Talmud. Various Authors
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to one is within the limits of the other, they may meet and take their meals together in the centre of their joint space, provided that neither exceed his own limits by going into those of his neighbor. If there are three persons so situated and part of the four ells occupied by the middle one forms part of the space belonging to each of the other two, the one situated in the middle is at liberty to meet each of the others, or each of the others may meet him; but the two on each side of him must not meet each other. Said R. Simeon: What can this be compared to? Three courts opening into each other and also opening into public ground. If the two outer courts have combined in an Erub with the middle one, one is at liberty to carry things between the middle court and each of the outer ones, but between the two outer courts one must not carry or convey anything.
GEMARA: We have learned in a Boraitha: R. Jehudah said: It once happened that R. Tarphon while on the road was overtaken by dusk on the eve of Sabbath and stayed outside of the town over night. In the morning the cattle-herders met him and said: "Rabbi, the town is not far distant. Enter." So he entered the town, went into the college and lectured all day. Said R. Aqiba to R. Jehudah: Wouldst thou cite this as an example? Perhaps it had been the intention of R. Tarphon to enter the town previously (i.e., he was within two thousand ells of it) or the college was included with the legal limits allowed R. Tarphon.
"Such is the decree of R. Johanan ben Nouri." Rabba propounded a question: What is the intent of R. Johanan's decree? Does he hold that things having no particular owner, if situated at a certain place on the Sabbath, acquire the right to their resting-place (i.e., may be carried for a distance of two thousand ells in any direction)? And the Mishna should have commenced by citing an instance of this kind. Why does it give the instance of a man who had fallen asleep, whom the sages consider the same as a thing having no particular owner? In order to show the firmness of the sages, who, though agreeing that the man when awake, is entitled to two thousand ells in each direction, whence we might assume that he is entitled to the same privilege when asleep, we are told that such is not the case; or, in order to show that R. Johanan ben Nouri does not hold, that a thing having no particular owner acquires the right to be carried for a distance of two thousand ells in every direction, but that a man when asleep is entitled to this privilege, merely because he is entitled to it when awake.
Said R. Joseph: "Come and hear: We have learned that if rain had fallen on the eve of a festival, the rain-water acquires the right of (being carried) two thousand ells in every direction; but if rain had fallen on a biblical festival, the rain-water has the same right (of being carried for the same distance) as the inhabitants of the place where it had fallen (have the right of walking)." Now, if we say, that R. Johanan holds, that a thing having no particular owner, if situated at a certain place on Sabbath, acquires the right of (being carried) two thousand ells in every direction, then the Boraitha is in conformity with his opinion; but if we say, that he does not hold to that effect, according to whose opinion is the Boraitha, certainly not according to that of the sages?
Said R. Jacob bar Idi in the name of R. Jehoshua ben Levi: "The Halakha prevails according to R. Johanan ben Nouri." Said R. Zera to R. Jacob: "Didst thou hear R. Jehoshua himself declare this, or dost thou merely infer this from another ruling made by him?" And he answered: "I heard him declare it." What ruling could R. Zera have referred to, which R. Jehoshua ben Levi had made? The ruling made by R. Jehoshua ben Levi elsewhere, that the Halakha always prevails according to the Tana, who makes the laws regarding Erubin more lenient. Why was it necessary for R. Jehoshua to make both statements? Said R. Zera: It was necessary; for had he said merely, that the Halakha prevails according to R. Johanan ben Nouri, we might assume that it always prevails thus, whether it be more lenient or more rigorous than another; hence we are told, that the Halakha prevails according to the one who is the more lenient regarding the laws of Erubin.
Let him say then, that the Halakha prevails according to the one who is the more lenient with the laws of Erubin, and that will cover the case of R. Johanan who is more lenient. Nay; it was also necessary to make the statement regarding R. Johanan exclusively; because it might be assumed that the Halakha prevails according to the more lenient interpretation where one opinion is opposed by the opinion of another individual, or where the opinion of a number (of sages) is opposed by the opinion of another number (of sages), but if the opinion of one is opposed by that of a number, the latter opinion prevails whether it be lenient or rigorous; hence we are told that the opinion of R. Johanan ben Nouri prevailed although opposed by a number of sages, and from this the rule is adduced that as far as the laws of Erubin are concerned the more lenient Halakha prevails even if the opinion of one is opposed by a number (of sages).
R. Papa, however, said: "Both statements made by R. Jehoshua ben Levi are necessary, because, had he simply stated, that the Halakha of the more lenient Tana only prevails, we might have assumed that he referred only to Erubin of courts and not to Erubin of legal limits; therefore he also stated the case of R. Johanan ben Nouri in order to demonstrate that he referred also to Erubin of legal limits."
R. Ashi said: "Both statements made by R. Jehoshua ben Levi are necessary because, had he only made the statement concerning the Halakha of the more lenient Tana, it might have been assumed that he referred to an Erub that had been made for a number of Sabbaths and had gradually dwindled, but not to such Erubin as had been made afresh; hence he also made the statement concerning R. Johanan ben Nouri in order to emphasize the fact that the more lenient Halakhoth prevail even in the instances of newly made Erubin." 1
R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa both said: "In all instances where R. Aqiba differs with an individual the Halakha prevails according to R. Aqiba. In all instances where R. Jose differs even with a number of sages the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, and in all instances where Rabbi differs with an individual, the Halakha prevails according to Rabbi." For what purpose is this statement made? Shall we act accordingly or is this merely a vague statement? R. Assi said: "Yea; we must act accordingly. Where R. Aqiba differs with an individual we must act in accordance with R. Aqiba's opinion; where R. Jose differs with a number of sages we must act in conformity with R. Jose's opinion." R. Hyya bar Abba, however, said: R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa, did not mean to establish the rule, that the Halakha prevails according to the opinions of R. Aqiba, R. Jose and Rabbi, but that they should be given preference wherever possible over their opponents (i.e., if, for instance, a man asks concerning a decree of R. Jose, it may be declared valid, but it should not be taught as a rule in the colleges that when a number of sages decide against R. Jose the Halakha nevertheless prevails according to his opinion). R. Jose bar R. Hanina, however, said: (Not even this should be done.) R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa, merely assert, that it seems to them that the Halakhas should prevail as stated, but not that this should be maintained as a general rule (and if one inclined to their opinion, he cannot be accounted wrong).
In the same manner as there is a divergence of opinions concerning the statement of R. Jacob and R. Zreiqa, so is there also a dispute concerning the following statement of R. Jacob bar Idi in the name of R. Johanan: In all instances where R. Meir and R. Jehudah differ, the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehudah, wherever R. Jehudah and R. Jose differ the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, and so much more when R. Meir and R. Jose differ the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, for if R. Jehudah is given preference over R. Meir, and R. Jose over R. Jehudah, then certainly R. Jose has preference over R. Meir.
Said R. Assi: "From this I can infer, that where R. Jose and R. Simeon differ, the Halakha prevails according to R. Jose, for R. Abba said in the name of R. Johanan, that wherever R. Simeon and R. Jehudah differ, the opinion of R. Jehudah prevails." As a matter of course if R. Jehudah is given preference over R. Simeon, R. Jose is certainly more competent authority than R. Simeon.
The schoolmen propounded a question: "How is it, when R. Meir and R. Simeon differ?" This question is not decided. 1
R. Mesharshia said: All these rules are of no account (i.e., decisions should be made according to the dictates of one's own understanding); for Rabh never acted according to such rules. 2 R. Jehudah. said in the name of Samuel: "Things belonging to non-Israelites, if situated