Church Government According to the Bible. Simon V. Goncharenko
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target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_5217632f-10d9-5f63-b09e-cf4d338ef775">114. Garrett, “Congregation-Led Church,” 171.
115. Taught in 1 Pet 2:4–10; Rev 1:5b–6; 5:9–10; 20:6
116. Garrett, “Congregation-Led Church,” 184.
117. Consistent of two grades: elders and deacons (Erickson, Christian Theology, 1080).
118. Merkle, “Elder and Overseer.”
119. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 928.
120. See Acts 2:46; 12:12, 17; 21:18; Rom 16:3–5, 10–11; 14–15, 23; Phlm 2; Col 4:15; 1 Cor 16:15, 19.
121. Akin, “Single-Elder-Led Church,” 65. See also Strong, Systematic Theology, 914–17; Carson, “Church, Authority in,” 249. Campbell suggests that the leadership of each group was naturally assumed by the head of the household—the one who would have a house large enough to fit the group and who would open it for such meetings (Campbell, Elders, 151–53).
122. Akin, “Single-Elder-Led Church,” 65.
123. Ibid., 66.
124. Strong, Systematic Theology, 916. However, we know for a fact that at least one of the churches listed in Rev 2–3 had multiple-eldership and not a single elder/pastor. See Ephesians; Acts 20:17.
125. Campbell, Elders, 160.
126. Grudem, Systematic Theology, 933. See 1 Tim 5:17–18.
127. Ibid.
128. See Acts 14:23; 16:4; 20:17; 21:18; 1 Tim 5:17; Titus 1:5; Jas 5:14; 1 Pet 5:1. Pointing to Acts 14:23, White adds that understanding “elders” merely in the sense of one elder per church runs counter to the plain meaning of “elders for them in every church” (White, “Plural-Elder-Led Church,” 271).
129. Erickson, Christian Theology, 1080.
130. Ibid.
131. Cowen, Who Rules the Church? 85. See also Samuel E. Waldron, “Plural-Elder Congregationalist’s Response,” 118–21.
132. MacArthur, Master’s Plan, 236.
3
Theological Considerations for Polity Models
The Need for Understanding Foundational Theological Principles
To use the words of Rex A. Coivisto, “we all interpret the Bible if we read it. It would do us all well then to think about whether we are doing so appropriately or not.”133 Since it is a known fact that the Scriptures do not speak with equal clarity on all matters they touch upon, the concern of this chapter, therefore, is to discover and lay out a position on some hermeneutical principles common to the discussion of polity that can function as a theological paradigm for accurate exegesis of ecclesiological passages in the New Testament.134 Or, stated differently, what position should we take on the theological principles in question when approaching Scripture for the purpose of determining what it teaches about church polity?
The Genesis of the Following Six Guiding Theological Principles
I realize that the idea of a theological paradigm that guides Scriptural reading may cause some to cry, “FOUL!” How dare I suggest that we should approach Scripture with preconceived notions regarding what it says? Have we not all been taught to come to the Bible with open minds and hearts and let its message determine what we believe?
The answer to the last question is a resounding “Yes!” and at the same time, “Not exactly.” We all come to the Bible with some preconceived notions about it, which themselves may or may not be based on Scripture.135 For example, when reading the Bible, everyone is guided by one of two theological presuppositions regarding its inerrancy and infallibility. One either assumes that it is, in fact, inerrant—containing no alleged error in doctrine, history, chronology, or physics, and infallible—or it is not. Much of one’s interpretation of and general attitude towards Scripture is going to depend on this theological presupposition regarding its trustworthiness. Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard put it this way: “Though we must always submit to the teachings of the Bible as our sole and final authority, our actual pre-understanding of the Bible as God’s revelation guides our interpretation of its pages” and “our commitment to the authority of the Bible derives from our prior conviction of its truthfulness.”136
Furthermore, we all are steeped in some type of tradition that also affects the way we read and interpret the Bible. Brown is right in stating that none of us can practice the “leapfrog” model of interpretation, which claims the ability to go directly to the Bible, uninfluenced by tradition. He believes that no one approaches the Bible free of denominational or theological presuppositions or unaffected by our contemporary situation, arguing,
When it comes to the theological or denominational presuppositions, Lutherans tend to read the Bible in the light of the interpretive principle of justification by faith, Presbyterians in terms of the sovereignty of God. The sect groups read it from the perspective of their own practices, which may range from snake handling to speaking in tongues. Liberal Protestants find the Bible a handbook for social justice, while conservatives find it depicting an everlasting hell fire designed for liberals . . . From the contemporary situation standpoint, Americans in East Lansing hear Rom 13 in a different way from Germans in East Berlin. When Mississippi Senators and Afrikaner nationalists read Paul’s speech on Mars Hill, they draw different conclusions about racial discrimination than do natives of Indonesia or Ghana who read the same passage . . . No one is trying to be dishonest. Everyone claims to be hearing the word of God. But the indisputable fact of the matter is that Lutherans, Presbyterians, sectarians, liberals, conservatives, Lansingites, East Berliners, southern Americans, southern Afrikaners, Indonesians, and Ghanaians all read the same Scripture and hear different things.137
Fee similarly argues that it is simply impossible for us to not bring our own experience of faith and church to biblical texts.138 “Presuppositionless understanding,” according to Schneiders’ blunt assessment, “is a figment of the imagination of nineteenth-century historicism.”139 Likewise, Fred H. Klooster concludes that “presuppositionless exegesis is impossible.”140
The issue of the “hermeneutical circle” or “spiral,” as it is sometimes called, needs to be mentioned in passing here insofar as it pertains to our present discussion. “Hermeneutical circle” assumes that understanding a whole stretch of language or literature depends on a grasp of its component parts, while comprehension of these smaller units likewise depends on an understanding of the total import of the whole.141 Admittedly, there is an inevitable circularity in interpretation.142
When