The Russia-China Axis. Douglas E. Schoen
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while leaving our allies puzzled, angry, and vulnerable.
EMBOLDENED ADVERSARIES, WEAKENED ALLIES
When red lines are crossed in Syria, when Libya deteriorates, when Crimea is taken effortlessly in the face of clear U.S. treaty obligations, our allies around the world lose confidence and faith in our policies, in our commitments, and in us. The evidence is everywhere.
We are losing what allies we had in the Middle East. Consider: Saudi Arabia, one of America’s key partners in the region, was elected to a seat on the UN Security Council in 2013—and declined to accept it. The Saudis cited the inability of the UN to put a stop to Iran’s nuclear program and blamed the UN for allowing Syria “to kill its own people with chemical weapons . . . without confronting it or imposing any deterrent sanctions.”55 When our own allies have no faith in international security mechanisms such as the UNSC, it signals a crisis of confidence in the international system, the system so long backed by the confidence and authority of the United States.
We have no relationship to speak of with Egypt, for generations a staunch American ally. That country is in undeniably worse shape than before the revolution that ousted Hosni Mubarak. New Egyptian president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is no friend of the United States; in fact, he has a strong and deepening relationship with Putin. Egypt is planning to buy Russia’s cutting-edge MiG-35 fighter jet, and the two countries have agreed to hold joint military exercises. Russia is engaging in “arms-supply diplomacy” across the Middle East in an effort to take advantage of the power vacuum left by America’s pullback from the region.56
Another formerly close American ally, Turkey, has been blaming Washington for months for its domestic unrest. Under the increasingly autocratic leadership of Recep Erdogan, Turkey is moving away from the United States. Erdogan even filed an extradition request for Fethullah Gulen, a political rival living in Pennsylvania. Erdogan knows that America will deny this request, but the rebuff will set the stage for Erdogan to take advantage of rising anti-Americanism as he goes into upcoming presidential elections.57 Like other Middle Eastern leaders, Erdogan has calculated that siding with America may no longer be a winning strategy.
In Afghanistan, where America spent an unfathomable sum in blood and treasure to defeat the Taliban, the current government is eager to distance itself from America’s faltering global leadership. This past March, Hamid Karzai, who owes his presidency to America’s efforts to promote democracy in that country, endorsed Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.58 Brazenly, Karzai chose to announce his position at a meeting with an American congressional delegation.59
Even Iraq, the country that America sought to remake, at enormous human, financial, and political cost to ourselves, is moving away from the U.S.—and toward a closer strategic alliance with Iran. The two countries concluded a sale of arms worth roughly $200 million in February 2014, the latest sign of a deepening relationship between the two majority-Shiite countries. Iraq might even be permitting Iranian shipments of weapons to Syria, directly undermining American efforts to support moderate anti-Assad rebels.60 (Of course, all bets are off if ISIS, made up of Sunni rebels and al-Qaeda fighters, continues its gains and winds up toppling the Maliki government. That will present different problems, perhaps even worse ones, for the U.S.)
Indeed, the carnage in Syria continues unabated, and the international community is powerless to put a stop to it. The United States, devoted to staying out, is not exerting meaningful leadership to sway an outcome. The Syrian conflict has become a proxy for Iranian power, as Tehran has recruited and paid impoverished Shiite Afghanis to fight for Assad.61 The Syrians have violated the chemical-weapons accord numerous times, including by using chlorine against rebels and civilians. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said publicly that the United States, Britain, and France were wrong to call off airstrikes against Assad in August 2013. Fabius says that he has evidence that Syria has used chemical weapons 14 times since September 2013. Damascus has missed the deadlines for disgorging the chemical weapons it still possesses, and it may be hiding other stockpiles.62
We have offered no credible threat that would curtail the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea and Iran. China continues to defend and support the murderous regime in Pyongyang, whose sickening crimes against its own citizens were detailed in a chilling United Nations report in February 2014.63 North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and threatens to provoke a nuclear arms race in East Asia.64
Our highly touted nuclear accord with Iran now appears all but certain to fail, as the terms of the deal leave Iran far too much leeway for uranium enrichment and will allow the Iranians to keep inspectors from visiting sites such as Parchin, where it is believed they are researching detonators that would convert nuclear fuel into nuclear bombs.65 The West’s deal-making has been not just incompetent, but destructive: In the process of making these craven attempts to put a good face on the Iranian situation, we have managed to alienate Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. Abandoned hope for any Israeli–Palestinian peace deal is another price paid for our misadventures.
We’re not doing much better reassuring our Asian allies, all of whom have felt the brunt, one way or another, of Chinese assertiveness. Obama’s April 2014 Asian tour was meant to placate Japan and the Philippines, but he was subdued in his assurances, lest he offend Beijing. “President Obama obviously wants to avoid any appearances that this is part of a new Cold War with China,” said Mark Thompson, director of the Southeast Asia Research Centre at City University of Hong Kong. “But this is a tricky balancing act because this is increasingly how the U.S.’s traditional allies that he is visiting are viewing things.”66 Thus the Philippines welcomed an agreement that would allow base access to American warships, planes, and troops for the first time since 1992, when the U.S. gave up its bases on the archipelago. But even this is hardly a warm embrace: We’re using Philippine bases, not reopening our own. The message seems to be, “We do need you, but only on our terms.” The Americans were quick to say that the decision had nothing to do with China, but most observers saw through that disclaimer.
Perhaps the most anxious Asian ally is Japan, which has found itself increasingly in Chinese crosshairs—and worried about whether Washington will really be there if trouble breaks out. In a press conference with Obama, Prime Minister Abe was less than enthusiastic about the alliance. Abe said: “We want to make this a peaceful region which values laws, and in doing this, strengthening of our bilateral alliance is extremely important. On this point, I fully trust President Obama.”67 But Abe has rapidly built up Japan’s military, seeking to “make Japan a more equal partner with the U.S. in policing Asia”—hardly a sign of confidence in America’s ability to keep the peace.68 He is also building a web of security and defense relationships with other Asian states, independent of U.S.-led initiatives, because he lacks faith in America’s willingness to use its alliances against China.
Most worryingly of all, Abe is reaching out not only to countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam but also to Russia. Looking at the China-Russia gas deal as a model, members of Abe’s party are pushing for a $6 billion pipeline that would supply Japan with Russian gas. The new pipeline would make Japan dependent on Russia for nearly a fifth of its annual supply.69 Putin will probably travel to Russia in the fall of 2014, and Abe hopes that the two countries can sign a peace deal that would normalize relations for the first time since World War II.70 If the deal comes off, it would mark a potentially tectonic shift in the Pacific power balance.
Finally, in Europe, uneasiness about American commitments is rampant. Obama’s humiliation on Syria has left European leaders wondering if he has a bottom line on anything, and our key allies increasingly doubt the strength and future of the NATO alliance—as their reaction to the crisis in Ukraine shows. The British refuse to go along with sanctions against Putin, looking to “protect the City of London’s hold on dirty Russian money.”71 The German business establishment is more interested in protecting billions in trade and energy business with Moscow than in saving Ukraine. And perhaps most notoriously, the French are dismissing American concerns about their plans to go forward with sale of Mistral-class warships to Russia. For France, the decision makes good economic sense for its struggling shipbuilding industry, but the