The Story of the Great War (Vol. 1-8). Various Authors
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Tribunal or to the great powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on March 18–31, 1909."
CHAPTER XXII
DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES
This reply from Serbia was not deemed satisfactory by Austria-Hungary and relations with Serbia were immediately broken off. On the following day, July 26, 1914, "diplomatic conversations," the object of which was to smooth over the differences between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, took place in Berlin, St. Petersburg and Vienna between representatives of the three nations whose capitals these were.
Austria-Hungary sent to the various governments the following "circular note" on July 27, 1914:
"The object of the Serbian note is to create the false impression that the Serbian Government is prepared in great measure to comply with our demands.
"As a matter of fact, however, Serbia's note is filled with the spirit of dishonesty, which clearly lets it be seen that the Serbian Government is not seriously determined to put an end to the culpable tolerance it hitherto has extended to intrigues against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.
"The Serbian note contains such far-reaching reservations and limitations not only regarding the general principles of our Action, but also in regard to the individual claims we have put forward, that the concessions actually made by Serbia become insignificant.
"In particular, our demand for the participation of the Austro-Hungarian authorities in investigations to detect accomplices in the conspiracy on Serbian territory has been rejected, while our request that measures be taken against that section of the Serbian press hostile to Austria-Hungary has been declined, and our wish that the Serbian Government take the necessary measures to prevent the dissolved Austrophobe associations continuing their activity under another name and under another form has not even been considered.
"Since the claims in the Austro-Hungarian note of July 23, regard being had to the attitude hitherto adopted by Serbia, represent the minimum of what is necessary for the establishment of permanent peace with the southeastern monarchy, the Serbian answer must be regarded as unsatisfactory.
"That the Serbian Government itself is conscious that its note is not acceptable to us is proved by the circumstances that it proposes at the end of the note to submit the dispute to arbitration—an invitation which is thrown into its proper light by the fact that three hours before handing in the note, a few minutes before the expiration of the time limit, the mobilization of the Serbian army took place."
The Great powers were not willing to go to war without first trying mediation between the two kingdoms in southeastern Europe, and even Russia, which was known to be a potential ally of Serbia, showed a disposition to use diplomacy before force. When the demands made by Austria-Hungary in her note of July 25, 1914, became known in the Russian capital, the following note was immediately telegraphed to Vienna:
"The communication [the circular note quoted above] made by Austria-Hungary to the powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.
"In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Serbian reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.
"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Serbian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations."
A copy of this note was at the same time sent to London with the addenda: "M. Sazonoff (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs) hopes that his Britannic Majesty's Government will share the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna."
But on the same day, July 25, 1914, the Government at Vienna informed the powers that the note to Serbia was not an ultimatum; it was merely a démarche, and in it Austria had threatened to start military preparations, not operations. The requested delay, therefore, was not granted. That day was eventful in London, too, for the Foreign Office was notified by the German Ambassador that though Germany had not been apprised beforehand of the contents of Austria's note to Serbia, the German nation would nevertheless stand by its ally. "The German Ambassador read to me," said Sir Edward Grey in a telegram to the British Ambassador at Vienna, "a telegram from the German Foreign Office saying that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no more than other powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian note to Serbia, but that once she had launched the note, Austria could not draw back." Prince Lichnowsky (German Ambassador at London) said, however, that "if what I contemplated was mediation between Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to accept it." He expressed himself as personally favorable to this suggestion.
"I concurred in his observation, and said that I felt I had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but as soon as the question became one as between Austria and Russia, the peace of Europe was affected, in which we must all take a hand.
"I impressed upon the ambassador that, in the event of Russian and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be essential to any diplomatic peace. Alone we could do nothing. The German Government agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I thought it the right thing to act upon it."
On July 26, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at Berlin informed the German Government that he was instructed to state that any annexation by Austria-Hungary of Serbian territory would not be looked upon by Russia with indifference. The German Emperor, who had been away from Berlin, returned hastily to the capital. As the crisis approached the British Government once more attempted to have the matters in dispute settled by mediation. The following telegram was dispatched from Downing Street to the British Ambassadors at Paris and Rome: "London, Foreign Office, July 26, 1914. Would Minister of Foreign Affairs be disposed to instruct ambassador here to join with representatives of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself to meet here in conference immediately for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications? You should ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether he would do this. If so, when bringing the above suggestions to the notice of the Governments to which they are accredited, representatives of Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, could be authorized to request that all active military operations should be suspended pending results of the conference."
But this move had come too late. The British Ambassador to Berlin reported by telegraph to his Government on July 27, 1914, that the Imperial German Government considered that the proposed conference amounted practically to a court of arbitration and could not be called except at the behest of Austria-Hungary and Russia. The German Government therefore turned down the British proposal. But Germany was not for provoking a war; the German Ambassador at London informed the British Foreign Office that his Government was willing to accept in principle the mediation of the powers between Austria and Russia.
The question of whether the alliances between the various nations would hold under a strain now became pointed. The Russian Government informed the British Government on July 27, 1914, that the impression prevailed in Berlin and Vienna that England would stand aloof under any circumstances, differences between Russia and Austria notwithstanding. But on the same day Sir Edward Grey, British Minister for Foreign Affairs, dispelled these impressions in a telegram to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. "The impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet," it read in part, "which is concentrated, as