The Story of the Great War (Vol. 1-8). Various Authors
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that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter capital by the rumors of a naval entente between Russia and Great Britain, by the czar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavor in Germany.
"The Under-Secretary of State [Sir Arthur Nicholson] has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the dispatch of the ultimatum.
"The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see no way of arresting the course of events.
"However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the démarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey."
In a second letter M. Cambon reported receipt of the details of the Austrian ultimatum.
"In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the conflict.
"Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose to suggest that he should ask for the semiofficial intervention of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack."
M. Bienvenu-Martin informed the French Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome, and the Ministers at Stockholm and Belgrade of M. Cambon's report, and his (Bienvenu-Martin's) willingness to cooperate in the proposed conciliatory action at Vienna.
Belgium. M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg
"that the Government had under consideration an address to the powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality assuring them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war breaking out on her frontiers.
"The Government have come to the conclusion that such a communication would be premature at present, but that events might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian representatives abroad.
"In these circumstances I have proposed to the King [Albert] and to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.
"I inclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a communication necessary.
"I shall inform you by telegram when you are to act on these instructions.
"This telegram will be dispatched when the order is given for the mobilization of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution."
The note inclosed said that Belgium had "most scrupulously" observed the obligations of neutrality imposed on her by the treaties of April 19, 1839, and would "strive unflinchingly" to fulfill them whatever the new circumstances might be.
"The friendly feelings of the powers toward her have been so often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities break out upon her frontiers.
"All necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have been chosen to secure the defense of the country and the respect of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have been put in a state of defense. …
"These measures are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfill her international obligations; and it is obvious that they neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention of taking part in an armed struggle between the powers or from any feeling of distrust of any of those powers."
On the following day this notification was also sent to the Belgian Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.
SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1914
Austria-Hungary. Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed from Lembach to his Under-Secretary, Baron von Macchio, that Russia through Prince Koudacheff, its Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, was pressing for an extension of the time limit in the note to Serbia, and that he should tell the prince this would not be granted, but that, even after the severance of diplomatic relations, Serbia could have peace by complying unconditionally with Austria-Hungary's demands—in which case, however, she must pay the cost of Austro-Hungarian military measures.
Later, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Prince Koudacheff had based his request on the powers being taken by surprise in the demands on Serbia, and therefore that Russia should have time to consider the evidence in the case as presented in Austria-Hungary's dossier. These grounds, said Count Berchtold, rested on a mistaken hypothesis.
"Our note to the powers was in no way intended to invite them to make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the character of a statement for information, the communication of which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international courtesy. … We regarded our action as concerning us and Serbia alone."
Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, telegraphed Count Berchtold that the Serbian Cabinet on the evening of the 24th and morning of the 25th had been preparing its reply to the note, and would deliver it before the time limit expired; preparations were being made by the Serbian Government and army for removal into the interior; foreign legations expected to have to follow; the Russian Legation was already packing up; the Austro-Hungarian Legation were ready to leave Belgrade by the 6.30 p. m. train.
Count Berchtold notified Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, on the same day, that, in case of Russia reconsidering her position, and refusing to be swept away by the bellicose elements, he, with the support of his German colleague, Count Pourtalès, a close understanding with whom was presumed, should impress upon M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Austria-Hungary, in event of war with Russia, would not stand alone.
"That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during the last forty years, and by the historical fact that our gracious emperor has won for himself the glorious title of 'Protector of the Peace.'
"We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and national independence would prove to the advantage of our relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.
"Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would undermine our existence as a state and our position as a great power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe."
In a supplementary telegram Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry to explain that point five in the note to Serbia was interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and not to infringe on the sovereignty of Serbia.
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