The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Rene Lemarchand
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large as a source of division. Personal and political grudges were certainly instrumental in causing Wamba-dia-Wamba's decision to form his own party in Kisangani (RCDK), but the choice of Kisangani was not made at random. The prospects of easy access to the area's rich mineral deposits were just as crucial for the dissident leader as they were, a few months later, in triggering the violent confrontation between Rwanda and Uganda, at which point he had few other options than to move to Bunia, the capital of Ituri. This is where the seeds of his undoing were sown. Quite aside from the greed factor, in the context of a growing ethnic polarization between Hema and Lendu, his decision to side with the Lendu immediately sealed a Nande-Hema alliance against him, bringing together Mbusa Nyamesi (Nande) and Tibasima (Hema) as the key players, identified with the RDC-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML). With Uganda firmly behind the Hema, Wamba eventually bowed to Museveni's pressure to leave Bunia, thus paving the way for the next round, between Nande and Hema. Eventually the Hema-Gegere group decided to break away from the RCD-ML in hopes of getting the exclusive benefit of the Kilo-Moto gold mines and under the leadership of Thomas Lubanga, formed the Union des Populations Congolaises (UPC). In time, however, intra-Hema rivalries would prompt the culturally distinct southern Hema to set up their own group, the Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo (PUSIC), led by chief Kahwa, whereas the northern Gegere-Hema remained under Lubanga's wing. Meanwhile, unable to hold his ground against the Hema's UPC, Nyamwesi retired to his solidly Nande fiefdom of Beni-Butambo, while Ituri sank inexorably into an ever more bloody factional strife. Ethnicity, greed, and political ambitions were all involved, though not always in equal proportion, in the unraveling of the original RCD.
And so were external actors, most notably Uganda and Rwanda. A detailed discussion of their involvement in Ituri politics would take us too far afield. Suffice it to note that both share a large part of responsibility in the factional strife that engulfed a large section of the province. First, by supporting the Hema against the Lendu, then switching sides while Rwanda threw its weight around the Hema, Uganda has played a major role in intensifying the conflict. And the same applies to Rwanda, even though Kigali made every effort to create the illusion that assistance to UPC was the initiative of the RCD-Goma. In truth, the UPC entered into an alliance with the RCD-Goma in January 2003, which provided for political and military assistance, but as early as June 2002, Rwanda was already delivering large quantities of arms and ammunition to the UPC. In trying to grasp the dynamic of violence in eastern Congo, one is reminded of Tilly's pithy formula, “someone who produces both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it, is a racketeer.”70 Nurtured by foreign patrons, and relayed by local warlords, the racketeering shows no sign of coming to an end any time soon.
The Rwandan Menace
In terms of size and potential wealth, there is no greater contrast than between minute, overpopulated, resource-poor Rwanda and its “scandalously” well-endowed, giant neighbor to the west; the anomaly lies in the overwhelming military superiority of Rwanda's RDF, one of the most experienced, disciplined, and efficient armed forces in the region.
The threats posed by Rwanda to its Congolese neighbor were cruelly revealed during the 1997 and 1998 wars, and by the repeated forays of the RDF into the DRC from 1998 to 2002, as far south into the interior as north Katanga and Kasai and Beni-Butembo in the north. Following the 2002 Pretoria accords, the bulk of Rwanda's army formally withdrew from the DRC; nonetheless, writes Reyntjens, “[it] later maintained a covert presence both directly and indirectly through its proxy, the RCD-Goma.”71 Just how serious is the challenge of its proxy was made clear during the May 2004 offensive on Bukavu, the border attacks on Kanyabonga in December 2004 and in Rutshuru in January 2006.
Ironically, Rwanda was the first to feel threatened by the presence of armed Hutu refugees in eastern Congo; its security concerns made it mandatory to “neutralize” the camps from which originated the raids against its national territory. Expansion quickly followed preemption and with the power vacuum created by the fall of the Mobutist state, the need to fill it with trustworthy allies backed by effective military force became all the more urgent. This is where a radical shift occurred in Rwanda's policy goals. Security meant, in essence, continuing access to mineral resources, not only to reward local allies but to strengthen its military establishment. No longer is Rwanda's security imperiled by Hutu rebels but, if anything, by rebels within its own military establishment. This is not to underestimate the nuisance potential of the radical, Hutu-led Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), consisting mainly of remnants of the interahamwe and ex-FAR. Although these constitute a clear and present danger to the civilian populations of North and South Kivu and parts of Maniema, Rwanda's allegation that they pose a mortal threat to its security is vastly exaggerated; nonetheless, the FDLR offer a convenient pretext for Kigali's military incursions into North Kivu. The FDLR are no match for an estimated 70,000 men under arms and a sophisticated military arsenal, consisting of armored personnel carriers (APCs), tanks, and helicopters. Even though it is not immediately threatened by rebel forces, Rwanda's maintenance of its armed forces is heavily dependent on free access to its neighbor's wealth.
Exactly how much of the mineral pie goes to Rwanda and how much to its local allies is impossible to tell because of the secrecy surrounding these transactions and the number of intermediaries and joint ventures involved. A rough indication of the profits going to the RCD was disclosed by Adolphe Onusumba, a key RCD figure, who is reported to have declared in 2000, “We raise more or less $200,000 per month from diamonds.…Coltan gives us more: a million dollars a month.”72 This is probably a fraction of the overall profits going into Rwandan pockets.73 Whether or how far discords over the sharing of the Congo's wealth have contributed to the RCD's declining fortunes is moot. What is beyond doubt is that the RCD is no longer Kagame's most dependable ally in eastern DRC. In the words of one observer, “the Rwandan government has progressively relegated the national RCD leadership to a secondary tool of influence in Kinshasa and focused instead on creating and strengthening autonomous power bases in areas of the DRC it considers to be within its sphere of influence.”74
Rwanda's principal ally in eastern DRC is the multifaceted NGO Tous pour la Paix et le Développement (TPD), headed until 2000 by the all-powerful North Kivu governor, Eugene Serufuli Ngayabaseka. It was founded in 1998, ostensibly “to assist Congolese refugees in Rwanda to return to the DRC,”75 meaning essentially those Tutsi elements indigenous to North Kivu who fled the violence in 1995 and 1996. Of far greater significance, however, are TPD's “latent” functions. Its aims are to expand and strengthen Kigali's grassroots “constituencies” politically, militarily, and economically. This is how Dennis Tull describes its activities: “[to help] the RCD establish a strong power base on both an elite level as well as on the ground by forging close links between Kigali, the RCD and a Banyarwanda group consisting of rich landowners and repatriates in North Kivu…to address Rwanda's security concerns by reinforcing military recruitment among the Banyarwanda repatriates…thirdly, by supposedly promoting humanitarian concerns, the repatriation network might have tapped resources provided by international agencies, thus contributing to the financing of this alliance.”76 The emphasis placed on the recruitment of Hutu participants in the TPD is the most arresting—and potentially risky—aspect of Kigali's new strategy.
That Serufuli happens to be a Hutu, and a Hutu from Rutshuru at that, is of course indicative of the new course being charted by Kigali. No longer is the aim to assemble a group of potential supporters from various ethnic and regional horizons around a core of Banyamulenge faithful, as was the case during the early years of the RCD, but to reach out to Hutu elements indigenous to North Kivu. In a fascinating exploration of the TPD's historical antecedents, Bucyalime Mararo shows its curious pedigree, traceable to the pro-Hutu Mutuelle agricole des Virunga (MAGRIVI) and the more “ecumenical” Mutuelle UMOJA. TPD, in short, has deep roots in the social landscape of the region. In one significant respect, its settlement policies are ominously reminiscent of the colonial era, when Hutu migrants gradually pushed the Hunde out of their traditional domains in Masisi, thus creating lasting enmities between them. As Hutu chiefs are once again replacing Hunde authorities, and appropriating their landholdings, the stage is set for a renewal of tension.77 Whether their shared awareness of being up against a common ethnic enemy can help forge closer ties between Hutu and Tutsi remains to be seen.
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