A Constitution of the People and How to Achieve It. Aarif Abraham
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2017 (N=1493) and Britain (1990 (N=1484), 1999 (N= 994), 2008 (N=1561), 2018 (N=1794).25 WVS and EVS are used as they are the only dataset that collated time-series data cross-nationally on issues concerning political participation over a significant period of time. Given the lack of any other serious time-series data, and gaps in the datasets which exist, the analysis is supplemented by data obtained from other local studies where available and relevant.
The quantitative analysis forms the basis for the rest of the study. The quantitative data together with the case study on Bosnia’s institutional failure (Chapter 4) is necessary to form some of the assumptions about players’ substantive preferences and institutional structures in the rational choice analysis that follows (Chapter 5). These assumptions give empirical content to the theory and hence make it testable (Ganghof 2009). Rational choice models have explanatory power and predictive potential: in Bosnia they serve to elucidate why substantive proposals for constitutional reform are failing and suggest possible ways to break the reform impasse. The Bosnian case study allows a clearer comparison with constitutional reforms suggested for Britain. The game theory approach helps to explain complex political behaviour in a systematic way; why the behaviour of political actors is an optimal response to conditions of their political environment and the behaviour of others. Changing the context or institutions (the ‘rules of the game’) leads to changes in preferences and, therefore, outcomes. The models, therefore, provide theoretical clarity and strong explanatory power by eliminating chance or ad hoc explanations whilst acknowledging that the model is only an approximation of reality although a relatively good approximation (Tsebelis 1990, 40-47). They also explain why certain conditions and behaviour prevail, as equilibria, in a State such as Bosnia. The veto player approach, in particular, can integrate a number of approaches to institutional analyses by focusing on actors within institutions that actually matter—those that can set, alter and veto legislation (Tsebelis 1999; 2002; Ganghof 2009; Hallerberg 2010, 21).
The game theory and veto player approaches are used to model the game played by the elites in the parliamentary arena in Bosnia. The preferences of elites, however, are influenced in another important space: the electoral arena where interaction with the people (or the electorate) can alter preferences and, therefore, outcomes. The objective of the study is not to discuss the shortcomings and benefits of various institutional structures generally for Bosnia but to compare all of these structures consistently with respect to one particular objective (Tsebelis 1995): the capacity for meaningful constitutional change.
Given that the use of such models has been neglected in the study of Bosnia’s political paralysis, this book aims to add to existing work by identifying the precise causes of failure in the institutional structures in Bosnia inhibiting meaningful constitutional reform and civic participation in politics. That would go some way to creating a Bosnia based on individual rights and equality rather than the presumed collective equality of ethnic groups. For Britain, this book seeks to draw together disparate thinking on suggestions for constitutional reform and attempts to reconcile competing models. The analytical models deployed allow a pathway out of constitutional paralysis, contestation and crises. Practical proposals are provided as to how States can enjoy higher civic participation in politics, fairer bargains between groups and increased democratic legitimacy. Britain and Bosnia may benefit, but so might others. ۞
| “And when we saw this script we’d never seen before In front of our very eyes from far-off times of yore A long silence Fell between Us | And half Amazed |
| This stillness was broken by a voice that was calm but outspoken – No scribe wrote this text for sure It looks like someone Was trying to Draw | Look it’s a secret text from the darkest days of old Rising it seems from the depths of our murkiest Dreams Its signs are like writing Seen in a mirror— Mutters A mouth Calm and Cold |
| And then a second says racking his brains— Look at the right that might be where it begins And it’s merrily flowing leftwards Widdershins Who was such writing Written for | The fifth with clenched fists and trembling fingers tries to hold This mirror of clear redeeming grace But it slips To the Floor |
| Those who insist on reading from right to left Are wrong all along— A third one says half crazed | For in it that instant he recognises His own Ancient Forgotten Face.” |
—Mak Dizdar, The Stone Sleeper 26
1 An extract of a poem called “BBBB” by Mak Dizdar [1917-1971] (2009, 50).
2 These, possibly apocryphal, remarks were widely reported to have been made by the Queen at a lecture being delivered by Prof. Peter Hennessy at Queen Mary College, London. See further, Hennessy’s (1995) own account of the event. Bogdanor (2009) gives an account of another incident. The Queen attended an event at University College London where she came upon a book called The Changing Constitution, edited by Prof. Jeffrey Jowell. She reportedly said to Jowell, who was standing nearby, “Changing, Professor Jowell, what changes? I haven't noticed any changes!” Jowell replied, “Well, evolving, Ma’am, evolving.” She responded, “Yes, but in what direction?”
3 Bosnia and Herzegovina is referred to throughout as “Bosnia”.
4 The State constitution was agreed as Annex IV of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled at Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. It is referred to throughout as the “Bosnian constitution”.
5 Richard Holbrooke, the principal negotiator of the Agreement, maintains that “on paper, Dayton was a good agreement; it ended the war and established a single, multi-ethnic country.” His caveat is that “the results of the international effort to implement Dayton would determine its true place in history.”
6 There is also the self-governing district of Brčko in the North of Bosnia which is under international supervision.
7 There have been three substantial reform processes since 2005 all of which have failed as a result of intransigent, ethno-nationalist positions taken by the elected representatives. There have also been two missives for reform that are very significant. These are all addressed in Chapter 4.
8 The constitution contravenes international law in a number of ways. For instance, only members of the three main ethnic groups are allowed to run for the office of president; members of the country's many minorities, such as Roma and Jews, are excluded as candidates. Also, individual rights are subservient to ethno-national group rights which permit vetoes, quotas, and exclusive ethno-national representation to the elected representatives of the groups.
9 Approximately 613.22 million USD in 2019 (PIC 2020).
10 The comparison