The Russia-China Axis. Douglas E. Schoen
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late 1990s, cancelling a number of technology-related contracts. And as more information came to light about Iranian intentions to acquire a nuclear bomb, Russia became more hesitant—at least in public—about its support. Iranian nuclear engineers continue to train in Russia, but under tighter protocols.45
Still, it’s important not to miss the forest for the trees here. By the time Russia began scaling back its support of Iran, it had already transferred significant quantities of information to Tehran. The ongoing work at Bushehr proceeds under the older contracts, and the Iranians have accumulated enough expertise to carry it on for years. Moscow trained hundreds of nuclear scientists to operate the plant, despite the urging of the U.S. and other Western nations to abandon the project. Hundreds of Iranians have been trained in Russia.46 The Russian nuclear-energy firm Rosatom operates the Bushehr plant today, supplies all fuel from Russian sources, and recovers all spent fuel, which is processed and disposed of in Russia.47 The Russians have no intention of walking away from Bushehr. If anything, they will expand their presence: Rosatom suggested in May 2012 that it would consider Iran’s request to help construct a second reactor there. In April 2014, Iran announced that it has signed a protocol with Russia to start construction of the second reactor.48
Just as China’s scolding of North Korea by no means suggests a fundamental shift of policy, Russia’s role in brokering the Iranian nuclear accords should not be read as a serious rupture in the Russia-Iran nuclear alliance, which has endured many bumps in the road. Perhaps the low point came in 2010, when, under President Dmitri Medvedev, the Russians voted for another round of UN sanctions against Iran. But as noted earlier, those sanctions were weak and watered-down at Russian insistence.49 And even this agreement came only with enticements from the U.S., including the lifting of bans on Russian arms exports and an agreement not to block sales of Russian arms to Iran.
The 2010 sanctions, along with the Russians’ agreement not to sell Iran the SS-20 missile-defense system, represented the high-water mark for the U.S.-Russian “reset.” Since then, and especially since Vladimir Putin retook presidential power in 2011, the Russians have resumed their strong support for Iranian nuclear and military procurement while making only occasional complaints. In January 2011, the Russians did voice disapproval over reports that the Iranians were enriching uranium at Qum. The foreign ministry said that Iran was “continuing to ignore the international community’s demands on dispelling concerns about its nuclear activities.”50
But these toothless public statements cost the Russians nothing, and they generally do nothing to interfere with Iranian nuclear pursuits. The Russians can gesture toward international cooperation on Iran, as they have recently, but as we’ve noted above, the accords do not necessarily mean that Iran’s nuclear program will be diminished—let alone destroyed—by the new rules and regulations. It follows that Russia’s real attitude is well summarized by Yevgeny Satanovsky, president of the Moscow-based Middle East Institute. The Russians are frustrated, he says, because their cooperation with various Western initiatives in the past produced nothing positive, from Moscow’s perspective. “The West has no credibility here anymore,” he writes. “The view is that Russia must chart its own course based on its own interests; if we don’t look out for ourselves, who will?”51 Indeed, after the Russians repossessed Crimea in early 2014, and the Americans levied sanctions in response and then expanded their scope, Moscow made clear that it would look out for itself. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned that if the West didn’t back off, the Russians would link their cooperation on Iran negotiations with the Ukraine situation. “If they force us into that,” Ryabkov said of Western officials, “we will take retaliatory measures.”52
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“China will not hesitate to protect Iran, even with a third World War,” said Chinese Major General Zhang Zhaozhong in 2011.53 The general’s stunning statement came during the same month that China provided Iran with the most advanced intercontinental ballistic missiles the nation had ever obtained, along with the technical expertise needed to operate them.54 Where most American observers tend to think of Russia as more closely aligned with Tehran, they can no longer overlook the substantial and growing Chinese-Iranian alliance—particularly on military and economic matters.
According to Gordon Chang, Chinese companies have violated international treaties and UN rules by selling equipment and materials to Iranian companies. Indeed, Beijing regularly exploits its dual role as Iranian benefactor and permanent member of the UN Security Council. Since 1991, China has sold more than $2.2 billion of arms to Iran.55 China’s exports to Iran include fighter jets, main battle tanks, and naval vessels, as well as roadside bombs, landmines, air-defense systems, and armored personnel carriers.56
The most disturbing interchange involves nuclear materials. China remains Iran’s top source of nuclear and missile technology.57 Chang traces the trade back to 1974, when China began helping Pakistan develop an atomic weapon as a hedge against Indian nuclear ambitions. Chang believes that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan sold China’s nuclear technology to rogue states—including Iran and North Korea—almost certainly with Beijing’s knowledge. Indeed, a North Korean engineering team took up residence at Khan’s lab and stayed for years, with the approval and assistance of senior Pakistani military and political leadership. And an Iranian team of scientists, returning from a visit to Beijing, paid a visit to Khan’s lab in 1995, which strongly suggests Chinese involvement in facilitating personal contacts between Pakistan and its customers. Moreover, Chinese companies played a leading role in Pakistan’s development of the P2 centrifuge, the core mechanism of enrichment technology in Iran and North Korea.
In 2012, Ahmadinejad, then the president of Iran, attended the SCO summit, where Iran has observer status, to emphasize economic and strategic ties and to appeal for political support as Iran dealt with pressure from the U.S. and the West over its nuclear ambitions.58 Ahmadinejad found a receptive audience. Much like Russia, China sees an anti-U.S., potentially nuclear-armed Iran as strategically useful in balancing American regional ambitions in the Middle East.59 As with Russia, China’s role in the P5+1 negotiations over the Iranian nuclear deal amounts to less than meets the eye.
China’s support for Tehran goes well beyond the nuclear issue. China’s main rationale for supporting Tehran, even more than political self-interest, is economic self-interest. For China, energy security is paramount, and energy has become the foundation of Chinese-Iranian relations. In 2011, China was the largest importer of Iranian crude oil, taking in 543,000 barrels per day.60 The oil connection is particularly vital: The Iranians have enough oil to remain a key China supplier for years to come. Meanwhile, due to its limited oil-refining capacity, Iran is also heavily dependent on China for refined oil and gasoline imports. China has proved loyal, making up sanction-induced shortfalls in Iranian gasoline imports. For instance, in the summer of 2010, when the U.S. and EU sanctions lashed Iranian gasoline imports, China upped its gasoline sales to Iran, providing the regime with half of its gasoline imports for July—approximately 45,000 barrels per day.61
In recent years, China has become Iran’s largest trading partner.62 Between 2001 and 2010, Chinese exports to Iran grew almost sixteen-fold, to $12.2 billion, while Iranian exports to China in 2010 totaled $16.5 billion.63 China has also ramped up its economic investments in Iran. About 70 Chinese companies now operate in the country. As of 2010, China was financing $1 billion worth of city-improvement projects in Tehran, including the expansion of its subway and highway system.64
The Chinese economic powerhouse has proved vital to Iran’s survival as the West’s crippling sanctions—which include expelling Iran from the global banking network—have pushed the regime to what some see as an impending breaking point. Iranian oil sales, which account for 80 percent of the government’s revenue, have been cut in half by the sanctions. Since the sanctions permit Iran to use its oil-sales revenue to buy products only from those nations to which it sells, a flood of cheap Chinese products has inundated the country.65 Without those cheap products, Iranian consumers would doubtless be struggling even more. At the same time, the situation plays right into China’s hands, increasing Beijing’s political influence and economic power within Iran.