Among Murderers. Sabine Heinlein
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crowded and disease ridden, many prisons had to give up on their concept of solitude, silence, and contemplation. This endemic problem, criminology expert Alexis M. Durham writes, “continues to bedevil modern correctional operations.” He points out that the psychological impact of living in crowded conditions “may not appear until after the inmate has returned to society and is no longer under careful observation.”11
In 1870, leading correctional thinkers convened at the National Congress on Penitentiary and Reformatory Discipline in Cincinnati and suggested a number of principles to reform the system: Prisoners were to be carefully classified; more rewards than punishment were to be administered; prison officials should receive special training; inmates were to be treated on an individual basis and should have access to education and work training. “By providing them with work and encouraging them to redeem their character and regain their lost position in society,” offenders were supposed to be reintegrated into society.12 The creation of indeterminate sentences (which were to make sure that a prisoner was released as soon as he was rehabilitated), the parole board, parole and probation officers, and the juvenile court were all direct results of what came to be known as the “Rehabilitative Ideal.”
Criminologists Cullen and Jonson note that the rehabilitative ideal reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s, when a broad range of treatment programs, including group counseling, college education, behavior modification, work release, and work training programs were introduced and community-based treatment programs were championed.13 Yet the unfettered belief in rehabilitation waned in the following decades. Cullen and Jonson attribute this decline to the social and political turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s, a period marked by the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, Watergate, urban riots, and an enormous increase in crime. While liberals grew suspicious of the unrestricted discretion of governmental institutions (such as courts, prisons, and parole boards), conservatives believed that criminals were “coddled” and that the public was being put at risk. With his notorious 1974 publication, “What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform,” criminologist Robert Martinson fanned the flames. Citing eighty-two studies on rehabilitation programs and recidivism, Martinson concluded, “With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have no appreciable effect on recidivism.”14 In 1975 Ted Palmer published a comprehensive rebuttal to Martinson's findings, reexamining the studies and concluding that 48 percent of the programs studied were, in fact, reducing recidivism.15 But Martinson's “nothing works” report was “the straw that broke the camel's back,” according to criminologists Edward Latessa and Alexander M. Holsinger.16 Its tone would define the law-and-order movement for decades to come.
Although not all treatment programs were eradicated, rehabilitation as the dominant correctional philosophy was replaced with a belief in deterrence, “incapacitation,” and “just deserts.” The notion of deterrence is rooted in the belief that punishment in itself reduces criminal behavior. It assumes that people are rational and seek to avoid pain. Incapacitation follows the idea that crime can be prevented by simply locking up criminals. “Just deserts” proponents don't concern themselves with preventing or controlling future crimes. Advocating mandatory sentences that don't make a criminal's release dependent on the discretion of judges and prison officials, they seek to create exact sentences that punish the criminal act: regardless of circumstances, finances, race, or rehabilitative development, each criminal receives exactly the same sentence for his or her particular crime.
It is important to point out that rehabilitation, deterrence, “just deserts, “ and incapacitation are not mutually exclusive. Angel, Bruce, and Adam experienced not one coherent guiding philosophy but rather a hodgepodge of competing philosophies that have been applied and absorbed at random.
While job training and educational programs for inmates are still available and while prison ministries continue to go strong, the rehabilitative ideal was largely pushed aside by these new philosophies and, significantly, vengeance. A tough-on-crime stance, resulting in mandatory sentencing, three-strikes laws, and the mass incarceration of people of color in particular, determined the approach to criminal justice for decades to come. Bruce, Adam, and Angel were kept in prison far beyond their mandatory minimum sentences. The decision of the parole commissioners was based on some vague notion that the three men's dispositions were “incompatible with the public safety and welfare.” Looking at Angel's parole transcripts, I wondered what could have gotten him out of prison after fifteen years, when he first became eligible for parole. He had gathered support letters, an education, and job training certificates to prove that he was no longer a menace to society but was denied parole the first seven times he went in front of the board. Apparently, deterrence, incapacitation, and programming had not yet achieved what they were supposed to do. This case again begs the question of what constitutes successful rehabilitation in the minds of the administration—and in our own.
One of the most obvious problems with the philosophies of deterrence and incapacitation are that what deters one person does not necessarily deter another. In fact, Bruce was not deterred by the prospect of prison. Sadly, he was familiar with it from the street and from his own family. Bruce's example also reminds us that rationality and self-control are not generally strong traits in criminals.
The problem with “just deserts” is that it is difficult to predict who will commit crimes and when; predictive sentencing prevents offenders from being released on good behavior and, overall, results in longer sentences. While proponents of incapacitation may argue that locking up offenders and throwing away the key does, indeed, lower crime rates, opponents retort that these rates are only lower compared to a “nothing works” approach. If a similar amount of money were to be invested in evidence-based correctional interventions, the crime rates might actually decrease.17
When Adam was incarcerated in 1976, there were fewer than 263,000 people in prison in the United States.18 Today there are 2.3 million Americans in prisons and jails and another 5 million on parole and probation.19 America's correctional system is once again in a state of crisis. “The prisons are ‘overcrowded,’ we are told (and, in fact, courts have ruled). ‘Overcrowding’ is a euphemism for an authoritarian nightmare,” writes Christopher Glazek in his comprehensive and eye-opening article on the topic. Detailing the manifold obstacles facing ex-offenders, he adds, “Once you go to prison, you never really come back.”20
Spurred by these daunting numbers, as well as by financial, humanitarian, and public-safety concerns, the last two decades have spawned a growing movement of criminologists who advocate for evidence-based rehabilitation. Under the assumption that “crime is chosen but not according to some vague notions of rational choice,” professionals have worked to identify “criminogenic risk factors” (such as antisocial values, a dysfunctional family background, criminal peers, risk seeking, and impulsiveness) that have been shown to correlate with crime and recidivism and, most important, that can be changed.21
In their influential 2002 article, “Beyond Correctional Quackery—Professionalism and the Possibility of Effective Treatment,” criminologists Latessa, Cullen, and Paul Gendreau point out that many of the correctional treatment methods of the last decades are not based on solid scientific knowledge.22 The long list of what does not work to reduce recidivism includes boot camps, programs that focus on humiliation and punishment, wilderness programs, psychoanalysis, acupuncture, and pet and art programs, many of which are goodwill attempts by private organizations. Latessa, Cullen, and Gendreau point to the principles of effective correctional programs established by the Canadian social psychologist Don A. Andrews, which are now widely quoted in contemporary American criminal justice literature . Andrews acknowledges that” risk factors for criminal conduct may be biological, personal, interpersonal, and/or structural, cultural, political and economic; and may reflect immediate circumstances.”23 (Bruce's, Angel's, and Adam's stories illustrate the complex interaction of some of these risk factors.) Emphasizing the importance of individual differences in criminal behavior, Andrews argues that offenders have to be rigorously assessed to determine their specific criminogenic risk factors and needs. These risks and needs have to be addressed through a cognitive-behavioral approach administered by qualified, warm, genuine, and well-supervised professionals in an environment of integrity. Treatment style,