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      Phantom Peace

      Henry “Scoop” Jackson, J. William Fulbright, and Military Sales to Israel

      When Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969, despite Johnson’s decision to sell offensive weapons, the future of U.S.-Israel relations remained uncertain. While Democratic presidents (Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson) maintained generally positive relations with Israel, the Republican Dwight Eisenhower did not.¹ As former vice president for Eisenhower, President Nixon did not want to get too close to Israel, a position that can also be gleaned from his anti-Semitic comments recorded on Oval Office tapes and his many outbursts about Israel during the course of his one and one-half terms.² However, Nixon regarded Israel as an important friend in the Cold War, and he admired Israeli toughness and, therefore, sought a closer strategic alliance with Israel. But much like his predecessors, regardless of party affiliation, he actually pursued an evenhanded position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Congress and the Cold War, along with Nixon’s weakened position due to Watergate and Vietnam, reworked Nixon’s policy aims in the Middle East.

      During Nixon’s first term as president, Congress played an influential role in securing larger military-aid packages for Israel, especially F-4 Phantom jets. Johnson agreed to sell fifty Phantoms in his last month in office, and Israeli officials hoped to persuade Nixon to sell more. The Phantoms promised to swing the balance of power in the Middle East even further in Israel’s direction. Israeli airpower proved decisive in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt, which followed the 1967 war and ended in August 1970, showed the necessity of the sophisticated Phantoms to combat Soviet-supplied, Egyptian artillery along the Suez Canal Zone.³ Nixon’s first term witnessed a significant increase in military assistance to Israel that cannot be understood without looking at congressional—and, in particular, Senate—politics.

      This chapter focuses on the battle between Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA) and J. William Fulbright (D-AR) over U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and, specifically, about military sales to Israel.⁴ Jackson, who ran for president in 1972 and 1976, and Fulbright, the longest-tenured chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, staked out very different positions for the proper relationship between the United States and Israel. Jackson viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict through the lens of the Cold War and wanted the president to authorize more military credit sales to Israel to match the growing Soviet presence in the region. Jackson planned to challenge détente, bolster his conservative position in foreign policy, and generate goodwill in the American Jewish community to support his upcoming bid for president. In doing so, he demonstrated that a senator can be just as apt to use the State of Israel to his advantage as the Israel lobby is to use a congressional official, which is a counterpoint to the argument made by Mearsheimer and Walt regarding the Israel lobby.⁵ Fulbright, on the other hand, advocated for more cooperation with the Soviet Union in the hopes of facilitating a comprehensive peace agreement through the United Nations. He regarded increased military sales as a threat to a potential peace agreement.

      Instead of looking at the Arab-Israeli peace process through the executive branch, as other scholars have done, this chapter views the issue of military sales seen primarily through the legislative branch, using the often-overlooked collections of important congressmembers to make its case.⁶ That does not mean to suggest, however, that military sales and peace discussions existed in separate vacuums. Rather, the two have shared something of a symbiotic relationship, with each impacting discussions about the other. One reason Nixon sought to limit military sales was his fear that if Israel were too strong it would resist peace negotiations. Yet Israel fit perfectly into the Nixon Doctrine, which, in light of Vietnam, prescribed sending arms and providing a nuclear umbrella for regional allies in lieu of sending U.S. combat troops abroad. Therefore, the two discussions speak well to each other.

      The debates about military aid for Israel revealed a developing alliance between U.S. conservatives and the State of Israel that would continue to impact U.S. foreign policy for decades to follow, in particular with regard to the peace process.⁷ As shown in the Johnson years, support for Israel started to come from both liberals and conservatives, and increasingly from the latter. This dynamic accelerated during the Nixon years. Conservatives and Cold War hawks like Jackson advanced the congressional critique of Nixon’s foreign policy, putting both Nixon and some liberals on the defensive. They disagreed with détente and aimed to continue the global war against communism, which included substantial military-aid packages, while liberals became more interested in human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and reduced defense spending.

      The perceived interests of U.S. conservatives and the State of Israel started to align. Both sides argued that a strong Israel was important for reasons of Cold War national security, and to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East required large-scale military sales to Israel, including more Phantoms. For Israel, the United States could replace France as its primary weapons supplier, and for U.S. conservatives, especially in the context of the Vietnam War, Israel could become the new centerpiece of U.S. Cold War foreign policy. As the Cold War consensus fell apart, and as South Vietnam’s position became increasingly untenable, conservative members of Congress shifted more of their focus from East Asia to the Middle East, where they joined many liberals in a revamped, bipartisan support for Israel that resulted in a powerful strategic alliance.

       More Phantoms?

      Unsatisfied with the status quo, Nasser declared a “War of Attrition” against Israel beginning in March 1969. Using Soviet weaponry, Egyptian forces began a heavy bombardment of Israeli forces along the Suez Canal Zone.⁸ Israel was largely successful in repelling attacks and offered some of its own, conducting deep raids into Egyptian territory during the first few months of 1970, thanks to U.S.-made Phantoms.⁹ The first delivery of Phantoms, which arrived in September 1969, extended Israel’s strategic reach and abruptly changed the balance of power. Previously, Israel had launched only a few commando raids into Egypt. But by January 1970 the Phantoms allowed Israel to fly deep bombing raids into Egyptian territory, including the Cairo area. Egypt responded by asking Moscow for greater Soviet involvement, which in turn increased U.S. concern.¹⁰

      Secretary of State William Rogers tried to assist U.N. special envoy Gunnar Jarring and restart the stalled peace process