Companion to Feminist Studies. Группа авторов
Читать онлайн книгу.
Springer.
56 McCabe, D.P. and Castel, A.D. (2008). Seeing is believing: the effect of brain images on judgements of scientific reasoning. Cognition 107: 343–352.
57 McEwen, B.S. and Milner, T.A. (2017). Understanding the broad influences of sex hormones and sex differences in the brain. Journal of Neuroscience Research 95: 24–39.
58 Medin, D. and Ortony, A. (1989). Psychological essentialism. In: Similarity and Analogical Reasoning (eds. S. Vosniadou and A. Ortony), 179–195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
59 Mednick, M.T.S. (1989). On the politics of psychological constructs: stop the bandwagon I want to get off. American Psychologist 44: 1118–1123.
60 Moir, A. and Jessel, D. (1989). Brain Sex: The Real Differences Between Men and Women. London: Mandarin.
61 Nicholson, L.J. (1990). Feminism/Postmodernism. London: Routledge.
62 O'Connor, C. and Joffe, H. (2014). Gender on the brain: a case study of scientific communication in the new media environment. PLoS One 9 (1–15): e110830.
63 Overton, W.F. and Lerner, R.M. (2012). Relational developmental systems: paradigm for developmental science in the post genomic era. Behavioral and Brain Science 35: 375–376.
64 Phillips, A. (2010). What's wrong with essentialism? Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 11: 47–60.
65 Pinker, S. (2002). The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. London: Allen Lane.
66 Plummer, K. (2012). Critical sexuality studies. In: The Wiley Companion to Sociology (ed. G. Rizer), 243–269. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
67 Raeme, E., Bar‐Ilan, O., and Illes, J. (2005). fMRI in the public eye. Nature Review Neuroscience 2: 159–164.
68 Rich, A. (1980). Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence. Signs 5: 631–660.
69 Rose, S. (ed.) (1982). Against Biological Determinism. London: Allison and Busby.
70 Rose, S. (1997). Lifelines: Biology, Freedom, Determinism. London: Allen Lane.
71 Rosenblum, K.E. and Travis, T.‐M.C. (eds.) (2016). The Meaning of Difference: American Constructions of Race and Ethnicity, Sex and Gender, Social Class, Sexuality and Disability, 7e. London: McGraw‐Hill.
72 Rossi, A. (1977). A biosocial perspective on parenting. Daedalus 106: 1–32.
73 Russett, C.E. (1989). Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universsity Press.
74 Savin‐Williams, R.C., Joyner, K., and Rieger, G. (2012). Prevalence and stability of self‐reported sexual orientation and identity during young adulthood. Archives of Sexual Behavior 41: 1–8.
75 Sayers, J. (1982). Biological Politics: Feminist and Anti‐Feminist Perspectives. London: Tavistock.
76 Schmitz, S. and Höppner, G. (2014). Neurofeminism and feminist neuroscience: A critical review of contemporary brain research. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8: 546.
77 Simon, W. (1996). Postmodern Sexualities. London: Routledge.
78 Smedley, A. (2016). ‘Race’ and the construction of human identity. In: The Meaning of Difference, 7e (eds. K.E. Rosenblum and T.‐M.C. Travis), 51–60. New York: McGraw‐Hill.
79 Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) (2014). Synthesis Report. OECD.
80 Spivak, G.C. (1988). Subaltern studies: deconstructing historiography. In: Selected Subaltern Studies (eds. R. Guha and G.C. Spival), 3–34. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
81 Stone, A. (2004). Essentialism and anti‐essentialism in feminist theory. Journal of Moral Philosophy 2: 135–153.
82 Stork, C. (1998). Married Women Who Love Women. New York: Doubleday.
83 Tallis, R. (2014). Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity. London: Routledge.
84 Tuana, N. (1993). The Less Noble Sex: Scientific, Religious and Philosophical Conceptions of Women's Nature. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
85 Ussher, J. (2006). Managing the Monstrous Feminine: Regulating the Reproductive Body. London: Routledge.
86 Wilson, E.O. (1975). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
87 Woese, C.R. (2004). A new biology for a new century. Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews 68: 173–186.
3 Marxist and Socialist Feminisms
Elisabeth Armstrong
Early Tenets
The writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels created a new continent of thought about social life. Marx demonstrated how capital was able to grow by the exploitation of labor. With the rise of industrial capitalism in the beginning of the nineteenth century, workers, with no other property except their own power to work, had to resign themselves to working for capitalists. But when the exhausted workers went back home from the factories and the fields, they had to resuscitate themselves with their meager pay packets through unpaid reproductive labor at home. In The German Ideology (1845–1846), Marx and Engels described the misperception of workers' relations of reproduction. “The production of life, both of one's own in labor and of fresh life in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship” (Marx and Engels 1964, p. 41). Reproductive labor had social forms that organized it, such as marriage and the family; but the labor itself was seen as biological. Women who performed this labor were also naturalized, as biological beings unable to effect changes in these social orders.
Marxism historicized social reproduction as labor, arguing that it exists within the relations of capitalism. Behind every capitalist social relation – that of the capitalist and the worker – lay another buried social relation, that of the household – between husband and wife. In the newly privatized household, as a result of inherited gender roles, women did the bulk of all reproductive labor under the control of men. Women, therefore, reproduced workers – including themselves – to return the next day ready to sell their labor power to the capitalist. The use value of this reproductive labor is the workers' daily and generational renewal. The exchange value of women's work in the family, however, is nothing at all.
The Marxist definition of a class society under capitalism describes how one class controls the means to produce goods. Wealth accumulates to this small group of owners because they hold what Marx calls the means of production – the elements that harness profit, including intellectual rights, labor, land, natural resources, raw materials, markets, and systems of distribution. All of these facets are privatized, all of them owned, since private property anchors a class society. In addition, that ownership class dictates how everyone else can use these resources. Those that own the means of production hoard for themselves the surplus value (profit) from the production of commodities, those socially useful goods that are bought and sold for the reproduction of life. In capitalism, workers receive wages, capitalists take the profit from their work, and those who reproduce daily and generational life receive no recognition for their labor, in wages or in social value. As subjects in capitalism, they are rendered invisible or a burden to the system.
Marxist feminism explores how gender ideologies of femininity and masculinity structure production in capitalism. It challenges the primacy of capitalist value to determine social values, both the exchange value in wages and the surplus value of profit by making the use value of reproductive labor visible. Today, Marxist feminism grapples with two central questions: how is the political economy gendered in late capitalism? And, how does the social reproduction of people and communities renew capitalism, rather than support anticapitalist praxis? The first question addresses imperialism today, what Lenin famously called the highest stage of capitalism. As a system based on profit over people's needs, capitalism constantly seeks new markets for its goods, what Marx calls commodities, due to the crisis