The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. James H. Blount
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K. Davis, of Minnesota, William P. Frye, of Maine, Republicans, and George Gray, of Delaware, Democrat. Senator Davis died in 1900, and Senator Frye in 1911. Senator Gray has been, since 1899, and is now, United States Circuit Judge for the 3d Judicial District. Among other things, the President’s instructions to the Commissioners said:
It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. * * * The lustre and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us * * * into an adventurous departure on untried paths.
By elaborate rhetorical gradations, the instructions finally get down to this:
Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity. * * * The United States cannot accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon.
Though already noticed, we venture, in this connection, again to recall that in the month previous (August, 1898) a gentleman high in the councils of the Administration2 declared in one of the great reviews of the period: “We see with sudden clearness that some of the most revered of our political maxims have outlived their force.” Among these “revered maxims” thus suddenly fossilized by his ipse dixit, Mr. Vanderlip exuberantly includes the teachings of “Washington’s Farewell Address and the later crystallization of its main thought by President Monroe”—the Monroe Doctrine, adding that in lieu of these “A new mainspring * * * has become the directing force * * * the mainspring of commercialism.”
As permanent chairman of the Philadelphia convention which renominated Mr. McKinley for the Presidency thereafter, in 1900, Senator Lodge, speaking of the issues raised by the Treaty of Paris, said: “We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade Expansion.”
“Philanthropy and five per cent. go hand in hand,” said Mr. Vanderlip’s Chief, Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage, about the same time. Such was the temper of the times when the treaty was made.
The first meeting with the Spanish Commissioners took place at Paris, October 1st. The opening event of the meeting, the initial move of the Spaniards, is extremely interesting in the light of subsequent events, especially in connection with the Iloilo Fiasco, hereinafter described (Chapter IX.).
“Spanish communication represents,” says Judge Day’s cablegram to the President,3 “that status quo has been altered and continues to be altered to the prejudice of Spain by Tagalo rebels, whom it describes as an auxiliary force to the regular American troops.”
Even diplomacy, in a conciliatory communication limited to the obvious, called the Filipinos our allies.
The Spanish initial move was more immediately prompted by the fact that in point of absolute astronomical time Manila, though captured when it was morning of August 13th there, was captured when it was evening of August 12th, at Washington, and the protocol was signed at Washington in the evening of August 12th. While this point was material, because we had captured $900,000 in cash in the Spanish treasury at Manila and much other property, the title to which, under the laws of war between civilized nations, depended on just what time it was captured, the matter was finally swallowed up and lost sight of in the agreement to give Spain a lump $20,000,000 for the archipelago. But the initial move had other aspects. In the event we should take the Philippines off her hands, Spain was going to insist that we should get back from the Filipinos, our “allies,” and restore to her all the Spaniards they captured after August 12th. She knew that in all probability if we bought the Islands we would be buying an insurrection, and she was “taking care of her own” at our expense.
The next feature of the proceedings entitled to attention in a bird’s-eye view like this, concerns the question whether we should take only Luzon, or the whole archipelago. President McKinley cabled Admiral Dewey on August 13th, the day after the protocol was signed, asking as to “the desirability of the several islands,” “coal and other mineral deposits,” and “in a naval and commercial sense which (of the several islands) would be most advantageous.”4 Admiral Dewey had replied, of course, that Luzon was “the most desirable,” but volunteered no advice. He did state, “No coal of good quality can be procured in the Philippine Islands,” which is still true. Allusion is made to this telegram in the proceedings, but no copy of it is there set forth. On October 4th, our Commissioners wired President McKinley suggesting that he cable out to the Admiral and ask him “whether it would be better * * * to retain Luzon * * * or the whole group.” Mr. McKinley answered that he had asked Admiral Dewey before General Merritt left Manila to give the latter his views in writing “on general question of Philippines,” and that “his report is in your hands in response to both questions.” But the commission replied that Admiral Dewey had sent only a copy of a report of General Francis V. Greene’s and nothing else. There is no record of any further advice or opinion from Admiral Dewey on the point except that in General Otis’s Report (p. 67) we get glimpses of a telegram that has never yet, apparently, been published, sent by Dewey to Washington early in December, 1898, suggesting that we “interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of the Islands.” No; Admiral Dewey must be acquitted of having ever counselled the McKinley Administration to buy the Philippines.
On October 7th the Commission telegraphed Washington that General Merritt attaches much weight to the opinion of the Belgian Consul at Manila, M. André, and that “Consul says United States must take all or nothing”; that “if southern islands remained with Spain they would be in constant revolt, and United States would have a second Cuba”; that “Spanish government would not improve,” and “would still protect monks in their extortion.”
To this advice there was absolutely no answer. It was a case of “all or nothing,” and it had already become a case of “all” when on September 16th previous Mr. McKinley signed his original instructions to the Commission stating “The United States cannot accept less than Luzon.”
The Commission’s telegram of October 7th goes on to quote from the Belgian Consul’s opinion that “Present rebellion represents only one half of one per cent. of the inhabitants.” The Consul was not before them in person. They were quoting from a memorandum submitted by him to General Merritt at Merritt’s request, made at Manila and dated August 29th, the day General Merritt sailed away from Manila bound for Paris via the Suez Canal. He had brought the memorandum along with him. From the previous chapters the reader will, of course, understand that Americans and Europeans at Manila in August, 1898, were paying very little attention to Aguinaldo and his claims as to the extent of his authority in the provinces. It is therefore not surprising that M. André’s memorandum of August 29th should have made the foolish statement, “Present rebellion represents only one half of one per cent. of inhabitants.” But it is eternally regrettable that his statement on this point had any weight with the Commissioners, for it was, or by that time at least (October 7th) had become, just about 99½ per cent. wide of the mark. As a matter of fact, by October 7th it would have been more accurate to have said, in lieu of the above, “Present rebellion represents practically whole people.” You see, we started an insurrection in May, in October it had become a full grown affair, and in December we bought it. The telegram of October 7th also quoted General Merritt as saying, “Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards did better in future than in past,” and as considering it “feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies.” These are about the only two sound suggestions General Merritt made to that Commission. In the next breath they quote him as saying, “Natives could not resist 5000 troops.” The fact that they did resist more than 120,000 troops, that it took more than that, all told, to put down the insurrection, is sufficient to show how much General Merritt’s advice was worth. He was right on two points, as indicated.