How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute. David Groten
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officials, in fact, experience feelings such as injustice, anger or unfair treatment aroused by their counterparts’ behavior not just as personal affronts but also as affronts to the state or government they are working for or are associated with (Steinberg, 1996; Taylor, 1993). In this regard, Lindemann observes an “‘affective’ and even […] ‘identity’ value that an abstract institutional entity – even if it is highly ‘fictitious’ – can possess for officials of such an institution” (2010, p. 18)23.
In addition, emotions such as fear, distrust, injustice or anger are not merely attributes of given actors, but, likewise, can be “institutionalized in the structures and processes of world politics“ (Crawford, 2000, p. 119), hence strongly operate on the collective, international level. Apart from collective emotions, research on nationalism provides another explanation as to why emotions matter beyond the interpersonal level. Accordingly, even in non-democratic political systems, government officials as an entity need to act upon strong (emotional) pressure exerted by predominant domestic groups in order to maintain their political legitimacy. In other words, contempt felt by certain influential domestic groups and society when confronted with discrimination and disrespect may be viewed as non-recognition and, hence, may be acted upon by the ruling elite on the former’s behalf. Similarly, government officials may absorb and utilize such domestic sentiment as an instrument to achieve specific political ends. Although in such cases individual state representatives do not necessarily ‘feel’ such sentiment themselves, it can play a vital role nonetheless.
Departing from this bulk of research, the author argues that disrespect, just like emotions at large, can be experienced on a collective group level if, on the [30] one hand, a significant share of members of that group agrees on common attributes and self-worth conceptions and, on the other hand, interprets other groups’ (particularly states’) behavior toward itself as inadequate consideration and recognition thereof (cf. chapter 2). This reasoning is further underpinned by Taylor & Brown who found that state representatives are keen to obtain external recognition of that states’ (self-ascribed) position (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and identity (‘view of itself’). In this light, national respect shall be understood as the respect receiving state’s perception of adequate recognition of its self-ascribed self-worth conceptions by a respect-granting state as expressed by the latter’s behavior and attitude (Wolf, 2011). As a result, a link between a state’s self-evaluated significance and external conduct is strongly presumed24. Accordingly, the pursuit of international respect can be regarded as the quest of institutionalized collective groups and state actors to obtain a level of adequacy that corresponds to the self-perceived significance and status of their reference group or state. As such, status, from a social identity perspective, is not corresponding to a state’s power capacities (Baird, 2011). Similarly, a state’s status satisfaction is not necessarily contingent on the distribution of relative power capabilities (Woolforth, 2008), but on perceived status attribution by external actors. Respect, thus, not only relates to a state’s self-conceived status, identity and self-worth but directly deals with expectations regarding the recognition thereof to be manifested in external actors’ observable behavior. In this vein, states, similar to individual actors, aiming at the adequate recognition25 of their:
“[P]hysical presence, their social importance, their point of views, ideas and values, their interests and needs, their achievements, abilities, merits and advantages and their rights“ (Wolf, 2011, p. 10).
Contrariwise, the perceived lack or inadequacy of such adequate recognition triggers the experience of national or collective disrespect26.
[31] In general, two dimensions of national respect can be identified: an intrinsic, identity and emotion-related dimension, on the one hand, and a rather material and instrumental one, on the other hand. Hence, respect may encompass both a sentiment (intrinsic value) desired for psychological self-evaluative and self-affirmative reasons and an instrument (means to an end) utilized as a “practical bargaining tool” (Nathan & Scobell, 2012, p. 25). The underlying logic regarding the instrument dimension is that actors whose ideas, values and viewpoints are adequately considered are particularly capable of successfully safeguarding their interests. For instance, they may succeed in finding supporters of their own concerns and objectives. This, in turn, potentially alleviates the likelihood of scenarios in that actors are met by others with confrontation27. While many studies tend to ignore the sentiment dimension, the author of this project places special emphasis on it and considers neglect thereof as insufficient. This viewpoint is already underscored by virtue of the fact that both respect dimensions may intersect, not least as material interests can further intensify the psychological evaluative sentiment dimension and vice versa. For instance, a state’s desire to obtain adequate consideration of its self-ascribed status, identity and overall self-worth conceptions often involve material, non-evaluative considerations as well. The same holds true for respect-related objectives caused by disrespectful conduct: the urge to re-establish the level of respect deemed appropriate may, at the same time, help achieve certain material objectives as well. Similarly, prestige, an essential element of the psychological respect dimension, is “distinct but not isolated from power: material, social or imagined” (Wood, 2013, p. 387). That said, while this project is primarily interested in the non-instrumental, self-evaluative dimension of respect, rather than material considerations like power capacities or economic revenues (Carr & Callan, 2002; Gilpin, 1981; Morgenthau, 1978; Waltz, 1979), these two are not mutually exclusive, hence, a clear separation is not feasible as both mutually enforce one another.
[32] 2.1.1.3 Cognitive Effects of Disrespect
Against this backdrop, what does a collective experience of disrespect imply, on the one hand, for the relationship between disrespect, anger and injustice and, on the other hand, for dynamics and response patterns triggered by non-adequate consideration of a given state’s collective respect needs and expectations?
First, as to the link between disrespect and anger28, preliminary studies maintain that a strong sense of being treated with disrespect causes anger, representing “one of the most essential emotions in the study of international relations” (van Kleef et al., 2008, pp. 13–14). Essentially, anger can be regarded a sentiment of frustration caused by (deliberate) non-recognition (or non-verification) of a distinctive element of an actor’s identity and status29 (Miller, 2001; Stets & Burke, 2000; Taifel, 1978). Usually, it is a specific insult or offense caused by an offender that fuels anger (Lazarus, 1991). Yet, there is no common sense as to whether disrespect is necessarily required to cause anger. It is widely agreed, however, that disrespect does not always arouse anger, especially if the victim does not believe that respect is required and deserved in the first place (Heuer et al., 1999). Similarly, studies indicate that anger and aggression increase the likelihood that an actor interprets certain conduct or attitude by others as disrespectful (Dodge et al., 1990; Graham & Hudley, 1994). As to injustice, social psychologists reason that feelings of injustice can negatively affect an actor’s level of self-esteem (Smith et al., 1998). As such, injustice arguably amounts to the most widespread kind of disrespect (Lupfer et al., 2000; Messick et al., 1985; Mikula, 1986; Mikula et al., 1990). Finally, there also is a conceptual link between disrespect and injustice, which is fairly straightforward30. Two logics appear particularly evident in this regard. According to Bourdieu (1966), a (disrespectful) insult by one actor is regarded as unjust once it is seen as a deprival of something that another actor feels entitled to. Following Miller, instead, an insult is [33] deemed unjust if it is said to provide the alleged offender with an undeserved material or psychological/symbolic advantage (Miller, 1993).
Second, non-adequate recognition by external actors can have multiple negative psychological and emotional effects on those actors in need of respect. First and foremost, contempt and perceived denial of respect can have negative implications for an actor’s sense of importance and self-ascribed self-worth conceptions. If the desired level of adequacy thereof is viewed as not being granted by others, disrespect is experienced. The level of disrespect is contingent, among others, on the harm it inflicts on the victim’s self-worth. For instance, outright ignorance of its status conceptions tends to be more severe than sole status inadequacy. In a similar vein, the level of anger and injustice experienced can affect the degree