Observations on the Disturbances in the Madras Army in 1809. John Malcolm
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to my own character demands that I should give a narrative (accompanied by an Appendix of original documents), which will show, in a clear and concise manner, the part I took, and the advice I gave, throughout the whole of those unhappy and guilty proceedings which have lately afflicted our country in India. To render this narrative intelligible to all, I shall prefix a general view of the principal acts of the Government of Fort St. George, from the commencement to the termination of the late violent agitations on the coast. My object in this publication is to vindicate myself, not to attack others. A plain statement of indisputable facts will show, that though my judgment might on some occasions have been wrong, I was invariably actuated by an indefatigable zeal, and an undeviating principle of public duty; that I predicted at the commencement, and at different stages of the proceeding, every event of importance that occurred; that if any one of the many slighted suggestions which I offered had met with attention, the most serious evils would have been averted; and that my efforts were such as ought to have entitled me to the praise and gratitude of those by whom I now find my conduct misrepresented and my character calumniated.
Sir George Barlow has, I observe, from the volume of papers printed by order of the House of Commons, placed upon record a number of my private and confidential communications. This I did not anticipate; and these letters were written in a less guarded style, and with more warmth, than they would have been, if I had foreseen the public use to be made of them. I do not, however, conceive that I have any right to complain of this act: the letters contain not one sentiment of which I am ashamed: they were all on public subjects: and that alone, when they were addressed to Sir George Barlow or his Secretary, rendered them public. But I must claim to myself an equal privilege in bringing forward such private documents as are necessary to prove what I have stated, and to defend myself from those imputations which have been thrown upon my character from a partial, and, I trust I shall prove, a most unfair statement of my conduct when employed at Masulipatam.
I should feel unworthy of that station which I hope I hold in life, if any motive upon earth had such power over my mind as to make me silent under reflections (which I deemed unjust) upon my conduct: and where those have been, from any cause, (however unforeseen,) brought before the public, my reply must of course be submitted to the same tribunal. This is a circumstance which I by no means regret. Publications in England on the affairs of India have been rare, except on some extraordinary epochs, when attention has been forcibly drawn to that quarter; and a groundless alarm has been spread of the mischiefs which (many conceive) must arise from such free disclosure, and consequent full discussion, of the acts of the Indian Governments. This practice, in my opinion, will have a direct contrary effect. It must always do great and essential good. The nature of our possessions in India makes it necessary that almost absolute power should be given to those entrusted with governments in that quarter; and there cannot be a better or more efficient check over these rulers than that which must be established by the full publicity given to their acts, and the frequent discussion of all their principles of rule. Such a practice will expose imprudence and weakness, however defended by the adherence of powerful friends in England: and it will be more certain to prevent oppression, or injustice, than the general provisions of law, which may be evaded; or the check of superiors, who may, from conceiving the cause of an individual identified with that of authority itself, feel themselves condemned to support proceedings which they cannot approve. This practice, in short, (restrained, as it always must be, by the laws of our country within moderate bounds,) must have the most salutary effects. Its inconveniences are obvious, but trifling when compared to the great and permanent benefits which it must produce: and I am confident that every effort made to repress such discussion is not merely a sacrifice to personal feeling, and to momentary expedience, of one of the best and most operative principles of the British Constitution; but a direct approximation to the principles of that oriental tyranny, which it is, or ought to be, our chief boast to have destroyed.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] I was, at the moment this letter was written, at Madras, preparing to proceed on a mission to Persia: not a word even of dissatisfaction at my conduct was expressed—no explanation of any of my acts required; and, consequently, no opportunity afforded of defending myself against the serious charges that were thus secretly transmitted to England. The letter to the Secret Committee is dated the 10th September, 1809, the day before that on which Lord Minto arrived at Madras.
PART I.
OBSERVATIONS
ON
THE CAUSES AND PROGRESS
OF THE
DISTURBANCES IN THE MADRAS ARMY
OBSERVATIONS, &c.
Some agitation, though of a trifling nature, had prevailed among the Company's officers on the coast establishment from a period as far back as the publication of the Regulations of the year 1796, which they conceived to entitle them to a complete equalization of allowances with the officers of the Bengal establishment. These feelings had little time for operation in the course of that active and brilliant service in which the Madras army was employed during the administration of Lord Wellesley. The increase of establishment rendered necessary to preserve the great accession of territory acquired by that nobleman, occasioned a promotion, that, for a period, silenced their discontent; but that spirit was revived in the year 1805 and 1806, when, in addition to their former grievance, they conceived that there was an evident and injurious partiality shown towards his Majesty's officers, who were said to be promoted to commands and staff situations to the injury of the officers of the Company's service. Addresses to Government and to the Court of Directors were at this period agitated and in circulation; but none, to my knowledge, were brought forward; owing, perhaps, to the orders from the Honourable the Court of Directors, who, it would appear, had, on private representation, adopted some measures to redress those grievances of which the army at that moment complained. This spirit of discontent might have died of itself; or, at all events, it would have been more easily repressed, had not the flame of discord burst out in a higher quarter. The quarrel which occurred between the Governor, Sir George Barlow, and the Commander-in-Chief, General McDowall, may, no doubt, (as it led to those measures which Government adopted towards the general staff of the coast army,) be deemed the remote source of all the violent and indefensible acts of the army, and in that view merits a short notice. The mind of General McDowall was much irritated at his not being appointed to council; and he gave way, in consequence, to a language of complaint and discontent, of which, it must be concluded, he could never have calculated the effect. Every act of Government that affected the wishes or interests of either an individual or a class of officers naturally caused complaints, which the Commander-in-Chief certainly did not discourage. He must have thought that the influence and importance of a seat in council would have enabled him more easily to have satisfied or silenced their murmurs; and he cannot be supposed to have felt much sorrow that Government should have experienced the inconvenience of an exclusion which he considered as so great a personal grievance: and when his mind was further irritated by what he deemed to be slight and neglect, on the part of Sir George Barlow, of his rights in his military character of Commander-in-Chief, these feelings had probably a wider action. In the temper which I have shown the coast army was in at this moment, it is not surprising, when they saw such an example of discontent, and felt unrepressed by that high authority which was immediately over them, that they should have been more bold, and that their violence should have taken a more formidable shape towards Government, against which this spirit was, by the proceeding of the Commander-in-Chief, very unadvisedly and inconsiderately, however unintentionally, directed. But if a want of reflection on one part (few