Map 1. The medieval Maghrib.

      State, Territory, and Region

      Historians who have studied Ḥafṣid politics have assessed the power of the Ḥafṣid state by analyzing its control over its territory, the region of Ifrīqiyā. In this transposition of modern notions of state and territory, the natural expression of Ḥafṣid domination is assumed to be the homogeneous territory that fell between primarily political borders. For specialists such as Talbi, the Ḥafṣids ruled that territory from Tunis, their capital. This dynastic or state-centric perspective has the benefit of agreeing with the perspective of the sources. But it rests on one fundamental assumption, and that is the equivalence of the modern concept of “state” and the medieval Arabic term dawla.

      The medieval word dawla is commonly translated it in English as “state” or “dynasty.” But dawla is attested in the earliest Arabic chronicles, and thus centuries before a notion of “the state” became established in European languages.¹⁵ Its meanings accrued and evolved in relation to widely different sociohistorical conditions and conceptions, and by the time Ḥafṣid chroniclers used the term, they were attributing to it meanings not all found in modern notions of the state.¹⁶

      Certainly, Ḥafṣid authors applied the term dawla to the ruling family or dynasty. For example, in his Kitāb al-‘ibar (Book of Examples), Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406) entitled the section on the Ḥafṣids “the dawla of the descendants of Abū Ḥafṣ” (dawlat Banī Abī Ḥafṣ).¹⁷ This usage suggests that the dawla was something the Ḥafṣids possessed or embodied collectively. In another example, the dawla was depicted as “Ḥafṣid,” as in “the Ḥafṣid dawla” (al-dawla al-ḥafṣiya). In this sense, “Ḥafṣid” was a quality the dawla possessed.¹⁸ This conception of dawla is, however, not the one most commonly found in the sources. Most frequently, dawla was applied to an individual ruler. This dawla began with the reception of the oath of allegiance and ended when the ruler died—or when he abdicated or was deposed. It is such a conception that the historian Ibn Qunfudh (d. 1407) applied when he wrote that the “dawla [of the Ḥafṣid al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77)] lasted twenty-nine and and a half years.”¹⁹ In this sense, dawla was a regnal period (mudda), not a kinship group or dynasty.²⁰

      While the “collective” dawla could continue to exist, in rare cases, without a Ḥafṣid emir, the more “personal” dawla could become extinct (inqaraḍat) while he was nominally in charge—although the end of the regnal period (dawla) had to await his actual death. This was the case of the dawla of Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar (r. 1284–95). “[His dawla] became extinct with the disappearance of its pillars (arkān).²¹ The first who died among its pillars was Abū Zayd ‘Īsa al-Fāzāzī—his family had means, leadership, and knowledge (‘ilm).”²² The conception of the dawla assumed here by the pro-Ḥafṣid historian Ibn Qunfudh differs from the aforementioned ones and refers neither to a dynasty nor to a regnal period. This dawla was imagined as a structure with weight-bearing walls or pillars. Significantly, this perspective envisaged a broader notion that included elite individuals outside the Ḥafṣid dynasty. Ibn Qunfudh also used the term dawla to describe an entity similar to the family. As the head of his dawla, the ruler was portrayed as keeping it in order, as a father would.²³ This familial (dynastic) dawla was run like a business. When the ruler managed his dawla properly, peace extended beyond his narrow circle, benefiting the people (al-nās). Conversely, when the dawla was not in order (murattaba), everyone suffered. Interestingly, in spite of the multiplicity of meanings they lent a dawla, Ḥafṣid intellectuals never personified the concept. Their dawla did not raise taxes, build roads, or purchase goods. Moreover, it did not engage in relations with abstract entities such as tribes and cities. In this sense, it was not like the reified modern state.