Complete Works. Hamilton Alexander
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the young republic were many. Hardly secure in her new footing in the family of nations, her adjustment to the ways of her older sisters was slow and difficult. Some of this was due to the jealousy of the two great countries, from the control of one of which she had freed herself a few years previously, and some to the chagrin that that nation naturally felt in the apparent success of French influence. It is true that "a definitive treaty of peace and friendship between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America was signed at Paris, the 3d day of September, 1783, in the name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity," but this was apparently insufficient, and Great Britain had not only left much undone, but had continued, among other things, to infringe upon the rights of the emancipated colonists.
John Adams had been sent abroad, had signed the first treaty of peace, and later attempted fresh negotiations with England, but he was treated discourteously, though he did all in his power to conciliate the mother country. He returned, however, empty-handed, without having accomplished anything. England was not disposed to fulfil her obligations in paying us for the negroes she had carried away near the close of the Revolution, and in many ways was arrogant and unjust. The American jingoes had no warm welcome for Mr. Adams, and a historian of the time said, "after Mr. Adams' return from England he was implicated by a large portion of his countrymen as having relinquished the Republican system, and forgotten the principles of the American revolution which he had advocated for nearly twenty years."
From the overthrow of Louis XVI until 1800 and later, the United States not only suffered internal dissensions, but her relations with both England and France were of the most discouraging kind. Hamilton's energies were first directed to the establishment of a more perfect reconciliation with the people speaking our own tongue, and with established institutions of the kind best calculated to benefit his own country. indeed, our success and prosperity were, at an early period, attracting the attention and respect of Great Britain, and the first evidence of a tardy rapprochement was the arrival of George Hammond, who was sent as diplomatic agent to join in negotiations for a treaty. Hamilton's exertions were unremitting. He disregarded the aggression and the enemy that he and others had just defeated, for he recognized the advantages of harmonious relations with an important, rich, and powerful commercial nation. As early as 1790, both Hamilton and Adams showed that the trade regulations of Great Britain were more favorable to the United States than those of France, although the latter had been our ally.
Owing to Jefferson's sympathy with the French, and his dislike of England, Hamilton's efforts at conciliation and an orderly adaptation to new conditions were, with difficulty, carried on. A new and disturbing influence which made itself manifest about this time was the absolute change in our attitude toward France after her Revolution.
After the War of Independence America bought freely from England, but not from France, much to the disappointment of the latter. Then, again, the debt of the United States to France had been incurred at a time previous to the revolt and overthrow of the king, and it was seriously questioned, even by Hamilton himself, whether the obligation should not be repudiated so far as the new government, which he never willingly recognized, was concerned.
His sentiments are embodied in a paper hitherto unpublished which I cannot identify. It is a fragment, but was probably written at a time when great pressure was being brought by Jefferson, Paine, and others, to have the United States take up the cause of the French Republic, and establish an entente with France.
All this was and is seen, and the body of the people of America are too discerning to be long in the dark about it. Too wise to have been misled by foreign or domestic machinations, they adopted a constitution which was necessary to their safety and to their happiness. . . . Too wise to be ensnared by the same machinations, they will support the government they have established, and will take care of their own peace, in spite of the insidious efforts, which are making to detach them from the one and to disturb the other. . . .
The information, which the address of the Constitution contains, ought to serve as an instructive lesson to the people of this Country. It ought to teach us not to overrate foreign friendships. . . to be upon our guard against foreign attachments. The former will generally be found hollow and delusive; the latter have a natural tendency to lead us aside from our true interest and to make us the dupe of foreign influence.
Foreign influence is truly the Grecian horse to a republic. We cannot be too careful to exclude its entrance. Nor ought we to imagine that it can only make its approaches in the gross form of direct bribery. It is then most dangerous, when it comes under the patronage of our passions, under the auspices of national prejudice and partiality. . . .
I trust the morals of the country are yet too good to leave much to apprehend on the score of bribery. Careless condescentions, flattery, in unison with our prepossessions, are infinitely more to be feared; and as far as there is opportunity for corruption, it is to be remembered, that one foreign Power can employ this resource, as well as another, and that the effect must be much greater, where it is combined with the other means of influence, than where it stands alone.
The observations and facts contained in this paper, while they lead to the conclusions just drawn, serve also to demonstrate, that as far as the conduct of France towards us in our late revolution created a claim to our acknowledgement and friendship1 these dispositions were immediately due to the then sovereign of the country and could not justly have been withdrawn from him to be placed elsewhere.
Gratitude alone therefore would not have recommended our assisting the French Nation against him. . . . As far as that principle was allowed to have any operation; -- this, upon a just estimate, would have been the result; that we ought not to take part against the person on whose sole will the assistance we received had depended -- that we ought not to take part with him, against the nation whose blood and whose treasure had been the means in his hands of that assistance.
"But Louis the XVI was a Tyrant. By his perjuries and his crimes he forfeited his crown and his life, and with these his title to our esteem and sympathy. -- Besides -- he is now no more. . . whatever competition may have before existed ceased with his death. The claim to our gratitude has by this devolved exclusively upon the Nation."
That Louis was a Tyrant is contradicted too emphatically by the whole tenor of his life to be credited without better evidence than has yet been produced. That he was guilty of the crimes which were the pretexts of his death remains still to be proved to an impartial world. Against the presumption of his guilt, this strong argument, independent of other topics which might be urged, presents itself. . . . "If the Convention had possessed clear proofs of the guilt of Louis, they would have promulgated them to the world in an authentic and unquestionable shape: Respect for the opinion of mankind, regard for their own character, the interests of their cause made this an indispensable duty, and would have produced a correspondent effect, if the case had admitted or it -- The omission is a satisfactory indication that the means of doing it were not possessed; and that the melancholy catastrophe of Louis XVI was the result rather of a supposed political expediency than of real criminality."
In a case so circumstanced, does it consist even with our justice or humanity to participate in the angry and vindictive passions, which are endeavored to be excited against him?
Hamilton then goes on to question the propriety of extending the "refined and beneficient sentiment of gratitude" to the successors of the murdered king, and says:
Shall we not be more sure of violating no obligation of that sort, of not implicating the delicacy of our national character, by taking no part in the contest, than by throwing our weight into either scale?
But the cause of France is the cause of Liberty. 'Tis our own cause; and it is our first duty to countenance and promote it -- Whatever foundation there may be for this suggestion, it is entirely foreign to the question of gratitude -- It turns upon a principle wholly distinct. Gratitude has reference only to kind offices received. The obligation to and the cause of liberty has reference to the abstract intrinsic merits of that cause -- It is possible that the benefactor may be on one side -- the defenders and supporters of liberty on the other. Gratitude may point that way . . . the lover of liberty this. . . . There is a necessary distinction to be made.
How far the last mentioned consideration ought to operate with us will be hereafter