Map 2. Rwanda, Map No. 3717 Rev. 10, June 2008. United Nations.

      On 11 January 1994, Gen. Dallaire sent a cable to the Secretary-General’s military adviser in New York, informing him that the Hutu leadership was planning to engage in mass killings against the Tutsi population,⁸ and indicating that he intended to seize weapons being stockpiled for the genocide.⁹ He was told not to undertake this activity, and the cable disappeared into the ether.¹⁰ UNAMIR’s second in command, Luc Marchal, said the “Mogadishu Syndrome”—the reluctance to engage in robust peacekeeping activities in the wake of the disastrous U.S. mission in Somalia in 1993 (also known as the “Somalia Syndrome”)—explained this inaction.¹¹ On 3 February, Dallaire was told that he could monitor action by the police to investigate reports of, and seize, arms caches. He would have to inform the government, and since members of the government were complicit in the planned genocide, they were given plenty of warning of any operations, and the arms caches were never found.¹² He also informed U.S., French, and Belgian diplomats. The first two countries dismissed the threat, while Belgium argued for more robust preventive measures, which came to nought.¹³

      Three months later, on 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. There is great speculation as to who was responsible; most point to Hutu militants,¹⁴ although Tutsi leader Paul Kagame has also been accused.¹⁵ Kagame was cleared in a 2012 French report.¹⁶ This event provided the shock that started the genocide. The killing of Tutsi by Hutu extremists—the interahamwe—started immediately. On 7 April ten Belgian peacekeepers, who had been sent to protect the prime minster, were killed. Belgium decided to pull out its peacekeepers on 12 April.¹⁷ There were calls in the Security Council to pull UNAMIR out entirely,¹⁸ even though Dallaire had asked for more troops to reinforce his dwindling force. At one point he estimated that 4,000 troops would have been sufficient to stop the killing and protect hundreds of thousands of lives.¹⁹ On 10 April he requested 5,000 troops and a more robust mandate. By this time, while not using the word genocide, he realized that widespread crimes against humanity were being carried out, with 50,000 people killed in four days.²⁰ An independent report looking back at the events argued that 5,000 troops could have saved 500,000 lives, more than half the estimated 800,000 killed in the ensuing three months.²¹ Indeed, nineteen years later, President Clinton admitted that the United States could have saved at least 300,000 people if it had intervened.²² The president of the Security Council that month, Colin Keating from New Zealand, appealed for a robust response.²³ Reports were sent by Gen. Dallaire and others detailing the killing.²⁴

      The pleas fell on deaf ears. Iqbal Riza, deputy to Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) head Kofi Annan, questioned whether peacekeepers should be involved in protecting civilians.²⁵ The U.S. had little interest in Rwanda, which was strategically unimportant. It did not want to send in its own troops, and it did not want to fund yet another expanded peacekeeping operation with a much more robust enforcement mandate. Not wanting to commit to anything, it indicated from the beginning that the UN was the best place to address the situation. At the UN, it argued for pulling out of UNAMIR.²⁶ The UK, too, was little interested.²⁷ The French, who were deeply implicated in supporting the Habyarimana regime and had strategic and culture interests in Rwanda, did not want to support any action that might in the end support the English-speaking RPF, which had immediately entered the country to stop the genocide of its co-ethnics.²⁸ Western countries did, however, send in forces to evacuate foreigners, a task with which UNAMIR had been authorized to assist.²⁹ On 13 April, the RPF sent a message to the president of the Security Council describing the situation as genocide,³⁰ invoking the Holocaust.³¹ Nigeria, which sat on the Security Council, wanted UNAMIR to be able to act more robustly, a suggestion that went nowhere.³²

      The Security Council took its first action on 21 April. It did not withdraw UNAMIR. Neither did it reinforce it. Rather, it decided to draw UNAMIR down to a force of 250 troops to negotiate a cease-fire, assist humanitarian operations, and “monitor and report on developments in Rwanda.”³³ Observe is what it mostly did. With so few troops and a weak mandate, its hands were tied. The members of the Security Council were well aware of the implications of their (in)action.³⁴

      After the genocide, there were denials from U.S. and other officials that they knew what was going on at the time—a denial repeated by President Clinton four years later during his apology to Rwanda³⁵—although it was revealed in 2004 that the Clinton administration was aware of a “‘final solution to eliminate all Tutsis’” significantly before the genocide began.³⁶ Alan Kuperman argues that the earliest President Clinton could have known that genocide was occurring was 20 April.³⁷ While this may or may not be true, what is true, first, is that diplomats and policymakers in a number of important countries and the UN knew there was widespread killing happening that beyond “mere” political killings—crimes against humanity. Second, President Clinton—and other leaders—did not ask the questions necessary to determine exactly what was going on. President Clinton never convened senior advisers to discuss the situation.³⁸ Third, there was a concerted effort to avoid the term genocide.³⁹ When asked whether genocide was happening in Rwanda, a U.S. State Department spokesperson indicated (weeks later, on 10 June) that “acts of genocide” had occurred,⁴⁰ even though the U.S. National Intelligence Daily for 23 April, a classified document that would have been distributed to several hundred government officials—and thus contained information which Clinton would have had access to—noted an “‘effort to stop the genocide, which relief workers say is spreading south.’”⁴¹ Oxfam used the word genocide on 28 April in a public statement,⁴² and by the end of April, Dallaire was using the term.⁴³ The ICRC issued a statement indicating that “‘whole families are exterminated … the cruelty knows no limits,’”⁴⁴ claiming that 100,000, and as many as 300,000, people had been killed.⁴⁵ Amazingly, Rwanda was allowed to keep its seat on the Security Council and participate in discussions. On 29 April, Ambassador Keating, along with ambassadors from Argentina, Spain, and the Czech Republic, tried to get the Security Council to release a statement indicating that genocide was occurring.⁴⁶ On 17 May the Security Council passed Resolution 918, which used the language of the Genocide Convention but did not use the term genocide itself.

      This is a clear indication of the force of the word. If one uses awkward verbal constructions such as “acts of genocide” or refuses to use the “G word” altogether, one is obviously trying to avoid the implications of using the word. To use the word would be to acknowledge responsibility—which would bring one under pressure to act. Indeed, as a paper prepared by the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense stated on 1 May: “Be careful. Legal at State was worried about this [using the term genocide] yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something’.”⁴⁷ Although a State Department spokesperson indicated that the Genocide Convention did not have an “‘absolute requirement’” to intervene, there was worry that this was the expectation. Here we see the clear working of the “never again” norm, the precursor to R2P. U.S. policy-makers felt there would be an expectation on the part of the public that the U.S. would live up to this perceived requirement. This was the last thing they wanted to do. So they manipulated and twisted words. The norm put pressure on policy-makers to act, but the action they took was perverse. The situation was denied, obfuscatory language was used, responsibilities were avoided. The “never again” norm was so powerful that when this norm collided with perceived state interests, policy-makers denied reality. There was recognition that people were being killed in Rwanda, but it was put down to civil war, tribalism, political killings, deep-seated ethnic hatred—in other words, the usual story from Africa.⁴⁸ But instead of making the case to stop the killing, the Genocide Convention was used to prevent such action. As long as the situation was not called genocide, there was no political downside to not reacting. Such is the status of genocide as the über crime that all other crimes can be made to pale in comparison. The Genocide Convention provides a shield against having to take action against “lesser” crimes.