The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts. James R. McConnell

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The topos of Divine Testimony in Luke-Acts - James R. McConnell


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rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_2504db9f-3195-54e5-af5d-027eee76fafa">109 specifically focusing on what he says concerning witnesses. For Aristotle, witnesses fall into two categories: ancient and recent. Ancient witnesses are the most reliable, because it is no longer possible to refute or discredit them; they have, in effect, stood the test of time. Appropriate ancient witnesses include poets, “men of repute whose judgments are known to all” (here, Aristotle provides Homer as an example), “interpreters of oracles for the future” (i.e., Themistocles’s interpretation of the wooden wall), and proverbial wisdom (παροιμία, 1.15.13–19).110 Witnesses who are contemporaries of the orator include “all well-known persons who have given a decision on any point” (these decisions can be used in similar cases) and “those who share the risk of the trial, if they are thought to be perjurers.” Witnesses such as these, however, can only help establish if something occurred or not; they are not reliable in establishing “the quality of the act” (1.15.15–17).

      Locus in Cicero

      Therefore, in my opinion at least, men ought none the less to devote themselves to the study of eloquence although some misuse it both in private and in public affairs. And they should study it the more earnestly in order that evil men may not obtain great power to the detriment of good citizens and the common disaster of the community . . . For from eloquence the state receives many benefits, provided only it is accompanied by wisdom, the guide of all human affairs. (1.4.5)

      Here in the opening of Inv., one sees that Cicero at an early age considers the practice of rhetoric to be a means to an end; namely, it is to be employed in service to the state.

      Now it seems desirable to give in turn the rules about confirmation as is demanded by the regular order of the speech. Confirmation or proof is the part of the oration which by marshalling arguments lends credit, authority, and support to our case. (1.23.33–24.36; emphasis in original)

      But I think that it will be not inconvenient to set forth . . . a kind of raw material for general use from which all arguments are drawn, and then later to present the way in which each kind of case should be supported by all the forms of argumentation derived from this general store. (1.24.34)

      Within the list of attributes of actions, Cicero elaborates on the “performance of the act” and writes, “In connection with the performance of the act (which was the second topic [locus secundus] under the heading of attributes of actions)” (1.26.38). From this use of terminology one can infer that in this context, Cicero considers these attributes to be loci. At the end of this section, one sees the same idea being expressed; Cicero concludes by stating, “All argumentation drawn from these topics which we have mentioned [ex eis locis quos commemoraviums sumetur] will have to be either probable or irrefutable” (1.29.44). After an extended discussion of what constitutes probable and certain arguments, Cicero offers this summary: “Now the sources of confirmatory arguments have been revealed as the occasion offered, and explained as clearly as the nature of the subject required” (1.30.49).

      there is to my mind no more excellent thing than the power, by means of oratory, to get a hold on assemblies of men, win their good will, direct their inclinations wherever the speaker wishes, or divert them from whatever he wishes. In every free nation, and most of all in communities which have attained the enjoyment of peace and tranquility, this one art has always flourished above the rest and ever reigned supreme. (1.8.30)

      Here one sees, as was the case in Inv., that Cicero connects the practice of oratory with that of statecraft, arguing that informed, educated orators (cf. 1.8.32) are essential to the well-being of the state.


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