Figure 1.5 Cartoon playing off the language ideology that considers French a romantic language.

      Grosz, Chris/Cartoon Stock.

      Language Ideologies

      Language ideologies¹⁰ are the attitudes, opinions, beliefs, or theories that we all have about language. Susan Gal and Judith Irvine consider such ideologies “to be neither true nor false. They are positioned and partial visions of the world” (Gal and Irvine 2019:2). We may or may not be conscious of them, and they may or may not square with scholars’ views about language (which are also, of course, language ideologies). Language ideologies can be about language in general (e.g., “Language is what separates humans from other species”), particular languages (e.g., “French is such a romantic language!” – see Figure 1.5 for a cartoon making fun of this language ideology), particular linguistic structures (e.g., “Spanish is complicated as it has two forms of the verb ‘to be’”), language use (e.g., “Never end a sentence with a preposition”) – or about the people who employ specific languages or usages (e.g., “People who say ‘ain’t’ are ignorant,” or, “People who live in the United States should speak English,” or, “Women are more talkative than men”). Scholars working within this fast-growing, exciting area of language ideology study, for example, how socially and politically influenced attitudes toward an endangered language can affect the likelihood of its survival (e.g., Jaffe 1999; Kulick 1998; Shaul 2014), or how teenagers and adults embrace or reject ways of speaking that link them with various racial, ethnic, or gendered identities (e.g., Briggs 1998; Bucholtz 2001; Cameron 1997; Cavanaugh 2012; Cutler 2003; Gaudio 2001; Kroskrity 2000a ).

In almost all cases, language ideologies turn out to be about much more than just language. As Judith Irvine notes, language ideologies are “the cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests” (1989:255). Therefore, language ideology as a concept allows scholars to connect micro- with macro-level social interactions and to analyze questions of cultural identity, morality, power, inequality, and social stereotypes. Paul Kroskrity (2000b:8–23) lists four features that characterize language ideologies.

      In many respects, therefore, attention to language ideologies can help scholars in linguistic and cultural anthropology (and beyond) understand how both language and culture shape and are shaped by human actions. To understand this recursive relationship further, we turn now to the concept of practice.¹¹

      Practice

      Consider Marx’s famous words in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1978[1852]:595). In place of the word “history” in this remark, one could easily substitute “language,” “society,” or “culture,” and the statement would remain equally insightful. At the core of what is known as “practice theory” is this seeming paradox: that language, culture, and society all apparently have a preexisting reality but, at the same time, are very much the products of individual humans’ words and actions.1852]:595). In place of the word “history” in this remark, one could easily substitute “language,” “society,” or “culture,” and the statement would remain equally insightful. At the core of what is known as “practice theory” is this seeming paradox: that language, culture, and society all apparently have a preexisting reality but, at the same time, are very much the products of individual humans’ words and actions.1852]:595). In place of the word “history” in this remark, one could easily substitute “language,” “society,” or “culture,” and the statement would remain equally insightful. At the core of what is known as “practice theory” is this seeming paradox: that language, culture, and society all apparently have a preexisting reality but, at the same time, are very much the products of individual humans’ words and actions.¹² To summarize the essence of practice theory, oftentimes simply by acting as if society’s institutions and norms existed, we thereby bring those institutions and norms into being.

The basic idea underlying practice theory is that structures (both linguistic and social) at the same time constrain and give rise to human actions, which in turn create, recreate, or reconfigure those same structures – and so on, with structures and actions successively giving rise to one another. This kind of human action – that which is embedded within social and linguistic structures, that which both reflects and shapes such structures – is known as “practice” or “agency.” Many practice theorists define practice further as being imbued with dimensions of inequality. Sherry Ortner, for example, considers any form of human action or interaction to be practice “insofar as the analyst recognized it as reverberating with features of inequality, domination, and the like in its particular historical and cultural setting” (1989:11–12; see also Ortner 1984). “Practice,” Ortner goes on to assert, “emerges from structure, it reproduces structure, and it has the capacity to transform structure” (Ortner 1989:12).

      Practice theorists are interested in questions of social reproduction and social transformation – why, in other words, things sometimes change and sometimes remain the same. One concept practice theorists have used to explain this process is Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, which he uses to refer to a set of predispositions that produce practices and representations conditioned by the structures from which they emerge. These practices and their outcomes then reproduce or transform the habitus – whether people intend them to do so or not (Bourdieu 1977:78). Habitus can be a very illuminating concept, for it can be used to describe how people socialized in a certain way will often share many perspectives and values, as well as styles of eating, talking, or behaving. To simplify, habitus refers to how we are predisposed (though not required) to think and act in certain ways because of how we have been socialized. And usually, once we act upon these predispositions, we end up reproducing the very conditions and social structures that shaped our thoughts and actions to start with. Not always, however. Because of the tensions and contradictions inherent in the habitus, actors are neither free agents nor completely socially determined products. Instead, Ortner (1989:198) suggests that they are “loosely structured.” The central question for practice theorists,