, to the breaking of those covenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them, are set at liberty, and have no law but from themselves.
7. This power of coercion, as hath been said chap. XV, sect. 3, of the former part, consisteth in