Psychological Problems and Their Big Deceptions. David W. Shave
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is more prevalent than what we might realize. For instance, we can suspect some preceding unconscious predicate-equating in much of what we communicate to others. Taxonomists often show evidence of some previous unconscious “schizophrenia-like” thinking in scientifically naming plants and animals, which then aids people in communicating with each other about those plants and animals. As an example, the New England sand fiddler crab, whose common name derives from predicate-equating a “fiddle,” with its fiddle-shaped claw in front of it, must have reminded the taxonomist that named it, not of a “fiddle” but, instead, a “boxer” holding his arm defensively in front of him, for its scientific name is “Uca pugilator.” Unconscious predicate-equating might have preceded that taxonomist’s conscious reminding. What the unconscious commonly shared predicates were for naming an Indian “Crazy Horse,” or “Sitting Bull,” or naming a bulky WW2 life jacket a “Mae West,” and after the war, a “Dolly Parton,” is rather obvious. “Being sweet” is the predicate you might unconsciously utilize in calling your loved one, “Honey.” Honey is sweet. Your loved one is sweet. “Being sweet” is the predicate that then makes honey, identical with your loved one, so that you refer to your loved one as “Honey.” They are made identical with unconscious “schizophrenic-like,” predicate-equating. You’re unconsciously utilizing predicate-equating, in talking to a friend, if you refer to your disliked neighbor as a “bad apple,” or a “pain in the ass.”
It might be some unconscious predicate-equating that allows us to make a conscious comparison. Someone must have unconsciously equated the lace of Queen Ann, which we can call “entity A,” with the blossom of a certain plant, which we can call “entity B.” With this unconscious equating, someone in the past made “A” the same as “B” when the predicate might have been “having lace.” This unconscious equating is an example of “part-to-part” equating, because the lace of Queen Ann is only one part of Queen Ann, and the lace-like blossom is only one part of the plant. The wildflower is commonly called, “Queen Ann’s Lace.” With our conscious thinking, we know that this plant’s blossom isn’t the lace of Queen Ann. But it’s unconscious predicate-equating that might have made the connection between the two. Similarly, a flower known to the ancient Romans, whose tiny yellow petal of its blossom must have been unconsciously predicate-equated with a tooth of a lion that they had seen in an amphitheater. “Dens” is tooth in Latin, and “leo” is lion. The genitive case of “leo” is “leonis” meaning “of the lion.” The predicate might have been “long and sharp-pointed.” Part of the plant was equated with part of a lion when they shared that same predicate. The Romans named this little plant “dens leonis,” or “tooth of the lion,” which hundreds of years later in France became “dent de lion.” We know the flower as a “dandelion.” Anyone consciously seeing a similarity between two entities, may have earlier unconsciously predicate-equated those entities in their unconscious mind. As another example, the ancient Greeks noted that a certain beautiful flower as always having a root with two distinct bulges that with some unconscious predicate-equating must have reminded them of two testicles, because what they then called this flower was “testicle” in Greek. “Orkhis” is “testicle” in Greek. (The surgical removal of a testicle today is called an “orchidectomy.”) They may have unconsciously predicate-equated the two bulges on the roots of this flower, which is just part of the flower, with the testicles of a male human, which is only part of a human. We call this flower “an orchid.”
This same type of unconscious “part-to-part” predicate-equating might have been involved with wildflowers with common names like “dog-tooth violet,” “Dutchman’s britches,” “shepherd’s purse,” “mouse ear,” “snakehead,” “lady slipper,” “buttercup,” and “ox-eye daisy,” just to name a few. We can easily discern the unconscious predicate-equating that might have taken place behind the common animal names such as the “horseshoe crab,” “hammerhead shark,” “swordfish,” “fox squirrel,” “snowshoe rabbit,” “garter snake,” “cardinal,” and “tape worm.” A small lizard of the Central and South American rain forests that appears to rapidly walk on the surface of water, when frightened, is called the “Jesus Christ lizard,” where “walks on water” is the equating predicate. How illogical predicate-equating can be, which can make it as having no bounds, is evident in calling a flat-topped mushroom a “toadstool,” when toads don’t ever sit on stools! The unconscious predicate-equating should now be obvious to us in the commonly described medical conditions of “buffalo hump,” “saddle nose,” “water hammer pulse,” “pill roller tremor,” and “St Vitus dance.” Psychiatry itself might be guilty of the same type of unconscious thinking it has accused schizophrenics of only having, as evidenced by the “Oral stage,” the “Anal stage,” and the “Oedipus complex.” Our seeing any similarity in two different entities may have been preceded by unconscious “part”-oriented predicate-equating.
“Part-to-part” predicate-equating makes predicate-equating far more widespread than we might initially realize. For instance, unconscious “part-to-part” predicate-equating may be involved whenever we engage in any extended talking with a listener. With predicate-equating, we can unconsciously meet some of what is unmet of our basic emotional need if we unconsciously perceive a very small part, which we can call entity “A,” within our listener that can meet our basic emotional need as we talk to that listener about anything. That small entity “A” that we might unconsciously perceive in our listener as we talk to that listener, can become the same as an entity “B,” or only a part of entity “B,” from our past, if they both are unconsciously perceived as sharing the same predicate “meets my basic emotional need.” With that commonly shared predicate, entity “A” becomes identical with entity “B,” or part of entity “B.” We could also unconsciously equate that small part we perceive in our listener with other things, people, experiences, and situations, or only parts of those, that might have also met our basic emotional need in our past. That equating process enhances the degree to which we can meet what might be unmet of our basic emotional need from that small unconsciously perceived part of our listener. On an unconscious level, a perceived part of that listener, of which we might not be consciously aware, can become emotionally important to us by making us feel more emotionally comfortable when it helps meet what might be uncomfortably unmet of our basic emotional need. Our unconsciously equating that small part, with very different entities, and parts of entities, of our past, might be based on the commonly shared predicate “meeting my basic emotional need.” That unconscious equating can go right on back to that part of the emotional mothering we received during our infancy that first met our basic emotional need. We might now conclude that we could unconsciously find a “good” part whenever we’re engaged in any extended talking with a person if we unconsciously perceive that part as listening to us and making us the center of favorable attention, just as our mothering person first did.
If you and I were to engage in some on-going talking, I’ll unconsciously find a “good” part in you, and you’ll unconsciously find a “good” part in me. Finding those parts will be an unrecognized pleasurable experience, and because it is a pleasurable experience, it will help meet what might be unmet of our basic emotional need. We’ll then continue to subtly meet some of what is unmet of our basic emotional need from those “good” parts, that we unconsciously perceive in each other, as we continue our on-going talking. Though we both won’t recognize that we’re meeting a little of what might be unmet of our basic emotional need from a “good” part that we unconsciously perceive in each other, we both might notice that we’re becoming more emotionally comfortable as we talk, and that we have more of those desired comfortable feelings which arise from meeting more of our basic emotional need. We would probably attribute our feeling more emotionally comfortable to the subject of our talking. We might later tell someone, that we enjoy talking to each other because we share a common interest in that about which we talk. Although this might be true, it might not be the predominate reason we enjoy talking to each other. The unrecognized predominant reason for our engaging in any enjoyable talking might be that when we talk to a listener, we’re mutually meeting some of what is unmet of our basic emotional need. It’s meeting more of our basic emotional need that makes us feel more emotionally comfortable. The more we engage in talking to a perceived interested listener, regardless of the