Tafelberg Short: Nkandla - The end of Zuma?. City Press
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people in Nkandla (and other rural areas of South Africa).
He courted controversy in 2010 when he did not declare his assets timeously. His lawyer Michael Hulley later said Zuma “does not hold any directorship, membership or shareholding in any company, either public or private”. He subsequently submitted a list of gifts, benefits and financial interests held or received.
By the end of 2010, President Zuma was trying his best to stomp on the growing controversy about the enrichment of the first family, but was failing.
While Young Communist League (YCL) chairperson David Masondo was smacked down for public criticism, his shorthand definition of first family empowerment as ZEE (Zuma Economic Empowerment) rather than BEE quickly worked its way into the national alphabet soup.
The controversy around Nkandla did not happen in a vacuum, nor has it been President Zuma’s only crisis.
On Thursday, 16 August 2012 there was a wildcat strike at a mine owned by Lonmin in the Marikana area. The event garnered international attention following a series of violent incidents between the South African Police Service, Lonmin security, the leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and strikers, which resulted in the deaths of 44 people, the majority of whom were striking mineworkers. At least 78 additional workers were injured. In the preceding week, 10 people, including two policemen and two security guards, were killed.
It was Zuma’s 9/11 moment. In response he ordered the Marikana Commission, headed by Ian Farlam, to investigate the incident.
Then, in May 2013 members of a wealthy and politically connected Indian family, the Guptas, landed their privately chartered aircraft carrying 200 people on a restricted military air base while en route to a family wedding.
The Gupta family had been repeatedly implicated in the bankrolling of Zuma family projects and their companies had employed two of Zuma’s children in high profile roles.
Neither of these incidents is under discussion here, but “Guptagate” does speak to and echo “Nkandlagate” in many ways. It was the emergence of “number 1”.
Diplomatic protocol chief Bruce Koloane said he acted “under pressure from number 1”, a direct reference to Zuma. Koloane was suspended; a government report said he used deception to obtain military landing permission.
Writing in City Press, Njabulo Ndebele said:
Like theoretical physicists, we can determine the nature and location of “Number 1” from the gravitational pull that reveals its presence. Its incorporeal presence is there in the entire Waterkloof Air Force base incident, but frustratingly invisible.
Not only is “Number 1” a known unknown entity, it is also unnamable. When Ambassador Koloane refers to “Number 1” as a source of instructions, he expresses his fear of naming him.
“Number 1”, through the practice of leaving no paper trail behind its actions, breeds conspiratorial illusions among those caught in carrying out its instructions. By leaving no trail of evidence, yet compulsively achieving its goals, it is a force that makes those acting on its behalf believe in the illusion that a phenomenon such as Nkandla, which is obvious to the human eye, can be rendered invisible through a device of law.
The watershed moment for Zuma regarding Nkandla, came in September 2012, when City Press received an anonymous email with proof that the state did not only pay for security upgrades when it spent R250 million on President Jacob Zuma’s Nkandla compound.
The proof came in the form of correspondence by consecutive former Public Works ministers Geoff Doidge and Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde, and senior Public Works officials. It laid bare the frantic rush with which the project was pushed through – and that Zuma was kept abreast of the extent of the upgrades.
A flurry of activity was triggered by a progress report prepared by the Durban office of Public Works for “Prestige Project A” – the name of the Nkandla upgrade – on 8 September 2010. Public Works’ call for “high-level intervention” resulted in Doidge attending an emergency progress meeting at Nkandla on 23 September 2010 where Doidge “pointed out that unnecessary delays are not acceptable”.
Seventeen days later, Public Works reported on the progress of the upgrades. Work was still outstanding on fencing, the helipad, the building of a guardhouse, the relocation of two families, and the construction of tunnels and safe havens. At the end of that month, Zuma fired Doidge and appointed Mahlangu-Nkabinde in his place.
Toward the end of 2012, City Press received documentation proving that the Public Works department had approved a R203 million budget in March 2011 for Prestige Project A.
According to official departmental documentation, the scope of the work was divided as follows:
•The “public (state’s) portion: R203 079 677.18”; and
•The “private (owner’s) portion: R10 651 580.64”.
It stated that the department had already spent R205 000 on electrical cabling and lightning protectors – something that Zuma was supposed to fund.
“Please note that the implementation of some of these issues was unavoidable and some had already been completed.” The rest of the work – including extensive landscaping of Zuma’s residential compound – fell “outside the scope of security measures”.
In the documentation, “written instruction” from “top management” was requested to proceed with work the state was not supposed to fund. There is a suggestion that it be discussed this with Zuma, referred to as the “principal”, because the “financial implication directly affects him”.
After the publication of this documentation, Presidency spokesperson Zanele Mngadi referred City Press to Public Works for comment. However, the department’s acting director-general, Mandisa Fatyela-Lindie, declined to comment on the amount that was spent.
“The Nkandla presidential residence, like all other presidential residences in South Africa, is a national key point. As such, information related to the national key point is protected in terms of the National Key Point Act,” was all she said.
Presidential spokesperson Mac Maharaj confirmed that Nkandla and nine other residences of current and former presidents had been declared national key points in April 2010.
The starting point for any legal evaluation of this alleged splurge of public funds to improve the private residence of our president must be the Executive Members Ethics Act and the code adopted to give effect to it, which binds all Cabinet members, including the president. The act and the code prohibit the president from acting in a way that is inconsistent with his office, using his position to enrich himself, or acting in a way that may compromise the credibility or integrity of his office or of the government. The code further prohibits the president from making improper use of any allowance or payment properly made to him, or to disregard the administrative rules that apply to him.
It is clear the spending of approximately R250 million on an upgrade to the private home of the president would be in clear breach of these obligations and would therefore be unlawful. No wonder government tried to hide details about the unlawful expenditure by invoking a piece of draconian apartheid legislation on national key points.
However, in a constitutional democracy, legislation can never be used to hide unlawful conduct, maladministration or corruption; and neither can it be used to try and escape from accountability for the spending of public funds.
In response to the City Press expose, Public Works Minister Thulas Nxesi called for an investigation into how City Press had obtained the documentation.
Nxesi defended the expenditure, but refused to confirm the amount of taxpayers’ money spent on the project. However, he slammed City Press for publishing details from “top secret” documentation.
“The merely unlawful possession of a top secret (document) is a breach of the laws … This therefore calls for an investigation to be launched to determine how the City Press illegally ended up in possession of this document,” Nxesi said.
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